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INTRODUCTION
Despite all of the attention that has been paid to federalism
recently, the states themselves remain something of a constitu-
tional enigma. The Founders did not provide any express definition
of statehood.1 The Constitution contemplates the existence of the
states, indicates the Founders' expectation that states would form
separate governments, and grants states certain participatory
rights; but it is otherwise mostly silent as to the status of states
under the constitutional plan.2 Courts and commentators have
invoked a variety of symbols or metaphors to represent and support
statehood. States thus have been likened to such disparate things
as corporations, agents, trustees, laboratories, communities, and
even nations.' Efforts to defend or justify the states and state
sovereignty typically stress that states enhance competition, serve
local interests, and ultimately, protect individual liberties by
dividing sovereign authority.4
States have endured, to be sure, but their significance and utility
have been sharply challenged.5 Federal power and supremacy long
ago eclipsed state power, no matter what barometer one consults.6
1. See Michael B. Rappaport, Reconciling Textualism and Federalism: The Proper
Textual Basis of the Supreme Court's Tenth and Eleventh Amendment Decisions, 93 NW. U.
L. REV. 819, 830-38 (1999) (discussing the original meaning and early interpretations of
"state").
2. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 ("The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections
for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature
thereof...."); U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 ("The Senators and Representatives before mentioned,
and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers,
both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation,
to support this Constitution...."); see also U.S. CONST. amend. X (granting states residuary
powers).
3. See infra notes 53-57, 71-72 and accompanying text.
4. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (describing normative bases for
federalism).
5. See Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes On a National
Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 919-20 (1994) (questioning whether federalism, as opposed
to mere decentralization, serves any real purpose).
6. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 159 (1992) ("As the Federal
Government's willingness to exercise power within the confines of the Constitution has
grown, the authority of the States has correspondingly diminished...."); id. (noting that the
Supremacy Clause gives the federal government a substantial advantage in exercising
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Whatever the import of the Tenth Amendment, which plainly
provides for state residuary power but whose meaning nevertheless
seems perpetually in flux, federal supremacy is the order of the day.
Despite this reality, or more likely because of it, "states' rights"
has experienced a renaissance in our constitutional scheme and in
our public discourse regarding federalism. Historically, in both
constitutional and political debates, "states' rights" has been
utilized mostly as a convenient shorthand for the concept that
federal power is limited in scope.7 Secessionists, nullifiers, and
segregationists, for example, argued that slavery, federal tariffs,
and central control of local education, respectively, were not within
the Founders' vision of Congress's enumerated powers.' Beyond
its constitutional meaning, "states' rights" has generally been
invoked opportunistically, as a political sound-bite or rhetorical
catchphrase s The current political climate is no exception, as the
Republican Party, the one that touts limited federal power, is
currently defending itself against charges by the Democratic Party,
the one generally associated with "big government," that major
Bush education reforms and Republican opposition to gay marriage
violate "states' rights." 0
This latter invocation of "states' rights" may be dismissed as
mere political rhetoric and grandstanding. The champions of
"states' rights," however, are not only politicians and other political
opportunists eager for a federalist sound bite. "States' rights" has
taken hold among rather more respectable sorts, namely judges,
including a majority of the Justices of the Supreme Court, and some
power).
7. On the history of states' rights, see generally FORREST MCDONALD, STATES' RIGHTS
AND THE UNION: IMPERIUM IN IMPERIO, 1776-1876 (2000).
8. On the connection between "states' rights" and racism, see WILLIAM H. RIKER,
FEDERALISM: ORIGIN OPERATION SIGNIFICANCE 142-45 (1964).
9. See generally MCDONALD, supra note 7 (discussing the history of states' rights
constitutional controversies); see also David Broyles, Federalism and Political Life, in SAVING
THE REVOLUTION: THE FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE AMERICAN FOUNDING 80-82 (Charles R.
Kessler ed., 1987) (discussing appropriation of states' rights arguments by political factions).
10. See Sam Dillon, Utah House Rebukes Bush with Its Vote on School Law, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 11, 2004, at A16 (noting that the vote to prohibit state authorities to spend local money
to comply with the No Child Left Behind Law "comes after weeks of criticism by lawmakers
arguing that the federal education measure impinges on the state's right to set its own
education agenda").
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scholars.'1 The language of "states' rights" is everywhere. Indeed,
today it seems that almost any act that implicates state authority
is a "states' rights" issue. Florida's recently upheld ban on adoption
by "practicing homosexuals," for example, was characterized by the
court as a "states' rights issue," the implication being that the state
has parental "rights" with respect to putative adoptee children
within its jurisdiction.' 2 Other recent court opinions have stressed
that states have the "right" to, for example, structure their own
court systems, 3 provide state constitutional protections that go
beyond the guarantees of the Federal Constitution, 4 and provide
compensation for personal injuries. 5
As even these few examples demonstrate, "states' rights" is an
extraordinarily malleable and often misunderstood concept. In
order to better understand the implications of "states' rights," we
need to be much clearer about what it means for states to have
rights in the constitutional sense. We can speak about "states'
rights" in three separate senses. The first and most common sense
is something of a misnomer, for, as stated, "states' rights" has
historically connoted the fundamental constitutional principle of
enumerated and limited federal powers. Within their separate
spheres, this argument holds, the state and central governments
11. See, e.g., Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S.
627, 664 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that "this Court once again demonstrates
itself to be the champion of States' rights"); Lynn A- Baker & Ernest A. Young, Essay,
Federalism and the Double Standard of Judicial Review, 51 DuxE L.J. 75 (2001) (arguing
that courts should not subject federalism, or "states' rights," to a "double standard" ofjudicial
review); John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311, 1313
(1997) (arguing that historical record does not indicate that federalism was to "receive
second-class status before the courts").
12. Lofton v. Sec'y of Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 806 (11th Cir.
2004).
13. See Chair King, Inc. v. GTE Mobilnet of Houston, Inc., No. 14-00-00711-CV, 2004 WL
162938, at *6 (Tex. App. Jan. 29, 2004) (concluding that federal law "simply acknowledges
the states' rights to structure their court systems and apply neutral state-court procedural
rules").
14. See State v. Wicklund, No. 96 042987, 1997 WL 426209, at *6 n.23 (Minn. Dist. Ct.
July 24, 1997) ("This is what 'states's rights' properly means."), rev'd, 576 N.W.2d 753 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1998), affd, 589 N.W.2d 793 (Minn. 1999).
15. See Irving v. Mazda Motor Corp., 136 F.3d 764, 767 (11th Cir. 1998) (arguing that a
strong presumption against preemption exists where the subject matter "has traditionally
been regarded as properly within the scope of the states' rights").
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are sovereign or supreme. 16 This traditional version of "states'
rights" has generally been associated with "strict" constitutional
construction of federal power, an interpretive approach that
reserves the widest possible sphere of sovereign authority for
states. 
17
The term "right," however, can and regularly does connote
something more significant than dual sovereign powers. With
regard to individuals, rights are strong, affirmative limitations on
governmental power expressly granted by the Constitution. This
concept of "right" is not as common to our discussion of federalism,
although that is changing. Structural arguments have tended to
focus on institutional powers, not rights. We do not typically speak
in terms of the rights of Congress, or of the President, or of the
Judicial Branch. We speak in terms of their separate powers. What
does it mean, then, to assert that a federal enactment threatens or
infringes upon the "rights" of states? What, specifically, are those
rights? Is there more than a semantic difference between claiming
that a state possesses "power" to act and claiming that the state has
a "right" to something?
To answer these questions, we need to examine specifically the
two other, less common senses in which "states' rights" have been
invoked. First, as a matter of constitutional structure, states
possess certain basic rights that must remain inviolate if they are
to be thought of as sovereigns in any meaningful sense at all. The
Constitution recognizes each state's right to exist, for example. It
protects the states' territorial integrity, imposes a duty on the
central government to protect states from invasion and other
harms, and preserves the states' authority to maintain internal
peace and order.' 8 The Constitution also guarantees states the right
16. See Steven G. Gey, The Myth of State Sovereignty, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 1601, 1618-19
(2002) (noting that pre-New Deal commerce decisions "all employed a theory of sovereignty
that assigned absolute authority over certain narrowly defined activities to the federal
government and equally absolute authority over everything else to the states").
17. As the Court said in Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 295 (1936): "It is no
longer open to question that the general government, unlike the states, possesses no inherent
power in respect of the internal affairs of the states...." (citation omitted).
18. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3 (protecting states' territorial integrity); U.S. CONST. art. IV,
§ 4 (providing that the central government shall protect states against invasion and
"domestic Violence").
218 [Vol. 46:213
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to form their own governments, free from central dictates. States
thus have the right, for example, to choose their own officials, to
locate their own capitols, and to set the qualifications for voters
in state and local elections. 19 States possess rights, by express
constitutional design, to participate in the Nation's political
processes and governance. Unless they waive the right, states are
granted equal suffrage in the Senate.2 ° They are also guaranteed a
pivotal role in the process of constitutional amendment. 2' Finally,
by implication, the Constitution rests in the states, where no
federal right or issue is presented, the right to render definitive
interpretations of their own laws and constitutions. These express
constitutional rights of existence, separateness, political participa-
tion, and interpretive independence are the most basic rights of
free and independent states. Without these rights, we could not
legitimately speak in terms of "dual" or "joint" sovereignty at all.
There is, finally, a third sense in which constitutional "states'
rights" have come to be understood. It is this iteration of "states'
rights" that will be the principal focus of this Article. The Supreme
Court has recently discovered a variety of what might be called
fundamental "states' rights" lurking in constitutional structure.2
These rights typically act as affirmative limitations on federal
powers that are granted in the Constitution, much as individual
rights, like those in the Bill of Rights, constrain enumerated
governmental powers. This distinguishes fundamental "states'
rights" from the traditional sovereign sphere version of "states'
rights," the latter of which is a manifestation of an argument
regarding the proper scope of federal power, not a "right" in the
strong sense of the term. Fundamental "states' rights," unlike the
sovereign rights of existence, separateness, participation, and
interpretive independence, are not contained in any constitutional
bill of rights for states. They are, like individuals' fundamental
rights to such things as "privacy" and "liberty," judicial extrapola-
tions from the penumbras of these basic sovereign rights. This,
19. See infra notes 158-62 and accompanying text.
20. U.S. CONST. art. V (declaring that "no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived
of its equal Suffrage in the Senate').
21. See id. (providing for state ratification of constitutional amendments).
22. See infra Part II.B.
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among other things, distinguishes fundamental "states' rights" from
both the power calculus version of "states' rights" and the idea that
the Constitution itself preserves certain minimal rights of state
sovereignty.
As a result of recent Court decisions, states now enjoy fundamen-
tal rights to intimate association, equality, physical autonomy,
mental autonomy, and due process. States, therefore, like persons,
enjoy a measure of liberty in ordering and arranging their intimate
affairs.23 With respect to immunity from lawsuits, states are
entitled to be treated as more than second-class sovereigns, just as
the Constitution's equality guarantees prohibit government from
creating lower-status persons.24 Further, like persons, states now
possess certain rights to physical and mental autonomy. Congress
thus cannot simply "commandeer," conscript, or thrust state organs
into service.25 Nor, the Court has held, can states be forced or
tricked into waiving their immunity; state waivers must, like
individual waivers, be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.26
As well, like persons, states must be afforded certain procedural
rights before their property or liberty can be adversely affected.
Congress's exercise of the power granted to it under Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment to remedy civil rights violations is
now viewed as an allegation or charge that the states have been
engaged in unlawful discrimination. This charge, like those made
by governments against persons, gives rise to certain procedural
protections. States are entitled to notice that Congress intends to
authorize private claims to state property.27 Furthermore, they are
entitled, at least indirectly, to an opportunity to be heard before
Congress may force them to answer in court for alleged civil rights
and other constitutional violations.'
23. See infra Part II.B. 1 (discussing the fundamental state right to order internal affairs).
24. See Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 769 (2002) ("ITihe
primary function of sovereign immunity is not to protect state treasuries ... but to afford the
States the dignity and respect due sovereign entities."); see also U.S. CONST. amend. V (Due
Process Clause); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (Equal Protection Clause).
25. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992); see Printz v. United States, 521
U.S. 898, 917-18 (1997).
26. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 666,
675-76 (1999).
27. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985).
28. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997) (holding that valid Section 5
220 [Vol. 46:213
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These fundamental state "rights" comprise what are now
commonly referred to as "extrinsic" limitations on Congress's
powers. They are "extrinsic" because they do not arise from judicial
interpretations of the scope of, for instance, the commerce power
or the Eleventh Amendment's express limitation on judicial
power. Like many individual fundamental rights, these funda-
mental "states' rights" have been discovered in penumbras and
emanations; they have burst forth from things like the "plan of the
convention,"29 amorphous "background principle[s],"3O and judicial
"presupposition[s]." 3' As the Court has turned its attention to the
fundamental rights of states, it has borrowed extensively from the
lexicon and methodologies usually identified with the rights of
persons, specifically with the controversial doctrine of substantive
due process. Constitutional text has been routinely stretched to
discover new "states' rights." The same Tenth Amendment that has
consistently been downgraded to the status of "truism"32 is now an
"affirmative limitation" on Congress's ability to regulate the states.
The Eleventh Amendment, the Court says, stands "not so much
for what it says, but for the presupposition of our constitutional
structure which it confirms."3" Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, a broad positive grant of congressional power, is limited by
newly announced procedural rules that operate in favor of the
states .
Further, in the course of announcing the fundamental rights of
states, the Court has lapsed into discussion of constitutional values,
like autonomy and dignity, normally associated with personhood.
The Court thus has repeatedly emphasized that "the primary
function of sovereign immunity is ... to afford the States the dignity
legislation must exhibit "congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented
or remedied and the means adopted to that end").
29. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 68 (1996).
30. Id. at 72.
31. Id. at 54.
32. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941) ("The amendment states but a
truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered.").
33. Blatchford v. Native Viii. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991).
34. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997) (stating that congressional
enactments under Section 5 must have "congruence and proportionality" to the evil
discovered).
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and respect due sovereign entities."35 Several commentators have
focused in particular on the Court's seemingly misplaced reverence
for state "dignity."3M Dignity, of course, is something we associate
most readily with human beings, not governmental institutions."
Some commentators, therefore, have treated this language as mere
rhetoric, or dismissed it as "silly."" Others have been willing to
assume that there is substance to this language, but have had some
difficulty making any concrete sense of it. 39
Although the Court's references to "dignity" surely express
something, we ought not focus myopically on this single word. This
Article hopes to broaden the scope of our understanding of the new
status of statehood and, hence of "states' rights." It makes perfect
sense to speak of state equality, dignity, autonomy, and rights to
process if what is afoot is something on the order of a rights
movement ("revolution" may be too strong) for statehood. It makes
sense, in particular, if we compare this new "federal liberty" to the
35. Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 769 (2002) (emphasis
added).
36. See Ann Althouse, On Dignity and Deference: The Supreme Court's New Federalism,
68 U. CIN. L. REv. 245, 246 (2000) (noting "how the theme of deference to the states has
drifted from normative, structural analysis to a states' rights approach"); Evan H. Caminker,
Judicial Solicitude for State Dignity, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. Sc. 81 (2001)
(discussing various "expressivist" theories for the Court's focus on dignitary interests of
states); Judith Resnik & Julie Chi-hye Suk, Adding Insult to Injury: Questioning the Role of
Dignity in Conceptions of Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1921 (2003) (identifying "role dignity"
in discussions of state sovereign immunity); Suzanna Sherry, States Are People Too, 75
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1121, 1127 (2000) ("Not since extending the language ofthe Fourteenth
Amendment to corporations has the Court so anthropomorphized an abstract entity."); Peter
J. Smith, States as Nations: Dignity in Cross.Doctrinal Perspective, 89 VA. L. REV. 1 (2003)
(locating dignity language in the law of nations, specifically the law of foreign sovereign
immunity).
37. For discussions ofdignity and its significance to human and constitutional rights, see,
for example, Alan Gewirth, Human Dignity as the Basis of Rights, in THE CONSTITUTION OF
RIGHTS: HUMAN DIGNITY AND AMERICAN VALUES 10, 11-14 (Michael J. Meyer & William A.
Parent eds., 1992); Gerald L. Neuman, Human Dignity in United States Constitutional Law,
in ZURAUTONOMIE DES INDIVIDuuMS 249,250-51 (Dieter Simon & Manfred Weiss eds., 2000);
see also Resnik & Suk, supra note 36, at 1933-41 (noting that dignity as a value underlies
many of the provisions in the Bill of Rights).
38. See Caminker, supra note 36, at 85.
39. See Resnik & Suk, supra note 36, at 1926-27 (positing a causal connection between
Supreme Court attention to state dignity and international norms and arguing in favor of a
limited "role dignity" for institutions); see also Smith, supra note 36 (locating dignitary
interest in foreign immunity cases, but arguing that this analogy should lead to the rejection
of state sovereign immunity claims).
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Constitution's protection of individual civil liberty.4" Indeed, the
Court itself has done just that on many recent occasions. It has
repeatedly compared the fundamental rights of states to the
personal rights granted in, and derived from, the Bill of Rights. 1
We shall have occasion to consider whether this specific comparison
holds; for one thing, the rights in the Bill of Rights are express,
whereas the fundamental rights of states are plainly not."2 In any
event, once discovered, "states' rights," like individual rights, are
the fundamental law of the land, unalterable by mere positive
enactments of Congress.'
In terms of solicitude for constitutional rights, as well as values
such as dignity and autonomy, statehood is the new personhood.
The decades of the 1960s and 1970s were a high watermark of
judicial solicitude for the rights, dignity, and autonomy of
personhood. These decades were marked by the discovery of
"fundamental" individual rights, such as the right to abortion, the
right to use contraceptives, and other aspects of more general rights
to "privacy" and "autonomy."4 As well, the due process revolution
of the 1970s produced important individual rights to due process."
The substantive rights among these, although unenumerated, were
discovered in constitutional "penumbras" and vague constitutional
text.'6 The discovery of rights to abortion and sexual autonomy was,
and is, a matter of controversy. These "fundamental" rights are
textually and otherwise unbounded; they raise the uncomfortable
specter of unconstrained judicial subjectivity.
40. James Wilson, a participant at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention, noted that just
as individuals are entitled to civil liberty, states are entitled to what he called "federal
liberty." James Wilson, Address to the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Nov. 26, 1787),
in 2 JONATHAN ELLIOT, DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 429 (2d ed. 1836) [hereinafter ELLIOT'S DEBATES]. Although
"federal liberty" has many meanings, this Article will treat the phrase as interchangeable
with what the Article calls "fundamental states' rights."
41. See infra Part II.B.
42. See infra notes 171-73 and accompanying text.
43. See infra Part II.B.
44. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (finding a right to abortion); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (finding a right to use contraceptives).
45. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (requiring that welfare recipients
receive pre-termination hearings).
46. See infra notes 171-73 and accompanying text.
2004] 223
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For a time in the late 1970s, but particularly during the past
decade or so, the discovery of fundamental rights has focused not on
persons, who have in fact lost some recent battles on this front,47
but on the states. Many constitutional protections that have been
afforded to persons now belong to the states as well." "States'
rights" thus has undergone a substantial transformation of late.
The Court has de-emphasized power in favor of individual-like
rights for states; it has de-emphasized text in favor of the loosest
sort of constitutional construction.
Part I of this Article addresses the origins of the Court's increas-
ing tendency to anthropomorphize the states. Statehood is a
malleable construct. States have been likened to, among other
things, laboratories, corporations, nations, and communities. 49 It
should come as no surprise, then, to find the Court treating states
as rights-bearing persons with dignity and autonomy interests.
Indeed, the state-as-person metaphor has deep and distinctive
constitutional roots. It is a little-noted fact that the Anti-Federal-
ists, whose theories and arguments have experienced a revival in
recent federalism doctrine, argued that states should be treated as
individual "moral persons" possessing both dignity and constitu-
tional rights.5" As we shall see, the Anti-Federalists were princi-
pally concerned with the two most common versions of "states'
rights" noted previously, namely the power calculus and textual
rights concepts. They feared that unlimited central power would
completely annihilate the states. Accordingly, Anti-Federalists
espoused limited central powers. Believing that they were literally
fighting for states' lives, Anti-Federalists were perhaps even more
adamant about the preservation of the minimal "states' rights" of
existence, separateness, and political participation. When they
argued in favor of a "bill of rights" for states, this is what early
advocates of statehood had in mind.
Part II examines the constitutional "rights" of states. It begins by
examining those minimal sovereign rights for which the Anti-
47. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (declining to recognize a "right"
to assistance in committing suicide).
48. See infra Part II.B.
49. See infra notes 53-57, 71-72 and accompanying text.
50. See infra Parts I.B-C.
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Federalists argued, namely, the rights of existence, separateness,
political participation, and interpretive independence. Although
they did not secure a bill of rights for the states, early supporters
of statehood did manage to secure these minimal constitutional
rights. Despite the inherent narrowness of these rights, and the
many general and specific limitations placed upon them in the
Constitution, the Court has nevertheless extrapolated a series of
additional "fundamental" constitutional rights both from these
sovereign rights and, as we shall see, from far less specific sources.
Part II examines these fundamental state rights of internal
ordering, equality, autonomy, and due process by comparing them,
in substance and origin, to the fundamental rights of persons. This
comparison demonstrates that statehood and personhood, for the
Court, share more than the symbolic or expressive resemblance that
"dignity" suggests. Federal and civil liberty are comparable in
substance, protecting analogous rights. More than this, the two
liberties are the product of a judicial methodology that seeks to
identify rights that are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.""'
Finally, individual rights' precedents and principles are often
utilized to support the recognition and defense of new "states'
rights." In all important respects, the two liberties, federal and
civil, are being treated by the Court as identical.
Part III critically examines the discovery and enforcement of
fundamental "states' rights." The Founders declined to treat the
states generally as rights-bearing persons. They chose, instead, a
concept of divided sovereignty based primarily upon structure and
the separation of powers. As the fundamental rights of states pile
up, the notion that federalism is the product of a distributive
calculus of power continues its precipitous decline. Structure and
power are being tossed aside for rights, much as rights have come
to dominate constitutional thinking where individual liberty is
concerned.
This trend should disturb us, for constitutional rights and powers
are not, as the Court occasionally insists, simply "mirror images" of
one another or flip sides of the same coin.52 As the arc of individual
51. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
52. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156 (1992).
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liberty teaches, constitutional rights, particularly "fundamental"
rights, differ from constitutional powers in important respects:
rights are inflexible, whereas powers ebb and flow; rights (at least
inherent ones) are implicit and unenumerated, whereas powers are
textually grounded; and rights imply an aggressive judicial role,
whereas powers generally implicate judicial deference to demo-
cratic processes. Further, although the specific rights the Court
has discovered, namely, the right to intimate association, equality,
autonomy, and due process, are appropriately enforced in favor of
individuals, they are not legitimate "rights" of states. Judicial
competence and legitimacy, the political realities of statehood,
and the lack of an overarching normative justification for the
newly discovered fundamental rights of states, all militate against
charting this path on behalf of statehood. Finally, crucial aspects of
federalism, including institutional flexibility, national community,
and ultimately even individual liberty, will all be casualties of this
new conception of "states' rights."
This does not mean that federalism is unenforceable, that states
serve no purpose, or that states should simply cease to exist. Part
IV briefly addresses the future of federal liberty. The existence of
states is constitutionally protected. Part IV offers some modest
proposals for preserving the states not by discovering new, discrete
state rights, but rather by restoring federalism to a more disci-
plined focus on constitutional structure and powers. Federal liberty
must recognize that states are subordinate institutions, not persons
with special rights.
I. THE STATE AS MORAL, RIGHTS-BEARING PERSON
Statehood, like federalism, is a malleable concept. State status
has changed many times since the Founding. There have been
numerous attempts to capture the essence of statehood, both in
terms of function and raw prestige. To quell fears of outright state
annihilation, for instance, Founders like Hamilton and Madison
argued that states would be invaluable "agents" and "trustees" of
the people, and would provide the principal community ties for
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citizens under the new divided government.53 States thus were
expected to serve liberty-enhancing and communitarian functions.
As well, states have been, and continue to be, characterized as
laboratories of social and economic experimentation. 54 This
metaphor has been invoked, most recently, in connection with the
heated debate concerning gay marriage.5
The prestige of states has also varied over time, from early
metaphors likening the states to mere corporate forms to those
comparing the states to sovereign nations.' New status symbols
have cropped up in specific contexts. States thus are sometimes
treated, for purposes of commerce doctrine, as if they are free and
independent "market participants" rather than constrained
sovereigns.57 Statehood, in sum, has meant and continues to mean
many different things. It is a polysemous construct.
In terms of constitutional rights, we are witnessing yet another
metamorphosis of statehood. Today, likening a state to a corpora-
tion, for example, would be an outright insult to its "sovereignty."
As well, we shall see that the implication that states are mere
prefectures or political subdivisions is viewed by some as an
"affront" to states' "dignity" and "esteem."58 Today's state is, in a
number of respects, more like a person than any of these other
53. See THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 297 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987)
(describing the state and federal governments as "but different agents and trustees of the
people, constituted with different powers and designed for different purposes').
54. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (considering it "one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country"); Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S.
312, 344 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (objecting to the Court's invocation of the Fourteenth
Amendment "to prevent the making of social experiments ... in the insulated chambers
afforded by the several States").
55. See James Pinkerton, Look at Gay Marriage as Experiment, NEWSDAY, May 17,2004,
http://www.newamerica.net/index.cfm?pg=article&DocID=1582; Jonathan Rauch, A More
Perfect Union: How the Founding Fathers Would Have Handled Gay Marriage, THE
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Apr. 2004, at 88 (invoking laboratory metaphor in favor of state
handling of gay marriage issue).
56. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dafl.) 419, 455 (opinion of Wilson, J.) (observing
that states were "the inferior contrivance ofman"); Smith, supra note 36, at 81-87 (discussing
cases in which the Court has treated states, with respect to each other, as sovereign nations).
57. See, e.g., Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 804-06 (1976) (drawing a
distinction between states as market participants and states as market regulators).
58. See infra text accompanying note 281.
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things. States are deemed to need a measure of private space in
which to conduct their affairs and to be self-autonomous. They are
considered capable of experiencing the insult that comes with being
treated by Congress as less than equally sovereign. They are
deemed to be in need of procedural protections against government
charges of wrongdoing. States, in sum, are considered sentient and
rights-worthy.
Conceptualizing states as persons is, in certain respects, not as
outlandish as it first sounds. Constitutional doctrine has routinely
anthropomorphized the enigmatic states in order to situate them in
the constitutional order. For example, we speak of "state action" as
if the state itself, as opposed to its designated officials, has acted
in some tangible or physical manner. Too, states, like persons, are
deemed to have "interests" that are often weighed on the same
constitutional scale as individual interests when courts engage in
balancing.59 A citizen's interest in free expression thus can, on
occasion, be outweighed by a state's interest in, for instance, peace,
order, and tranquility.60
An explicit state-as-person metaphor once played a fundamental
role in constitutional debates. From the earliest days of the Nation,
the state-as-person metaphor has been invoked to both situate
and defend statehood. Some early supporters of statehood were
not prepared to argue based upon the supposed instrumental or
functional benefits commonly associated with states in particular,
and federalism more generally. For one thing, they lacked the data
and experience to demonstrate, for example, that states fostered
competition or served as effective laboratories for social or economic
experimentation.
Anti-Federalists, who argued most strenuously in favor of the
"rights" and status of states, thus turned perhaps instinctively
to the prestige metaphor of personhood. Their early imagery of
state personhood consisted of three elements. First, each state
was likened to an individual corpus, one with a relationship with
59. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J.
943, 946-47 (1987) (discussing the balancing metaphor).
60. See, e.g., Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288,296 (1984) (holding
that the government's interest in maintaining Lafayette Park and the National Mall
outweighed expressive interests of demonstrators for the homeless).
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government-in this case the central government. Second, the
states were likened to "moral persons," each possessing unique
characteristics and each entitled to a basic level of "dignity" and
"respect." Finally, states were said to be entitled to certain "rights."
As individuals were entitled to civil liberty, states, it was urged,
were entitled to a certain degree of "federal liberty."6 ' Indeed, Anti-
Federalists suggested that states, like individuals, ought to have
their own bill of rights.62
In light of the Supreme Court's ongoing Anti-Federalist revival,
it is especially important to grasp this early comparison of state and
person, and the conception of "rights" it embodied. As we shall see,
the three basic elements of the Anti-Federalists' invocation of the
personhood metaphor-individuality, morality, and rights-have
reappeared in recent federalism doctrine. They have, however, been
invoked by the Court in a manner that the Anti-Federalists could
not have imagined.
A. Individuality
Of the numerous concerns expressed by Anti-Federalists,
perhaps none was more acute than the desire that the people
not, as some suggested, "forget our local habits and attachments,"63
or "be reduced to one faith and one government."64 Many Anti-
Federalists feared that states would either be treated as mere
corporate bodies or annihilated altogether by an expansive central
authority.65 It was imperative that the states' right to exist be
61. James Wilson, Address to the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Nov. 26, 1787), in
2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 40, at 429 (emphasis omitted).
62. See infra notes 122-33 and accompanying text.
63. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 413 (Max Farrand ed., rev.
ed. 1966) (remarks of James Wilson) [hereinafter RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION]
64. HERBERT J. STORING, WHAT THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR 10 (1981) (quoting
Demosthenes Minor, Gazette of the State of Georgia, Nov. 15, 1787).
65. See, e.g., Essays of Brutus (No. 1), N.Y. J., Oct. 18, 1787, reprinted in 2 THE
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 367 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) [hereinafter THE COMPLETE
ANTI-FEDERALIST] (expressing concern that the central government would exercise its
commerce power "as entirely to annihilate all the state governments, and reduce this country
to one single government"); Essays of An Old Whig (No. 6), INDEP. GAZETrER, reprinted in 3
THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra, at 43 (arguing that the moment the power of
taxation is given to Congress, "we ought by consent to annihilate the individual states").
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preserved. Further, if states were to be vital, vigorous, and
ultimately sovereign, it was imperative that they retain their
individuality.
The concept of states as separate individual units permeates
Anti-Federalist writings. It begins with the imagery of the state of
nature. Anti-Federalists argued that "the separation from [Great
Britain] placed the 13 States in a state of nature towards each
other."6 Luther Martin thus asserted, "the States like individuals
were in a state of nature equally sovereign and free." 7 The "several
states," as Anti-Federalists preferred to refer to them, were thus
conceptualized as persons from their inception. "[W]hen a number
of States unite themselves under a federal government," Martin
said, "the same principles apply to them as when a number of
individual men unite themselves under a State government."68
Like men, the states needed government to order their existence
and secure their liberty; thus, they entered the social contract. As
even Anti-Federalists were forced to concede, the Articles of
Confederation, the first such contract, had been ineffectual. From
the perspective of states' advocates, however, the proposed Consti-
tution was not necessarily much of an improvement. Although
states in general were threatened by the breadth of proposed
federal powers, the position of the smaller states in particular was
deemed precarious. Although the Anti-Federalists viewed the New
Jersey Plan in the Convention (which provided for, among other
things, equal state voting rights) as "calculated to preserve the
individuality of the States," the Virginia Plan (which did not
provide for equal voting rights for states), in their view, had a
tendency "to destroy this individuality." 9 George Clinton argued
66. 1 RECORDSOFTHEFEDERALCONVENTION, supra note 63, at 324; see also id. at 340-41
(discussing the relative roles of the states and the federal government).
67. SAMUEL H. BEER, To MAKE A NATION: THE REDISCOVERY OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM
240 (1993).
68. Luther Martin, The Genuine Information, Delivered to the Legislature of the State of
Maryland, Relative to the Proceedings of the General Convention, Held at Philadelphia, in
1787, reprinted in 3 RECORDS OFTHE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 63, at 183 (emphasis
omitted); see id. at 184, 192; 1 RECORDS OFTHE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 63, at 340-
41,437-38; see also THE FEDERALSTNOs. 18,20 (James Madison, with Alexander Hamilton)
(discussing equal representation for states by looking to examples from the governments of
other nations over the course of history).
69. BEER, supra note 67, at 239. The Virginia Plan was a highly-centralized proposal
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that just as individuals entered a social contract to preserve their
rights and liberties, "the only end for which states are induced to
confederate, is mutual protection and the security of their equal
rights."7 °
In defending state sovereignty, Anti-Federalists stressed that it
was the states who would consent to the new constitutional plan,
not the nation as a whole. Dr. Johnson of Connecticut observed that
the Anti-Federalists considered the states to be "'so many political
societies,' each with its 'individuality,'" while Federalists conceived
of the states as "districts of people composing one political
Society."71 Dr. John Witherspoon, along with other supporters of the
compact theory of government, which held that states consented
individually to join the Union, viewed "each state as equivalent to
an individual, and thus the national government as a compact
between individual states, each considered as a self-sufficient
community."
72
The concept of state individuality played a central role in several
specific debates touching on the early status of states. As men-
tioned, the issue of state voting rights was a point of serious
contention. Anti-Federalists defended the notion of equal voting
rights for states on the ground that with respect to individual men,
the fact that one may be wiser, stronger, or wealthier does not
result in unequal voting strength; the same ought to hold true, they
reasoned, with respect to the individual states. 73 Equality was a
emphasizing population in the distribution of power. See 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION, supra note 63, at 20-22 (setting forth proposals ofthe Virginia Plan). The New
Jersey Plan, by contrast, focused on state equality and primacy. See RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 63, at 242-45 (setting forth proposals of the New Jersey
Plan).
70. George Clinton, Remarks at the New York Ratifying Convention (1788), in 6 THE
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 65, at 182.
71. BEER, supra note 67, at 239.
72. Id.; see Donald S. Lutz, The Articles of Confederation as the Background to the
Federal Republic, PUBLIUS, Winter 1990, at 55, 62 (discussing Witherspoon's support of the
compact theory). The debate pitting compact and nationalist theories of the Constitution
against one another has continued to this day. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514
U.S. 779 (1995) (discussing nationalist and compact theories of constitutional ratification);
see also BEER, supra note 67 (arguing for a nationalist theory of ratification).
73. Luther Martin, The Genuine Information, Delivered To The Legislature of the State
of Maryland, Relative to the Proceedings of the General Convention, Held at Philadelphia, in
1787, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 65, at 36.
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principle often invoked on behalf of the smaller states as the
Constitution was being framed. As Luther Martin explained: "[Luike
individuals, each State is considered equally free and equally
independent, the one having no right to exercise authority over
the other, though more strong, more wealthy, or abounding with
more inhabitants."7 As George Clinton put it: "A dwarf is as much
a man as a giant; a small republic is as much a sovereign as the
most powerful kingdom."75 This notion of an equality of status was
a central premise of the individual rights revolution brought on by
the American Revolution.7" The Anti-Federalists applied it with
vigor to argue for the equal status of the separate states.
In sum, Anti-Federalists invoked the state-as-person metaphor
to argue in favor of the states' right to exist. They further asserted
that state "individuality" or separateness was vital to statehood.
States thus needed to be independent of and equal to one another.
State "individuality" was to be preserved against anticipated
central encroachments. As George Clinton asserted, the notion that
the states would cede their independence and individuality so
completely as was contemplated in the proposed Constitution "is as
absurd and unreasonable as it would be to suppose that a man
would take a draught of poison to preserve his life."77
B. Moral Personhood and "Dignity"
In addition to emphasizing the separateness or individuality of
the states, the Anti-Federalists claimed for each state the mantle
of a symbolic moral personhood. In making this claim, Anti-
Federalists sought to place the states on the same moral plane as
74. Id. (emphasis omitted).
75. Clinton, supra note 70, at 182. Clinton was here paraphrasing the words of the
eighteenth century theorist Emer de Vattel, who was invoking the state-as-person metaphor
to argue that nations were all "equal" to one another. See EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF
NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW: APPLIED TO THE CONDUCTAND TO THE AFFAIRS
OF NATIONS AND OF SOVEREIGNS 7 (Charles G. Fenwick trans., Carnegie Inst. of Wash. 1916)
(1758).
76. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 229-43 (1992)
(discussing the move toward egalitarianism and individuality in connection with the
republican revolution).
77. Clinton, supra note 70, at 182.
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persons, who were then thought to possess natural and inalienable
rights.
Dr. John Witherspoon, a member of the faculty of what would
later become Princeton University, thus specifically referred to the
states as "moral persons." 8 George Clinton, among others, echoed
and expanded upon this sentiment:
The definition given of States and their rights by authors of the
first authority is, that they are equally free and independent, as
the individuals of which they are composed, naturally
were-that they are to be considered as moral persons, having
a will of their own and equal rights-that these rights are
freedom, sovereignty, and independence.79
As persons left the state of nature, they ceded some, but not all, of
their natural rights. They retained those rights necessary to sustain
an independent existence. Similarly, states, it was argued, ceded
only a portion of their freedom and independence in joining the
Union.80 Like individuals, states laid claim to certain natural and
inalienable rights of freedom, sovereignty, and independence.
In part, this moral claim to "states' rights" appeared to be based
upon the uniqueness, the "personality," of the individual states. To
the Anti-Federalists, states were not homogenous units. Rather,
the early states were, like individuals, considered diverse in many
significant respects. For example, Roger Sherman of Connecticut
emphasized that each state "like each individual" has "its peculiar
habits [,J usages and manners."8' In Anti-Federalist writings, states
exhibited such things as happiness, greed, laziness, pride, and
78. BEER, supra note 67, at 239.
79. Clinton, supra note 70, at 182 (emphasis added).
80. See 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 63, at 166-67 (remarks of
James Wilson) (making Federalist argument that just as individuals had to cede some rights
to the government, so too must states cede some rights to the federal government).
81. 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 63, at 343.
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pique." Anthropomorphic arguments, therefore, are not exactly new
to constitutional discourses regarding statehood and federalism.
States' moral status was also based upon their early position of
relative frailty. Like individuals, states were believed to be
susceptible to disease, weakness, and demise. 3 For example,
although New York appeared at the time to be quite vital, "A
Farmer" commented that Georgia was "all body and no head or feet,
and on nearer view it has no body either." 4 Pennsylvania likewise
was a "child of nature, and strong convulsions must attend her
destruction."' From the perspective of the Anti-Federalists, the
Framers appeared to be "forgetting that bodies politic, like natural
bodies have their duration of manly vigor and the decline of age,
prolonged and regulated by the length of years in which they have
been arriving at maturity." 6 Anti-Federalists appeared to be
making a claim that just as the government owed a moral duty to
protect the basic existence of individuals, so too was it obliged to
look after the well-being of the individual states.
The moral status of states led naturally as well to the claim that
states possessed "dignity" and were entitled to respect and esteem.
An overbearing central authority was considered a general offense
to statehood. Indeed, it was a common, if wildly overstated, Anti-
Federalist refrain that the effect of the proposed Constitution would
82. See Essays of Brutus (No. 1), supra note 65, at 370 (noting that "manners and habits"
of states differed and that their "sentiments are by no means coincident"); Letters ofAgrippa
(No. 12), MASS. GAZETTE, Jan. 11, 1788, reprinted in 4 THE COMPLETE ANTi-FEDERALIST,
supra note 65, at 94 (asserting that "no state can be happy, when the laws contradict the
general habits of the people"); id. ("The idle and dissolute inhabitants of the south, require
a different regimen from the sober and active people of the north.").
83. See Patrick Henry, Remarks at the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 4, 1788),
reprinted in 5 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 65, at 211 (describing the states
as "the characteristics, and the soul of a confederation").
84. Essays by a Farmer (No. 7), MD. GAzETTE, Apr. 22, 1788, reprinted in 5 THE
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 65, at 67. Anti-Federalists could, on occasion, get
carried away in their anthropomorphic fervor, as when Oliver Ellsworth claimed: "My
happiness depends as much on the existence of my state government, as a newborn-infant
depends upon its mother for nourishment." 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra
note 63, at 502; see BEER, supra note 67, at 241 (stating a similar quote by Ellsworth).
85. Essays by a Farmer (No. 7), supra note 84, at 67.
86. Id. at 69. Alexis De Tocqueville also used the symbolism of a human corpus to
describe the early states. He likened the state to a body with a nervous system-towns,
counties, and other organs of government. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, 1 DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA 59-60 (Phillips Bradley ed., Vintage Books ed. 1990).
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be to impose a form of slavery upon the states.8 1 The Constitution,
some suggested, would destroy the "soul" of the states.8
Less charged versions of the appeal to state "dignity" abound in
the writings of the Anti-Federalists. Luther Martin argued that the
proposed Constitution was an insult to both persons and states
alike. He inquired:
Could there possibly be a greater indignity and insult offered to
the majesty of the free States, and the free citizens of America,
than for the very men who were entrusted with powers for the
preservation and security of their rights, and for the establish-
ment of a permanent system to promote their happiness, to
make use of that power to destroy both the one and the other?8 9
"A Federal Republican" thought that it would be "worth our while
to enquire how far the proposed constitution will tend to reduce
the dignity and importance of the states."' "A Countryman from
Dutchess County" objected to the proposed supremacy of federal
authority and federal law as a concept "humiliating to sovereign
and independent states."9 1 Martin considered the proposed system
"incompatible with the political happiness and freedom of the
States in general."92
"A Gentleman in a Neighbouring State," striking by degrees a
humbler tone, expressed thanks for the opportunity to make
alterations to the Articles of Confederation in order to "effectually
support the authority and dignity of the states, and public faith."93
87. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 68, at 186 (referring to proportionate representation as
"the most complete, most abject system of slavery that the wit of man ever devised, under the
pretence of forming a government for free States").
88. See Patrick Henry, Remarks at the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 9, 1788),
reprinted in 5 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 65, at 235.
89. Martin, supra note 73, at 26.
90. A FEDERAL REPUBLICAN, A REVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION PROPOSED BY THE LATE
CONVENTION (1787), reprinted in 3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 65, at 78.
91. Letters from A Countryman from Dutchess County (No. 4), N.Y. J., Dec. 15, 1787,
reprinted in 6 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 65, at 58. "A Countryman from
Dutchess County" was making an explicit argument for sovereign dignity. He asked: "Would
this junto have dared to offer such an indignity to any sovereign prince in Europe, had they
been appointed by one?-I know that your answer must be in the negative. Why then thus
presumptuously attempt to prostrate thirteen sovereignties?" Id.
92. Martin, supra note 73, at 78.
93. A Letter from a Gentleman in a Neighbouring State, to a Gentleman in this City,
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On the other hand, the gentleman felt it a "manifest indignity" to
place the power to call forth the militia in Congress.94 Patrick
Henry similarly objected to the proposed prohibition on state
interference with private contracts: "So degrading an indignity-so
flagrant an out-rage to the States-so vile a suspicion is humiliat-
ing to my mind, and many others."5 George Clinton objected that
the plan rendered the states no more worthy than mere corporate
bodies: "They are divested of the power of commanding the services
of their own Citizens and reduced to the degraded situations of
public corporations by being rendered liable to suits."9 6
"Agrippa" similarly lamented that the states were given no power
to pay their own debts; this, he argued, placed states "in an
humiliating & disgraceful situation."97 Patrick Henry objected that
the powers left to the Virginia legislature under the constitutional
plan were "trivial domestic considerations, as render it unworthy
the name of a Legislature."98 He envisioned instead vigorous,
independent states: "These will exhibit a bright specimen of real
dignity, far superior to that immense devolution of power, under
which the sovereignty of each state shall shrink to nothing."99 A
confederation was defended "as the only method to preserve
internal freedom, together with external strength and respectabil-
ity."'0°
Finally, Anti-Federalists specifically objected to placing the
central government in a position or station of supremacy vis-a-vis
the states. To "Cincinnatus" and other Anti-Federalists, the word
"supreme" "implies the highest in dignity or authority, etc."' The
Anti-Federalists argued, not without cause as it happens, that the
expansive powers granted to the central government, coupled with
CONN. J., Oct. 17, 1787, reprinted in 4 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 65, at
7.
94. Id. at 12.
95. Henry, supra note 88, at 229.
96. Clinton, supra note 70, at 184.
97. Letters of Agrippa (No. 16), MASS. GAzETTE, Feb. 5, 1788, reprinted in 4 THE
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 65, at 113.
98. Henry, supra note 88, at 238.
99. Id. at 187.
100. The Fallacies of the Freeman Detected by A Farmer, FREEMAN'S J., Apr. 1788,
reprinted in 3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 65, at 186.
101. Letters from a Countryman from Dutchess County (No. 4), supra note 91, at 59.
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the driving premise of national supremacy, would substantially
degrade the powers left to the states.
Given the significant attention that has been paid to the lan-
guage of "dignity" in the Court's recent sovereign immunity cases,
as discussed below, 2 a few additional words on this particular
matter are in order. The foregoing discussion is not meant to
suggest that the Anti-Federalists' conception of "dignity" was of the
same character as that which we have come to associate with
"personhood" since World War II and the ascendance of individual
rights, particularly fundamental rights.0" As students of "dignity"
would point out, the concept of dignity during the Founding might
be likened to social or governmental rank rather than something
inherent to personhood. °'0 Too, there is no doubt, as some have
suggested, that the Founding generation was influenced in its
thinking about the states by the law of nations, which also empha-
sized the "dignity" of sovereign nations. 10 5
It is also plausible, however, to attribute this early concern for
state dignity to the state-as-person metaphor. Early international
relations theorists often likened nations to persons, staking
national claims to "rights" and "dignity" on this metaphor.0 6
Moreover, the concept of dignity was evolving as the proposed
102. See infra Part II.B.2.
103. See Resnik & Suk, supra note 36, at 1926 (noting, based on research, that "the word
dignity was not used in reference to personal constitutional rights in the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence until the 1940s in the wake of World War II").
104. See id. at 1923 ("Monarchs were the sovereigns to whom dignity belonged in eras
when ordinary persons were not due such respect and deference."). As Resnik and Suk note,
"throughout its history, the United States Supreme Court has ascribed the harms of
indignities to institutions." Id. at 1941.
105. See Thomas H. Lee, Making Sense of the Eleventh Amendment: International Law
and State Sovereignty, 96 Nw. U. L. REv. 1027, 1061-67 (2002) (locating modern concern with
dignity in international law); Smith, supra note 36, at 7 (same).
106. See JOSEPH A. CAMILLElU & JIM FALK, THE END OF SOVEREIGNTY? THE POLITICS OF
A SHRINKING AND FRAGMENTING WORLD 17 (1992) (noting that nineteenth century
international relations theorists conceived of a state as "a living, articulate force, a historic
individual with a personality and will of its own" (quoting KENNETH H.F. DYSON, THE STATE
TRADITION IN WESTERN EUROPE: A STUDY OF IDEA AND AN INSTITUTION 103 (1980))). The
nation-as-person metaphor can be traced to an earlier era. Emer de Vattel, who authored the
most widely read treatise on international law in the eighteenth century, invoked it to argue
on behalf of the equality of nation-states. See Bardo Fassbender, Sovereignty and
Constitutionalism in International Law, in SOVEREIGNTYINTRANSITION 121 (Neil Walker ed.,
2003).
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Constitution was being debated.1 17 Honoring social rank for its own
sake conflicted with the more general movement toward equality
that began in the Revolutionary period. Indeed, the Constitution
itself would ultimately ban titles of nobility.08 Individual dignity
outside social rank was recognized by, among others, Alexander
Hamilton, who defended the Constitution to the people of New
York as the "safest course for your liberty, your dignity, and your
happiness.""°9
In any event, the Anti-Federalists saw a certain value in
comparing states not just to persons, but to moral persons. Part of
that value inhered in the notion that the states, as special persons,
possessed a strong moral claim to their individuality, to certain
liberties and protections, to "happiness," and, perhaps, to the same
sort of basic respect from government that individuals were then
thought to enjoy. "0 The Anti-Federalists were, after all, among the
strongest advocates for a bill of rights that would enshrine a
number of personal dignitary interests in the Constitution.
C. Rights
Anti-Federalists would take the state-as-person metaphor
further still. They argued that states, as individuals and moral
persons, possessed not only dignity but rights. Some of those
rights, like individual rights, were thought to be inherent and
natural. Broad rights to freedom, independence, and sovereignty
were certainly among these.
In at least this respect, the Articles of Confederation were
considered superior by Anti-Federalists to the proposed plan of
government. David Howell, a delegate from Rhode Island, viewed
the Articles of Confederation as "a constitution framed with the
primary purpose of securing the liberties of the states." 1 ' Article II
107. See Michael J. Meyer, Introduction, in THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS: HUMAN
DIGNITY AND AMImcAN VALUES 5-6 (Michael J. Meyer & William A. Parent eds., 1992)
(sketching the evolution of the concept of dignity during the Framing period).
108. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
109. THE FEDERALIST NO. 1, at 89 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
110. See Essays of Brutus (No. 2), N.Y. J., Nov. 1, 1787, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE
ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 65, at 373 (mentioning, for example, "the rights of conscience,
the right of enjoying and defending life, etc.").
111. JACKN. RAKOvE, THE BEGINNINGS OF NATIONAL POLITICS: AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY
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of the Articles of Confederation lent substantial credence to this
interpretation. Unlike the Tenth Amendment, which refers only to
state "powers," Article II of the Articles of Confederation referred
expressly to state rights. It provided: "Each state retains its
sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and everypowerjurisdic-
tion, and right, which is not by this confederation expressly
delegated to the United States in congress assembled."112 Article II
thus preserved state sovereignty in two respects not adopted by the
Constitution. First, it expressly reserved the inherent rights of
states to sovereignty, freedom, and independence. Second, it
granted to the federal government only those powers expressly set
forth in the Articles.
To state supporters, then, the Constitution contained some
glaring omissions. As many state defenders conceived it, the
goal in amending the Articles of Confederation should have been
"the preservation of the individual states, in their uncontrouled
constitutional rights."11 Supporters of strong state sovereignty
believed that they were in danger of losing the "liberties, privileges,
and immunities" that were secured to states under the Articles.
114
For supporters of state sovereignty, preservation of the rights
of the individual states was a paramount consideration in design-
ing a federal structure of government. Many Anti-Federalists
subscribed to the following creed: "As the preservation of the rights
of individuals is the object of civil society, so the preservation of the
rights of states (not individuals) ought to be the object of federal
society."" 5 Rights were necessary for state sustenance; as one Anti-
Federalist put it, states "ought to be fit to keep house alone if
necessary."' 16 States needed those rights that would allow for the
OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 327 (1979); see id. at 313-16 (discussing Howell's states'
rights view of the confederation).
112. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. 11 (1778) (emphasis added).
113. Robert Yates & John Lansing, Reasons of Dissent, N.Y. J., Dec. 21, 1787, reprinted
in 2 THE CoMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 65, at 17; see also, e.g., Martin, supra note
73, at 39 (referring to "the rights of men and the rights of States").
114. A Friend of the Republic, Anti-Federalist No. II, FREEMAN'S ORACLE, Feb. 8, 1788,
reprinted in 4 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 65, at 243.
115. STORING, WHAT THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR, supra note 64, at 11.
116. The Fallacies of the Freeman Detected by A Farmer, supra note 100, at 184.
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existence of "Thirteen State governments, preserved in full force
and energy."'17
James Wilson of Pennsylvania, himself no ardent state defender,
captured the essence of the early connection between individual
rights and "states' rights." Civil liberty, he said, was that which
persons retained when they consented to be governed-a person
"retains the free and generous exercise of all the human
faculties, so far as it is compatible with the public welfare."" 8
Wilson counterposed that states, when they joined the confederate
republic, enjoyed a comparable "federal liberty.""9 Like men, states
were said to cede only so much of their independence and "political
liberty" that would benefit the whole. 2 ° As Wilson explained:
"While they resign this part of their political liberty, they retain the
free and generous exercise of all their other faculties, as states, so
far as it is compatible with the welfare of the general and superin-
tending confederacy."' 2 '
These assertions, however, were only generalizations concerning
the rights of states. Many Anti-Federalists were disturbed that the
proposed Constitution did not contain any explicit reservation of
state liberties.'22 Specifically, they proposed that there be a bill of
rights for the states similar to the proposals then circulating for an
individual bill of rights. 123 Luther Martin argued that there should
be a "bill of rights" that would be "a stipulation in favour of the
rights both of states and of men." 124 George Mason also recom-
mended a bill of rights for the states."2 So did Rufus King, who
argued: "As the fundamental rights of individuals are secured by
117. Martin, supra note 73, at 34 (emphasis omitted).
118. 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 40, at 429 (remarks of James Wilson).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. 1 THE COMPLETE ANTi-FEDERALIST, supra note 65, at 35.
123. As Akhil Amar has noted, the Framers were accustomed to thinking of the Bill of
Rights not simply as a list of protections for individuals, but as a means of providing
structural protections for the people. See AXHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 125-27
(1998).
124. Luther Martin, Reply to the Landholder (Mar. 19, 1788), reprinted in 3 RECORDS OF
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 63, at 290.
125. See George Mason, Objections to This Constitution of Government, reprinted in 2
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 63, at 640; 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra
note 40, at 444 (containing Mason's remarks in the Virginia convention).
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express provisions in the State Constitutions; why may not a like
security be provided for the Rights of States in the National
Constitution. "12 "An Officer of the Late Continental Army"
complained that "the liberties of the states and of the people are not
secured by a bill or DECLARATION OF RIGHTS."' 7 "Agrippa"
believed that a "declaration [of rights] ought to have come to the
new constitution in favour of the legislative rights of the several
states, by which their sovereignty over their own citizens within the
state should be secured."" A declaration, he argued, would ensure
that "each state reserves to itself the right of making and altering
its laws."
129
There were many similar complaints of a lack of express protec-
tion for states' rights and liberties in the proposed Constitution.
3 0
There were, as well, some specific proposals for such state bills or
declarations. Most of these pressed claims for specific statements
cordoning off state powers from perceived federal aggrandizement.
"Agrippa," for example, proposed the following representative
amendments, among others:
126. 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 63, at 493.
127. Letter by An Officer of the Late Continental Army, INDEP. GAZETTEER, Nov. 6, 1787,
reprinted in 3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 65, at 93.
128. Letters of Agrippa (No. 6), MASS. GAZETTE, Dec. 14, 1787, reprinted in 4 THE
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 65, at 80.
129. Letters of Agrippa (No. 12), MASS. GAzETTE, Jan. 14, 1788, reprinted in 4 THE
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 65, at 94; see also A FEDERAL REPUBLICAN, A
REVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION PROPOSED BYTHE LATE CONVENTION(1787), reprinted in 3 THE
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 65, at 85 ("A bill of rights should either be inserted,
or a declaration made, that whatever is not decreed to Congress, is reserved to the several
states for their own disposal.").
130. See, e.g., Essays by A Farmer (No. 6), MD. GAZErTE, Apr. 1, 1788, reprinted in 5 THE
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 65, at 51 (noting "the omission of a declaration to
ascertain the rights of the several States"); Clinton, Remarks at the New York Ratifying
Convention (1788), supra note 70, at 182-83 (lamenting lack of security for rights of states);
Letters ofAgrippa (No. 3), MASS GAZETTE, Nov. 30, 1787, reprinted in 4 THE COMPLETE ANTI-
FEDERALIST, supra note 65, at 75 ("All the defenders of this system undertake to prove that
the rights of the states and of the citizens are kept safe."); The Address and Reasons of
Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of Pennsylvania to Their Constituents, PA. PACKET
& DAILY ADVERTISER, Dec. 18, 1787, reprinted in 3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra
note 65, at 156 ("The new constitution, consistently with the plan of consolidation, contains
no reservation of the rights and privileges of the state governments....").
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1. "It shall be left to every state to make and execute its own
laws, except laws impairing contracts, which shall not be
made at all."
2. "Each state shall have the command of its own militia."
3. "No continental army shall come within the limits of any
state, other than garrison to guard the publick stores, without
the consent of such states in time of peace."
4. "Every state may emit bills of credit without making them a
tender, and may coin money, of silver, gold or copper, accord-
ing to the continental standard."
5. "No officer of Congress shall be free from arrest for debt by
authority of the state in which the debt shall be due.1 31
All of these rights, and a host of others, were considered necessary
both to check the central government and to "preserve the impor-
tance of the state governments." 132 The mere guidance of the Tenth
Amendment was not considered sufficient for this purpose.
James Madison recognized that critics of the proposed plan of
government contended that a bill of rights "ought to be declaratory,
not of the personal rights of individuals, but of the rights reserved
to the States in their political capacity.""'3 The proposals, of course,
were not accepted, the Convention preferring instead to rely upon
the combination of limited, enumerated federal powers, the
reservation of state powers in the Tenth Amendment, and the
protections against federal aggrandizement in the remaining
provisions of the Bill of Rights. These, especially the dispersal of
sovereign power, were ultimately considered sufficient to protect
and preserve the basic "rights" of states.
In sum, the Anti-Federalists relied to a significant extent on the
state-as-person metaphor.'4 The metaphor provided, among other
131. Letters of Agrippa (No. 16), MASS. GAzE7TE, Feb. 5, 1788, reprinted in 4 THE
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 65, at 112; see also 5 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note
40, at 551-52 (rejecting Roger Sherman's attempt to include in Article V the proviso that "no
state shall ... be affected in its internal police").
132. Letters of Agrippa (No. 16), supra note 131, at 113.
133. THE FEDERALIST No. 38, at 250 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
134. Some were concerned with this strategy, arguing that states should not be reduced
to the status of individuals. For example, "The Federal Farmer" protested that states "may
complain and petition-so may individuals; the members of them, in extreme cases, may
resist, on the principles of self-defence--so may the people and individuals." OBSERVATIONS
LEADING TO A FAIR EXAMINATION OF THE SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT PROPOSED BY THE LATE
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things, an explanation for the states' entrance into the Union.
States thus could conveniently borrow the "state of nature" theory,
which explained individuals' partial surrender of liberty to govern-
ment through the compact of the Constitution. More than this,
however, state-as-person literally put a face to state sovereignty.
Viewed as moral persons, states could not be readily ignored in
drafting the constitutional plan. As we shall see, their rights to
existence, separateness, political representation, and interpretive
independence were ultimately preserved.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF STATES
As noted in the Introduction, the principal difficulty with
discussions of "states' rights" is that there is considerable confusion
as to what the concept actually encompasses. "States' rights" has
unfortunately become confused through misuse and sometimes
opportunistic abuse. Politicians and other interested parties have
co-opted "states' rights" as a shorthand for localism or as a worn
anti-Washington-insider slogan.1"' Others, whether at bench or
bar, or in the academy, use the phrase as if it were essentially
interchangeable with "federalism," thus essentially substituting one
undefined construct for another. I 6 Still others might view "states'
rights" as more or less synonymous with state police powers." 7 This
view of "states' rights" is most often associated with strict constitu-
tional construction of federal enumerated powers.
We need to be much more precise about the meaning of "states'
rights" in the constitutional sense. Indeed, one of the goals of this
Article is to refine the terminology of state-federal relations in the
interest of conceptual clarity. The first thing to do is to distinguish
between states' claims to residual power and their claims to person-
like inviolable constitutional rights. It no longer makes sense to
advance claims of exclusive state power. Dual federalism, in which
CONVENTION; AND TO SEVERAL ESSENTIAL AND NECESSARY ALTERATIONS IN IT. IN A NUMBER
OF LETTERS FROM TmE FEDERAL FARMER TO THE REPUBLICAN (1787), reprinted in 2 THE
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 65, at 339.
135. See supra note 10.
136. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
137. See supra note 15; see also, e.g., United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 586 n.9
(1981) (holding that a federal racketeering statute does not interfere with states' rights "to
exercise their police powers to the fullest constitutional extent").
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state and central governments occupy exclusive spheres of power,
has been gradually replaced by a more "cooperative" federalism,
which is characterized by overlapping jurisdiction and powers.' 38
When today we speak in terms of state powers, it is generally with
reference to residual, rather than exclusive, sovereign authority. As
the Tenth Amendment confirms, therefore, states retain those
powers not granted to the federal government nor prohibited to
them by the Constitution. 139
States have rights, however, that may not be abridged even if the
Constitution grants Congress, for example, the power to regulate
interstate commerce. There are narrow, yet critical, areas in which
states can be said to possess valid claims, or rights, to be free from
federal interference without regard to whether federal power has
been constitutionally granted. States enjoy certain basic rights
of sovereign self-preservation and independence; these include
the rights to existence, separateness, political participation, and
interpretive independence. It makes sense to consider these as
sovereign rights, rather than as the product of some power calculus.
These rights are either expressly guaranteed in the text of the
Constitution or readily implied from its basic structure.
As a result of recent Court decisions, however, we must now
account for another specie of state constitutional rights. The Court
has discovered additional affirmative limitations, or what we might
call "fundamental" rights, which shield states from federal power
that is otherwise constitutionally granted. These fundamental
rights reside in the penumbras and presuppositions of constitu-
tional text and structure. In this sense certain "federal liberties" are
modeled on the civil liberties of persons, particularly the individual
fundamental rights associated with the doctrine of substantive due
process. This Part examines, in turn, the "sovereign" and "funda-
mental" rights of states.
A. The Sovereign Rights of States
The Constitution grants states certain basic sovereign rights,
things that the states may claim as due regardless of context,
138. See Rubin & Feeley, supra note 5, at 933.
139. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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circumstance, or federal claim to authority. These are the rights of
states to exist, to form separate governments, to participate in the
political process, and to render definitive interpretations of their
own laws, at least where no federal right or issue is involved. These
rights are critical to divided sovereignty and state independence.
Without them, we could not speak in terms of a federal system that
respects the sovereign independence of states.
1. The Right to Exist
The most important right one can possess is the right to live and
to attend to one's self-preservation.140 This right was of particular
concern to Anti-Federalists as they fought against what they feared
would be the states' utter annihilation under the proposed Constitu-
tion. 14' The compact theory, which was based in part upon the state
of nature analogy, held that the separate states had joined the
Union in part to preserve their very existence. 42 Toward that end,
states, like individuals, delegated limited and, ultimately, revocable
power to the central government.
With all of the substantial confusion that has attended federal-
ism, the Court has managed to retain clarity about at least this one
thing: "[N] either government may destroy the other...."" The post-
Civil War Court, for rather obvious reasons, repeatedly stressed the
necessity of the states. The Constitution, the Court declared in
Texas v. White, "looks to an indestructible Union, composed of
indestructible States." 44
The Constitution in various provisions contemplates the states'
existence by providing for various roles states are to play. As the
Court noted in Lane County v. Oregon,141 "in many articles of the
Constitution the necessary existence of the States, and, within their
140. The Constitution, of course, protects, even sanctifies, the personal interest in "life."
Life cannot be taken arbitrarily, without process, or by methods that are "cruel and unusual."
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (stating the prohibition on taking "life,
liberty, or property" without "due process of law"). In addition, numerous procedural and
substantive rights in the Constitution protect personhood in this core sense.
141. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 66-72 and accompanying text.
143. Metcalf& Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514, 523 (1926).
144. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 725 (1869).
145. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71 (1869).
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proper spheres, the independent authority of the States, is dis-
tinctly recognized.""' The Constitution protects, for example, the
territorial integrity of the states. 147 State citizenship, as well, is
expressly recognized and carries with it certain privileges."48
The Constitution cannot be amended without the participation
of the states."9 Finally, the Guarantee Clause"5 "presupposes the
continued existence of the states ... [aind ... those means and
instrumentalities which are the creation of their sovereign and
reserved rights."'5 ' These and other constitutional provisions
establish that the states enjoy a sovereign right to exist.
In order to protect their right to exist, states also enjoy the right
of self-preservation. They are entitled to defend themselves against
internal threats to integrity, peace, and tranquility. States thus
may prosecute criminals in order to preserve their existence, as well
as their internal "peace and dignity."'52 "Each [state] has the power,
inherent in any sovereign, independently to determine what shall
be an offense against its authority and to punish such offenses....""'
Although one hopes it does not come to pass, states may also resist
efforts by internal or external forces to extinguish or annihilate
them altogether. The Second Amendment, whose meaning with
regard to who retains the "right" to bear arms has yet to be
definitively resolved, contemplates the existence in all free states
of a "well regulated Militia. " 154
As part of the social contract, states may also expect that central
governmental power will be used to protect their existence should
146. Id. at 76; see Brannon P. Denning & Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Essay, Comfortably
Penumbral, 77 B.U. L. REV. 1089 (1997) (noting the Court's embrace in federalism areas of
the sort of penumbral reasoning common to substantive due process precedents).
147. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3 ("[N]o new State shall be formed or erected within the
Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the Junction of two or more
States, or Parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned
as well as of the Congress.").
148. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
149. U.S. CONST. art. V.
150. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
151. Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 414-15 (1938).
152. United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377,382 (1922); see also Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S.
82, 90 (1985) (noting that under the "dual sovereignty" principle, a state can prosecute a
person for a crime even if another state has also prosecuted the person for the same offense).
153. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 320 (1978).
154. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
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it be threatened. The Constitution expressly provides that the
United States "shall protect each [state] ... against Invasion; and on
Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the
Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence." 55
Provisions such as these are the result of the Anti-Federalists'
moral arguments on behalf of the "frail" states.'56
The expectation of the states' existence does not, of course, speak
to the robustness and vigor of state "life." Just as an individual's
right to life does not guarantee any baseline of economic or other
sustenance, the states' right to exist does not tell us what, if any,
other "rights" the states are to enjoy. Nor does it mean that the
federal government has any specific obligation, moral or otherwise,
to support states beyond, that is, protecting them from invasion
and violence, and preventing their annihilation. At a minimum,
however, the Constitution recognizes the states' sovereign right to
exist.
2. The Right To Separateness
It would make little sense to speak of "dual sovereignty" if one
sovereign could dictate to another the most basic terms concerning
the formation of its own government. State independence and
sovereignty could not exist if the central government could effec-
tively dictate who may serve in state governments or where they
may serve. States thus retain a basic right to separateness or, as
the Anti-Federalists argued, "individuality."'57
Indeed, the Court has recognized that the states enjoy a limited
sphere of liberty and independence with respect to their internal
governance. In Coyle v. Oklahoma,5 ' for example, the Court held
that the "power to locate its own seat of government and to
determine when and how it shall be changed from one place to
another, and to appropriate its own public funds for that purpose,
are essentially and peculiarly state powers."'59 The Constitution
155. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
156. See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
157. See supra text accompanying note 71.
158. 221 U.S. 559 (1911).
159. Id. at 565; see also Highland Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608, 612 (1937)
("How power shall be distributed by a state among its governmental organs is commonly, if
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contemplates that state governments will be composed of legisla-
tive, judicial, and executive branches. 6 ° Beyond locating and
funding these institutions, states also have the right to choose their
own officials, and to prescribe at least their basic qualifications. 161
Each state must also be allowed to determine the manner in which
these officials will be chosen.162 Only the states, for example, may
establish voter qualifications for state and local elections.
Although the Court refers to such things as residing within a
sphere of state "power," it makes more sense to consider them as
elements of the states' inviolable right to separateness. Such
matters must necessarily remain impervious to federal power,
whatever the context, if the states are to remain free and sovereign
in even the most limited sense. Even if, for example, Congress is
regulating interstate commerce within what the Court has deter-
mined is the proper scope of that enumerated power, it may not do
so if the effect is to displace basic state prerogatives with regard to
internal governance. In this sense, separateness is a right states
possess, rather than a residual constitutional power they exercise.
It is not based in the Tenth Amendment, which speaks only to state
power, but rather resides elsewhere in the Constitution or can be
readily implied as essential to the recognition of dual sovereignty.
If sovereignty is to remain truly divided in character, states must
have the right to decide where the situs of government will be, who
may serve in their governmental chambers, and what officials' basic
qualifications must be. For states, these are "functions essential to
separate and independent existence." 63
3. Rights to Political Participation
States are also granted sovereign rights to participate in the
governance of the Nation. The Constitution grants these political
participation rights in express terms. It provides that states shall
not always, a question for the state itself.").
160. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 ("Members of the several State Legislatures, and all
executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be
bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution....").
161. Taylor & Marshall v. Beckham (No. 1), 178 U.S. 548, 570-71 (1900).
162. Boyd v. Nebraska ex rel. Thayer, 143 U.S. 135, 161 (1892).
163. Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71, 76 (1869).
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possess and enjoy political rights writ small, and political rights
writ large.
Article V absolutely and unequivocally guarantees to each state
equal suffrage in the Senate. 6 4 The right to equal suffrage is
political process writ small. This was one of the critical sovereign
rights identified by the Anti-Federalists. 65 It guarantees that each
state will have an equal vote in all matters of national governance.
It requires that all states be granted an equal opportunity to be
heard on legislative proposals. Unlike states' representation in the
House of Representatives, which varies because it is based upon
population, the right to equal suffrage in the Senate is a constant
and an absolute. Unless a state consents to its waiver, this right
cannot be diluted or abridged. 161
Article V also grants states the sovereign right to participate in
the constitutional amendment process. 67 This is political process
writ large. It guarantees the sovereign states a substantial voice in
all fundamental proposals to alter the basic charter of government.
This right, too, is subject to neither abridgement nor denial.
4. The (Limited) Right to Interpretive Independence
Article III of the Constitution sets forth the jurisdiction of the
federal courts." As the Supreme Court has emphasized, the
"judicial power of the United States" does not generally extend to
matters relating solely to the constitutions or laws of the states. 
69
164. U.S. CONST. art. V ("[No State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal
suffrage in the Senate....).
165. See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
166. U.S. CONST. art. V.
167. See id. (providing that proposed amendments may be ratified by the legislatures of
three-fourths of the states, or by conventions in three-fourths of the states).
168. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 ("The judicial power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made,
or which shall be made, under their Authority ..... ).
169. See, e.g., Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691 (1975) (noting that the Court
generally defers to state courts on the interpretation of state law); Minnesota v. Natl Tea
Co., 309 U.S. 551,557 (1940) ("It is fundamental that state courts be left free and unfettered
by us in interpreting their state constitutions."). There are, of course, exceptions to this rule.
The most famous exception in recent years is Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). In that case,
the Court refused to defer to the Florida Supreme Court's interpretation of Florida election
law. See id. at 115 ("To attach definitive weight to the pronouncement of a state court, when
the very question at issue is whether the court has actually departed from the statutory
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By clear negative implication, and as an incident of federalism, the
Constitution provides that the states should generally be free to
interpret their own laws and constitutions. 70 So long as no federal
constitutional right or power is implicated, the states possess
interpretive independence.
These, then, are the principal and critical sovereign rights of
states. They arise from the structural plan of the Constitution. The
rights to exist, to form separate governments, to participate in the
political process, and to interpret state laws and constitutions are
recognized so that states may retain a basic degree of independence
and freedom. It is in this rather narrow, but nevertheless critical,
sense that the Anti-Federalists fought for "states' rights." For them,
this was the critical import of the state-as-person metaphor.
B. The "Fundamental" Rights of States
The Anti-Federalists' concern with moral personhood and rights
was aimed principally at providing for the very survival of state-
hood. This is, of course, no longer a pressing concern. Although
states' powers have waned considerably, their essential sovereign
rights remain intact. Personhood, however, has come to be associ-
ated with an elaborate and impressive panoply of constitutional
rights. These are both set forth in the Bill of Rights and arise as a
matter ofjudicial extrapolation from constitutional text. The Court
has extended the rights of states in a similar fashion, far beyond
the narrow "sovereign" rights of existence, separateness, participa-
tion, and interpretation. From the "penumbras" and emanations of
these rights, as well as other sources, the Court has aggressively
discovered and enforced a number of "fundamental" rights on behalf
of states. As of this writing, the states have been granted person-
like "fundamental" rights to intimate association, equality, physical
autonomy, mental autonomy, and due process.
meaning, would be to abdicate our responsibility to enforce the explicit requirements of
Article II.").
170. See Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386,391 (1974) (recognizing that the Supreme
Court acts as an "'outside[r' lacking the common exposure to local law which comes from
sitting in the jurisdiction" and that deference to state courts "helps build a cooperative
judicial federalism").
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The pattern of constitutional rights extension noted here is quite
familiar. This Part examines the fundamental rights of states by
expressly comparing them to the fundamental constitutional rights
of persons. There are three basic similarities between these rights:
substance, methodology, and vitality. For each newly discovered
fundamental state right there is a fundamental personal right
analogous in its core or basic substance. Further, state and personal
fundamental rights have been generated or discovered by means of
a similar judicial methodology. Although the Court often compares
the fundamental rights of states to the express individual rights
that are set forth in the Bill of Rights, fundamental "states' rights"
more closely resemble the constitutional rights associated with the
Court's "substantive due process" doctrine."'7 Like those rights, the
newly discovered "states' rights" have no specific textual support;
they arise from constitutional "penumbras," background principles,
and structural presuppositions.'72 The Court often discovers
these negative state liberties as it discovers fundamental personal
liberties, namely by asking such things as whether they are "deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."'73 Finally, both types
of fundamental rights-those of persons and those of states-are
vital or strong; they occasion, at the least, heightened judicial
scrutiny. Indeed, the new "states' rights" tend to be stronger still.
They have a tendency to be absolute in character.
Commentators have noted, with some puzzlement, the
anthropomorphization of states, particularly the Court's repeated
references to state "dignity,"'74 discussed below in connection with
the states' right to sovereign immunity.' The discussion that
follows takes us beyond this single term and demonstrates the
extent to which statehood has in fact become the new personhood.
During the 1960s and 1970s, the heyday of substantive and
171. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997) (explaining the Court's
substantive due process analysis).
172. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (opining that "specific
guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those
guarantees that help give them life and substance").
173. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality) ("[Tihe
Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the family
is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition....").
174. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
175. See infra Part II.B.2.
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procedural due process, the Court aggressively protected values
like personal dignity and autonomy, and forged new constitutional
protections, both substantive and procedural, in the name of
personhood. '76 The Court has grown wary of extending the doctrine
of substantive due process where individual rights are concerned,
and procedural protections for individuals have substantially
waned.1" During the past few decades, however, states have
experienced a surge in substantive and procedural rights. State
dignity and autonomy have risen to the forefront of the Court's
constitutional rights agenda. The result has been the discovery and
enforcement of new state substantive and procedural rights
comparable in many ways, though surely different in others, to the
individual rights discovered in the 1960s and 1970s.
1. The Right to Order Intimate Affairs
There is an essential core to personhood that cannot be disturbed
by government, save under the most extraordinary circumstances.
The First Amendment protects our right to believe as we wish, and
to order our private thoughts.' Individuals also have an implied
fundamental right to order their intimate associations-to choose,
for example, where and with whom to live and how to raise and
educate their children.179 The right to arrange or order intimate
176. See Resnik & Suk, supra note 36, at 1926 (describing judicial protection of individual
"dignity").
177. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)
(reaffiming constitutional protection for personal decisions "involving the most intimate and
personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and
autonomy"). The Court has refused, on recent occasions, to recognize new fundamental
rights. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997) (refusing to recognize a right
to assisted suicide). The procedural due process revolution was launched in Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254 (1970), which required that welfare recipients receive pre-termination hearings.
Goldberg was a high watermark for procedural due process, which has since been narrowed
both with respect to the interests it protects and the process that is due. See Paul v. Davis,
424 U.S. 693 (1976) (interpreting'liberty" narrowly); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,334
(1976) ("[Dlue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular
situation demands..... (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972))).
178. U.S. CONST. amend I.
179. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 518-19 (1977) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in judgment) (choice of internal ordering of family relationships); Pierce v. Soc'y
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (liberty of parents to direct upbringing and education
of children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (parental control over education
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affairs-where and with whom to live or associate, and what
vocations and interests to pursue-is part of the zone of "privacy"
the Court has developed under principles of substantive due
process. These intimate internal affairs, the Court has held, are not
properly the subject of governmental regulation, but are considered
core aspects of personhood. As the Court recently stated in Law-
rence v. Texas:' "[Tihere is a realm of personal liberty which the
government may not enter."
181
As discussed, the states enjoy a limited sovereign right to form
separate governments. 8 2 This includes the right to choose their own
officials and to locate their own capitols. The Court has sought to
expand this sovereign right to a fuller, more robust state right to
order all of the state's intimate affairs. Beyond locating capitols
and choosing state officers, however, the Court has encountered
methodological, legitimacy, and other problems in staking out the
scope of this right to internal association and ordering. This, then,
should be an instructive example in terms of the Court's present
drive to recognize other fundamental "states' rights."
The Court began to extend the scope of the states' right to
intimate ordering around the same time it was discovering
individual constitutional rights to sexual intimacy and constructing
what would become the fundamental right to "privacy." Shortly
after the Court decided Griswold v. Connecticut 8 3 and Roe v.
Wade, '84 at a time when those decisions were still considered novel
experiments in substantive due process, the Court decided National
League of Cities v. Usery. 8 ' As Griswold marked the beginning of
the modern fundamental rights movement for persons, National
League of Cities initiated the modern fundamental "states' rights"
movement.
In National League of Cities, the Court held that the minimum
wage and maximum hours provisions of the federal Fair Labor
Standards Act could not be applied to the public employees of states
of children).
180. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
181. Id. at 578 (quoting Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 847).
182. See supra Part II.A.2.
183. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
184. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
185. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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and their political subdivisions.18 The holding was based upon the
premise that states have the power to order their internal relations
with employees and officials, and, in addition, to decide on the best
means of delivering services to their citizens. The Court declared:
One undoubted attribute of state sovereignty is the States'
power to determine the wages which shall be paid to those
whom they employ in order to carry out their governmental
functions, what hours those persons will work, and what
compensation will be provided where these employees may be
called upon to work overtime.8 7
Congress could not be permitted, the Court stated, to force states to
relinquish some crucial services or to "displace[] state policies
regarding the manner in which they will structure delivery of those
governmental services which their citizens require." " The Court
concluded that federal law threatened "fundamental employment
decisions" in core state and local areas such as fire prevention,
police protection, and public health. 189
The National League of Cities Court did not claim that Congress
had acted outside its admittedly "plenary" power to regulate
interstate commerce. The Court held, rather, that Congress had
violated the Tenth Amendment, a provision that the Court charac-
terized as an "affirmative limitation" on Congress's power.19 ° This
"affirmative limitation," the Court said, was "akin to other com-
merce power affirmative limitations contained in the Constitution,"
such as "the right to trial by jury contained in the Sixth Amend-
ment, or the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. " 191 Of
course, the rights to a jury trial and due process are expressly
guaranteed in the Bill of Rights. The Court insisted, however, that
the Tenth Amendment contains an "express declaration of this
limitation."192 As the Court, therefore, was just beginning to mine
the Due Process Clause for clues regarding fundamental rights to
186. See id. at 851-52.
187. Id. at 845.
188. Id. at 847.
189. Id. at 851.
190. Id. at 841.
191. Id. (citations omitted).
192. Id. at 842.
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personal privacy, liberty, and autonomy, the Court was at the same
time interpreting the Tenth Amendment as an affirmative limita-
tion on Congress's power to affect the states' "integrity"-their
ability to perform basic functions.19
Having announced that there was some core of statehood arising
from constitutional text that was vague at best, the Court con-
fronted the same problem it was then facing in Griswold and its
progeny: how to identify the scope of the liberty the Constitution
purportedly granted. There were, according to the Court, "attributes
of sovereignty attaching to every state government which may not
be impaired by Congress." 94 States were, the Court said, entitled
to make "essential" decisions free from federal interference. 95 The
following questions, however, remained: Which "attributes" and
which "decisions"?
National League of Cities identified only a few core aspects of
statehood, including the aforementioned sovereign rights of states
to locate their own seats of government and the power implicated
in the case itself-to determine the wages and hours of its own
employees.' 96 Faced with substantive uncertainty, the Court turned
for future refinement, as it would later in the individual fundamen-
tal rights context, to tradition as the purportedly objective indicator
of the fundamental right of states to order their internal affairs.' 9
The minimum wage and maximum hours provisions of the Fair
Labor Standards Act interfered, said the Court, with "traditional
aspects of state sovereignty."'9 The federal provisions thus "may
substantially restructure traditional ways in which the local
governments have arranged their affairs. "199
193. See id.; see also Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542,547 n.7 (1975) ("Congress may not
exercise power in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity or their ability to function
effectively in a federal system.").
194. Nat'l League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 845.
195. See id. at 850; see also New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 587-88 (1946)
(asserting that although states may, like individuals, own real property, it does not follow
that a federal tax can be constitutionally applied to state property).
196. Nat'l League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 845; see Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559, 565
(1911) (noting that a state holds the right to determine the location of its seat of
government).
197. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997) (relying on tradition to
define ftmdamental rights under the Due Process Clause).
198. Nat'! League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 849.
199. Id.
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The attempt to further define a core state right to internal
ordering, by tradition or otherwise, was short-lived. The Court
overruled National League of Cities less than a decade later in
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.200 The
Garcia Court found it impossible to determine, under the "tradi-
tional state function" test, whether municipal ownership and
operation of a mass transit system was a "fundamental attribute"
of state sovereignty. 20' The Court abandoned the "traditional
governmental function" approach as "not only unworkable but ...
also inconsistent with established principles of federalism." 2
The Court found it "difficult, if not impossible, to identify an
organizing principle" that could distinguish essential from non-
essential attributes of statehood. 213 It rejected a case-by-case
approach, which the Court candidly observed had proven to be an
abject failure in other areas, noting particularly precedents
involving intergovernmental tax immunity.2°' The Court criticized
its own reliance upon history and tradition to define internal state
autonomy, stating that its promised objectivity was "illusory,"205 it
"prevents a court from accommodating changes in the historical
functions of States,"2 M6 and it "results in line-drawing of the most
arbitrary sort."20 7 The Court also noted "a more fundamental
problem at work here."0 8 Identification of fundamental "states'
rights," it stated, "inevitably invites an unelected federal judiciary
to make decisions about which state policies it favors and which
ones it dislikes."2 9
As the Court saw it, therefore, there were only two choices when
it came to identifying constitutional limits on Congress's commerce
authority. The first was a judicially managed substantive federal
200. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
201. Id. at 537-47; see Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264,
287-88 (1981) (setting forth a four-part test for state governmental immunity).
202. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 531.
203. Id. at 539.
204. See id. at 540-41.
205. Id. at 544.
206. Id. at 543.
207. Id. at 544; see id. (noting that "courts would have to decide by fiat precisely how
longstanding a pattern of state involvement had to be for federal regulatory authority to be
defeated").
208. Id. at 548.
209. Id. at 546.
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liberty, an effort "to single out particular features of a State's
internal governance that are deemed to be intrinsic parts of state
sovereignty."21 ° The Court rejected this approach based upon "the
elusiveness of objective criteria for 'fundamental' elements of
state sovereignty."21' The second approach, and the one the Court
purported to choose in Garcia, was to rely upon constitutional
structure and the political process to police the limits of congres-
sional power.212 After Garcia, therefore, the states were to derive
their fundamental protections not from a priori judicial definitions
of state sovereignty, but rather from such things as limitations on
Congress's enumerated powers and the states' role in the selection
of the executive and legislative branches.21
The Garcia majority stressed that the Court had "no license to
employ freestanding conceptions of state sovereignty when measur-
ing congressional authority under the Commerce Clause."2"4 On the
other hand, the dissenters complained of an "emasculation of the
powers of the States."215 Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor specifi-
cally predicted that the states' fundamental right to internal
ordering was "a principle that will, I am confident, in time again
command the support of a majority of this Court."216
This prediction has proven to be substantially accurate. For
the present, however, the Court continues to rely upon procedural
safeguards to protect states' essential internal operations. In
Gregory v. Ashcroft,21 the Court held that the federal Age
Discrimination in Employment Act's (ADEA) mandatory retirement
provisions did not apply to Missouri judges. 18 The Court reasoned
that the choice of qualifications for judges "goes beyond an area
traditionally regulated by the States; it is a decision of the most
fundamental sort for a sovereign entity."219 Rather than return to
210. Id. at 548.
211. Id.
212. See id. at 550 ("[Tlhe principal means chosen by the Framers to ensure the role of the
States in the federal system lies in the structure of the Federal Government itself....").
213. See id. at 552-53 (describing political safeguards).
214. Id. at 550.
215. Id. at 572 (Powell, J., dissenting).
216. Id. at 580 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
217. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
218. See id. at 470.
219. Id. at 460.
2004] 257
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
a full-blown fundamental rights approach, as in National League
of Cities, the Gregory Court chose a procedural mechanism for
protecting this right to internal ordering. It required that Congress
provide a "clear statement" of legislative intent whenever it
purports to upset the "state-federal balance."22 ° Finding the
legislative intent with respect to the ADEA ambiguous in this
respect, the Court held that the statute could not be applied to
prohibit the mandatory retirement of state judges pursuant to the
state constitution.22'
The "clear statement" rule is one of a panoply of recently
discovered quasi-constitutional process limitations on congressional
power.222 Whether this sort of protection is merely procedural is
open to question. There is certainly a sense in which such proce-
dural rules protect substantive state interests, including their
sovereign right to form their own governments. Indeed, the Gregory
Court stated that "the authority of the people of the States to
determine the qualifications of their government officials may be
inviolate ."2'z The Court compared the state's right to choose its
officials to a state's power, pursuant to equal protection doctrine, to
prohibit aliens from certain public employments.224 Just as such a
right "inheres in the State"2 5 and is "intimately related to the
process of democratic self-government,"226 the Court reasoned, the
states must be permitted to define their internal makeup and
structure.227
There is, thus, substantial bite to Gregory's clear statement rule,
at least insofar as Congress seeks to affect the qualifications of
state officials. The characterization of the right as "procedural"
should not obscure the Court's conviction that states should retain
220. Id. at 464.
221. Id. at 470.
222. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear
Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 598 (1992) (arguing
that "super-strong clear statement rules" essentially "amount to a 'backdoor' version of the
constitutional activism that most Justices on the current Court have publicly denounced").
State process-based rights are discussed infra at Part II.B.4.
223. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 464 (emphasis added).
224. See id. at 461 (discussing Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973)).
225. Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 647.
226. Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 220 (1984).
227. See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 463 (stating that it lies within "the authority of the people
of the States to determine the qualifications of their most important government officials").
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a fundamental right to order their internal affairs. As the Court
said: "Through the structure of its government, and the character
of those who exercise government authority, a State defines itself as
a sovereign."228 This language rather closely resembles some of the
most sweeping language in recent fundamental rights cases. As the
Court has said with regard to fundamental individual rights: "At
the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human
life." 22
9
What, then, is the status of the states' fundamental right to
internal ordering? States, of course, retain their sovereign rights to
locate capitols and choose government officials. Garcia claimed to
abandon the project of defining "essential attributes" of statehood
by reference to tradition. Other interferences with the internal
ordering of states may, under Gregory, require at least a very clear
statement of congressional intent. There is, indeed, some ambiva-
lence on the Court as to whether some such internal matters may
be considered "inviolate."
2. The Right to Equality-Freedom from Second-Class
Sovereignty
After Garcia and Gregory, observers would have been excused for
believing that the Court had abandoned the effort to define the
substantive constitutional rights of states, and that henceforth
states would be left to defend themselves in the political arena.
As others have noted, however, recent federalism cases indicate
that Garcia has been overruled sub silentio.2'0 As in individual
rights cases, the Court has refused to rely solely on constitutional
processes and structures to protect states. The Court has, as we
shall see, aggressively discovered a number of additional fundamen-
tal state rights. These rights have extended well beyond the
narrowly cabined sovereign rights to self-preservation and self-
determination that were discussed previously.
228. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460 (emphasis added).
229. Planned Parenthood ofSoutheastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,851 (1992) (emphasis
added).
230. See Yoo, supra note 11, at 1334-57 (arguing that Garcia has effectively been
overruled).
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The Court has been particularly aggressive in terms of protect-
ing the states from federal waivers of their sovereign immunity
from private lawsuits. The history of state sovereign immunity is
complex.23 1 At least insofar as the constitutional text is concerned,
however, state sovereign immunity was originally conceived quite
narrowly. The Eleventh Amendment limits the judiciary's power to
entertain only one type of private lawsuit against states: federal
diversity suits brought against a state by citizens of another
state.3 2 The amendment was proposed and ratified for a narrow
purpose--to overrule Chisholm v. Georgia,233 which had allowed
such suits in part because the states were then considered mere
corporate forms lacking dignitary or other interests that out-
weighed citizens' right to seek redress.3 4
Recently, however, the Court has steadily expanded the scope
of the states' "right" not to be subjected by Congress to private
231. For a discussion of the original intent of the Eleventh Amendment, see Lawrence C.
Marshall, Fighting the Words of the Eleventh Amendment, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1342, 1356-71
(1989).
232. The Eleventh Amendment provides: "The Judicial power of the United States shall
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one
of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State." U.S. CONST. amend XI.
233. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
234. As Justice Cushing stated:
[T]he obvious dictates ofjustice, and the purposes of [slociety [demand that]...
in certain cases one citizen may sue forty thousand; for where a corporation is
sued, all the members of it are actually sued, though not personally, sued....
Will it be said, that the fifty odd thousand citizens in Delaware being associated
... under their charter, that although it may become the latter to meet an
individual on an equal footing in a Court of Justice, yet that such a procedure
would not comport with the dignity of the former?
Id. at 472 (emphasis omitted). As a corporate form, the state had no more "dignity" than a
bank or a railroad. Like those forms, the state had to yield to individual justice and personal
dignity. Indeed, although an insult to statehood at present, the concept of the state as
corporation would be relied upon by Congress in enacting important civil rights legislation,
including the Civil Rights Act of 1781, the precursor to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Some sponsors and
supporters of the enactment expressed the view that states would be covered by its
proscriptions, which extended to all persons." According to the Dictionary Act of 1780, which
purported to provide definitions in aid of statutory construction, "person" included
corporations and bodies politic. See Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70 n.8
(1989) (setting forth the Dictionary Act). Based upon the Dictionary Act, there was at least
some indication that states would be covered by the Civil Rights Act. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d
Cong., 1st Sess. 661 (1871) (Sen. Vichers) ("What is a State? Is it not a body politic and
corporate?"); id. at 696 (Sen. Edmunds) ("A State is a corporation.").
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lawsuits. In prohibiting these lawsuits, the Court has repeatedly
emphasized states' "dignitary" interests. It has held, for example,
that Congress cannot use its authority under the Commerce Clause
to abrogate state immunity from private suits in state courts
pursuant to federal causes of action,2 35 or even to subject states to
adjudicatory proceedings before federal agencies.236 In recent cases,
the Court has literally blanketed the states in sovereign immunity
from lawsuits." 7
The source of this broadened, extra-textual right to immunity has
been something of a moving target. It was at one point located, like
the limited right to internal ordering discussed above, in the Tenth
Amendment.3 Despite its narrow text, a broad state right to
immunity has also been said to be inherent in the Eleventh
Amendment.3 9 In truth, as its immunity doctrine has developed,
the Court has essentially conceded that the right to immunity is not
rooted in any constitutional text at all. As a result, neither the
Eleventh Amendment nor, by some method of importation, the
Tenth Amendment, gives rise to it. 24° As the Court has explained,
the Eleventh Amendment stands "not so much for what it says, but
for the presupposition ... which it confirms."241 This version of
states' rights, unlike its predecessors, obviously does not rely upon
principles of "strict construction."
The basic "presupposition" for state immunity, the Court
explained in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,242 is the principle
of divided sovereignty, which carries with it the "inherent" right of
states "not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its
235. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 716 (1999).
236. See Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002).
237. There are, however, indications that the Court may be balking at the logical
implications of its expansion of state sovereign immunity. See Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct.
1978 (2004) (holding that Congress validly abrogated states' immunity from lawsuits under
Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act).
238. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 713-14.
239. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996).
240. See Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 535 U.S. at 767-68 n. 18. As the Court explained with respect
to the Eleventh Amendment: "[Tihe Eleventh Amendment does not define the scope of the
States' sovereign immunity; it is but one particular exemplification of that immunity." Id.
at 753.
241. Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991).
242. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
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consent."243 Pursuant to this presupposition, the scope of the right
to immunity is demarcated not by constitutional text, but rather by
"fundamental postulates implicit in the constitutional design."244
Like individual fundamental rights, particularly those associated
with the doctrine of substantive due process, this right is less a
matter of text than of "history and experience and the established
order of things."245 It is, as Justice Stevens has described it, "the
second Eleventh Amendment, which has its source in judge-made
common law, rather than constitutional text."24
According to the Court, the fundamental right to immunity is
based upon a "background principle," which confirms that immunity
is an inherent attribute of sovereignty.247 This "background princi-
ple," the Court has explained, "is not so ephemeral as to dissipate
when the subject of the suit is an area ... that is under the exclusive
control of the Federal Government." 241 Immunity prevails in the
face of even plenary congressional power, the Court says, because
it is a "fundamental aspect" of sovereignty.249 It "inheres in the
system of federalism established by the Constitution,"2 0 apparently
just as certain individual rights inhere in the concept of ordered
liberty.
Because the right to immunity is fundamental, the Court has
indicated that Congress can alter or abrogate state immunity "only
if there is compelling evidence that the States were required to
surrender this power to Congress pursuant to the constitutional
design.""' Proceedings that Congress purports to authorize against
states, but which were "anomalous and unheard of ... when the
Constitution was adopted,"1 2 are treated as presumptively
unconstitutional. 25" The Court has applied the presumption
243. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1890) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 487
(Alexander Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed., 1961)); see Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54.
244. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 716, 729 (1999).
245. Hans, 134 U.S. at 14.
246. Nev. Dep't ofHuman Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721,741 (2003) (Stevens, J., concurring).
247. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72.
248. Id.
249. Alden, 527 U.S. at 713.
250. Id. at 730.
251. Id. at 731.
252. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 18 (1890).
253. Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 755 (2002).
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assiduously; it has yet to discover the "compelling evidence"
required to subject states to suit.
The right to immunity is, by the Court's own admission, based in
the common law. Yet notwithstanding its common law lineage, the
Court has held that the right to immunity is not defeasible by
Congress. As the Court recently explained, once again drawing an
explicit analogy to individual fundamental rights, the right to
immunity is comparable to the right to a jury trial and the prohibi-
tion on unreasonable searches and seizures, both of which are based
upon the common law; "[t]hey are," the Court explains, "constitu-
tional rights, and form the fundamental law of the land."" 4 There
is yet another sense in which the fundamental right to immunity
mirrors individual constitutional rights. Individual rights often
serve functional purposes, but there is no requirement that they do
so in order to be judicially enforced. The First Amendment is said,
for example, to serve a truth-seeking function by protecting a robust
"marketplace of ideas."255 First Amendment protection, however,
does not hinge on the ability of speech to serve this or any other
interest; even low-level speech like pornography receives some
protection.
56
The right to immunity likewise does not rest upon instrumental
reasons. It does not, for example, arise so that state treasuries will
be protected from litigation.2 57 The interests served by state
sovereign immunity are far more symbolic than this. As the Court
has repeatedly emphasized, the states' right to immunity rests
squarely upon the "dignity" and "esteem" of the states. The Court
has made this much patently clear: "The preeminent purpose of
state sovereign immunity is to accord States the dignity that is
consistent with their status as sovereign entities."' Forcing states
to answer private lawsuits at Congress's behest, the Court has
explained, is an "offense" to a state's "standing in the Union." "
254. Alden, 527 U.S. at 733.
255. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
256. See FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 252 (1990).
257. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 535 U.S. at 769.
258. Id. at 760 (emphasis added); see also Alden, 527 U.S. at 748 (stating that "our
federalism requires that Congress treat the States in a manner consistent with their status
as residuary sovereigns and joint participants in the governance of the Nation").
259. Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 282 (1997).
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With this background, we are now in a position to appreciate the
significance of the state-as-person metaphor in this context and to
identify the individual rights analog for this fundamental right to
sovereign immunity. Invoking the notion of "dual" or "joint sover-
eignty" and the value of state "dignity," the Court, according to one
view, has implied that states are figurative nation-states not
subject to involuntary waivers of immunity.6 ° This metaphor can
work, however, only if the Court is willing to insist that states are
fully sovereign nations within the meaning of international law.2"'
As others have noted, this assertion would run counter to the
significant constitutional divestiture of state sovereignty in matters
of foreign affairs, as well as the post-ratification understanding of
state sovereign authority.262 More importantly, the metaphor would
run counter to the law of nations itself. Under that body of law,
Congress is entitled to subject foreign nations to suit in our
courts. 263 The state-as-nation metaphor, therefore, "clearly should
lead to the conclusion that Congress can subject the states to suit
in federal court."2 64 This is, of course, precisely the opposite
conclusion the Court has reached over and over again in recent
sovereign immunity cases.265
There must, then, be some other explanation for the Court's
enhanced solicitude for state "dignity" and status. The language the
Court has adopted when speaking of state sovereign immunity, and
the substance of the right that has been recognized, bear a striking
resemblance to the individual right to equality. Immunity, like
260. See Smith, supra note 36, at 7 (arguing that recent sovereign immunity precedents
treat states as nations); see also Lee, supra note 105, at 1061-67 (arguing that the Framers
of the Eleventh Amendment relied upon principles of international law in conceptualizing
the states).
261. See Smith, supra note 36, at 88 ("[T]he Court's implicit suggestion in relying on the
states' dignity is that the states are analogous to independent sovereigns within the meaning
of customary international law.").
262. See id. at 92 (noting that the Constitution 'specifically divested the states" of powers
of foreign diplomacy and commerce).
263. See id. at 36-50 (discussing limits of foreign sovereign immunity).
264. Id. at 99.
265. The Court has emphasized the equality and dignity of the states vis-A-vis each other
principally in interstate border disputes, the doctrine of personal jurisdiction, and cases of
interstate immunity. States are said in these contexts to be "equal" to each other in the same
sense in which foreign nations enjoy equal rights and equal powers of sovereignty. See id. at
81-87 (discussing cases).
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equality, is being enforced as a status-based right. Indeed, it is
being protected on that basis and no other. Like other status-based
rights, the right to immunity is explicitly comparative. As the Court
has noted, the federal government retains immunity from suits in
state and federal courts. The Court thus has reasoned: "In light of
our constitutional system recognizing the essential sovereignty of
the States, we are reluctant to conclude that the States are not
entitled to a reciprocal privilege."266 This is what the Court means
when it states that immunity's central purpose is to "'accord[] the
States the respect owed them as' members of the federation."26 '
Cast in this light, plenary federal control of state institutions-
including state courts that are essentially conscripted into enter-
taining private suits against states--"denigrates the separate
sovereignty of the States."268 The denigration consists of an
interference with an essential attribute of statehood. Permitting
such interference would send, to Congress, the states, and private
litigants, the message that a state is somehow less than a "full"
state, in the same sense that a law that deprives one of an essential
right, while granting it to others no more deserving, sends the
message that a person is not quite fully human.269 The Court thus
has emphasized that states "are not relegated to the role of mere
provinces or political corporations, but retain the dignity, though
not the full authority, of sovereignty."211 Congress "may not treat
these sovereign entities as mere prefectures or corporations," but
266. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 716, 749-50 (1999) (emphasis added).
267. Id. at 748-49 (quoting P.R. Aqueduct and Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506
U.S. 139, 146 (1993)); see also Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261,268 (1997)
(recognizing "the dignity and respect afforded a State, which the immunity is designed to
protect"); P.R. Aqueduct, 506 U.S. at 146 (stating that the Eleventh Amendment serves to
avoid "the indignity of subjecting a State to the coercive process of judicial tribunals at the
instance of private parties" (quoting In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 505 (1887))).
268. Alden, 527 U.S. at 749.
269. See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 142 (1994) (plurality opinion)
(striking jurors based upon gender "denigrates the dignity of the excluded juror"); City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,493 (1989) ('[Pjersonal rights' to be treated with
equal dignity and respect are implicated by a rigid rule erecting race as the sole criterion in
an aspect of public decisionmaking"); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 555 (1896) (Harlan,
J., dissenting) (stating that the Fourteenth Amendment "added greatly to the dignity and
glory of American citizenship, and to the security of personal liberty").
270. Alden, 527 U.S. at 715.
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"must accord States the esteem due to them as joint participants in
a federal system."2"'
In sum, then, the Court's primary concern is that states :not be
treated by Congress, with respect to their immunity from private
lawsuits, as second-class sovereigns. The dignitary concern with
second-class status is quite similar to the individual constitutional
right to equality.272 Whatever the equality guarantees of the
Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments entail, these provisions mean at
least that governments are prohibited from treating certain groups
or persons as if they occupy a second-class status. Congressional
abrogation of state immunity, which permits private litigants to
hail states into court without the states' express and voluntary
consent, has been treated by the Court as problematic for similar
reasons. The Court apparently believes that compelling states to
respond in court at the behest of citizens signifies that states occupy
a lower sovereign status than they should.
Sovereign immunity thus is not treated, as the Eleventh Amend-
ment suggests, as a narrow limitation on the judicial power to
entertain lawsuits against states. Rather, it is treated as a funda-
mental right of statehood. The substance of the right is equal or
reciprocal treatment. Its source, unlike the individual right to
equality, is not textual; immunity arises from judicially determined
"presuppositions" and "background principles." It is a vital right,
one that requires "compelling" evidence to sustain a congressional
waiver, even in an area of plenary federal power. Finally, this right
271. Id. at 758.
272. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 213 (1982) ("The Equal Protection Clause was
intended to work nothing less than the abolition of all caste-based and invidious class-based
legislation.'); see also Daniel Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The Pariah Principle, 13 CONST.
COMMENT. 257,271-72 (1996) (discussing stigmatic harms associated with caste treatment);
Cass R. Sunstein, TheAnticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410,2429 (1994) (urging courts
to consider whether legislation creates "second-class citizenship, or lower-caste status" for
a group). The Court looks with disfavor upon denigrated status and esteem in other
individual rights contexts as well. The Establishment Clause is one example. In a much-
quoted passage from Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984), Justice O'Connor stated:
"Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members
of the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are
insiders, favored members of the political community. Disapproval sends the opposite
message." Id. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See Caminker, supra note 36, at 85
(suggesting that the right to immunity seems to mirror the Court's recognition of dignitary
interests of persons in equality and establishment contexts).
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is grounded primarily in the states' dignitary interests. The right
to immunity has, as Justice Souter has commented, all of the
hallmarks of a "natural" right--"a universally applicable proposi-
tion discoverable by reason."273 Whatever its true source, we can
place immunity from suit among the new fundamental rights of
states.
3. The Right to Autonomy-Freedom from "Physical" and
"Mental" Coercion
Individuals possess and enjoy basic fundamental rights to
physical and mental autonomy. Some of these rights are explicitly
protected in provisions of the Bill of Rights. The Fourth Amend-
ment, for example, prohibits the government from arbitrarily taking
hold of or seizing our persons.2 ' The Eighth Amendment limits the
nature and character of punishments to which we can be constitu-
tionally subjected.2 75 Procedural protections like the right to trial by
jury and the right against self-incrimination are designed, in part,
to limit the conditions under which physical autonomy, our most
basic freedom, can be affected by government. In addition, as a
matter of substantive due process, the Court has on many occasions
recognized an individual's fundamental right to control how her
body is treated.2 7' These dignitary and autonomy interests are at
the very core of personhood.
The Constitution also protects persons from certain forms of
mental coercion. As previously noted, the First Amendment broadly
guarantees that individuals are free to think and believe as they see
fit.2 77 In addition, constitutional safeguards like the Fifth Amend-
273. Alden, 527 U.S. at 763 (Souter, J., dissenting).
274. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (prohibiting unreasonable seizures).
275. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (prohibiting "cruel and unusual" punishments).
276. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (noting that the right
"to bodily integrity" is part of the "liberty" guarantee in the Due Process Clause); Planned
Parenthood ofSoutheastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,847-49 (1992)(listing substantive due
process rights, including the right to bodily integrity); Cruzan v. Dir. Mo. Dep't of Health, 497
U.S. 261, 270 (1990) (recognizing a limited right to refuse life-sustaining treatment);
Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210,221-22 (1990) (recognizing "a significant liberty interest
in avoiding the unwanted administration of anti-psychotic drugs"); Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S.
753, 766 (1985) (supporting the right to refuse a surgical procedure).
277. See supra text accompanying note 178.
20041 267
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
ment's protection against self-incrimination and the Sixth Amend-
ment's right to counsel exist in part to ensure that persons will not
be mentally or physically coerced into waiving other fundamental
rights." 8 Coerced confessions and intimidation of suspects, the
Court has recognized, are "destructive of human dignity."279
States possess and enjoy analogous rights to both physical and
mental autonomy. The type and character of the coercive govern-
mental conduct at issue is obviously dissimilar. The principles,
however, are analogous. There are constitutional limits on the
extent to which the government may physically or mentally
interfere with fundamental autonomy interests, whether of persons
or of states.
a. State "Physical" Autonomy
To assist the metaphor, we can imagine that the state corpus is
composed of essential organs, as is the human body. It has legisla-
tive, executive, and judicial appendages that conduct the essential
business of government. In addition, states make critical decisions
with regard to the exercise of their powers and the enjoyment of
their liberties. They do so, generally speaking, through their
governmental agencies and officials, their figurative central nervous
systems.
State autonomy, like personal autonomy, is a broad concept. We
have already seen how the Court has protected the states' ability to
order certain intimate internal affairs.8 ' This may be described as
an autonomy interest of sorts. States, in choosing the locus of
government as well as whom they please to govern, are exercising
a form of sovereign liberty or autonomy.
States also have the right to maintain some level of control over
their corporal or bodily integrity once their governments have been
formed. The rights of states overlap, as do the rights of persons. In
addition to its concern for state equality and reciprocity, therefore,
278. See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (stating that waiver of counsel
must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent).
279. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,457 (1966); see also Rochin v. California, 342 U.S.
165,172,174 (1952) (individuals have a right to be free from physical methods "so brutal and
so offensive to human dignity" that they "shock the conscience").
280. See supra Part II.B.1.
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the right to sovereign immunity also protects state physical
autonomy to some extent. In Alden v. Maine, the Court considered
it an. affront to a state's "dignity" and "esteem" to force it to "face
the prospect of being thrust, by federal fiat and against its will, into
the disfavored status of a debtor, subject to the power of private
citizens to levy on its treasury or perhaps even government
buildings or property that the State administers on the public's
behalf."2"' This language rather vividly conjures the image of a
person being physically thrust or forced, against her will, into some
coercive governmental process. In Alden, the Court rejected what
it perceived as an effort literally to "turn the State against itself' by
"press[ing] a State's own courts into federal service to coerce the
other branches of the State."2 2 This, the Court said, was akin to
"commandeer[ing] the entire political machinery of the State
against its will and at the behest of individuals."'
This "anti-commandeering" principle has been a familiar refrain
in the renaissance of "states' rights." The Court has held that states
have an absolute right to be free from all federal "commandeering"
of their legislative and executive organs. In New York v. United
States,8 4 the Court held that Congress could not directly compel the
states to take title to radioactive waste generated within their
borders, or directly order states to regulate such waste pursuant
to federal instructions.' Although Congress was permitted to
encourage or motivate the states to comply, it was not permitted to
put states to the choice of either regulating waste or taking title to
it. 28 6 This, the Court said, would effectively "'commandeer' state
governments into the service of federal regulatory purposes."28 7
According to the Court, Congress cannot, regardless of circum-
stances, command, instruct, or compel state legislatures in this
manner.
288
281. 527 U.S. 716, 749 (1999); see id at 758.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
285. Id. at 176.
286. Id. at 175-76.
287. Id.; see also Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264,288
(1981) (holding that the Act 'commandeers the legislative processes of the States by directly
compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program").
288. New York, 505 U.S. at 176.
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There are three notable aspects of this new limitation on federal
power. First, contrary to Garcia's apparent plan, this right to
autonomy was discovered by the Court rather than fabricated from
within the political process. Indeed, there was no evidence at all
that the political process had failed; quite to the contrary, the states
were able to come to an agreement on their own through the
available political machinery.28 9 New York did not like the hand it
had been dealt, and it sued. Second, according to the New York
Court, the purported source of the anti-commandeering limitation
is the Tenth Amendment, which protects state physical autonomy
as "an incident of state sovereignty" or one of its fundamental
"attributes."2'9 Third, the right is absolute; regardless of the source
or scope of congressional power, or the national interest at stake,
Congress cannot compel the states to enact federal law or policies.
As the Court said in New York: "No matter how powerful the
federal interest involved, the Constitution simply does not give
Congress the authority to require the States to regulate." 1
Congress may still regulate directly and preempt state enactments,
but "it may not conscript state governments as its agents."292 The
Court specifically emphasized that states are not "mere political
subdivisions of the United States," "regional offices," or "adminis-
trative agencies of the Federal Government."293 As free and
autonomous sovereigns, states cannot be directly compelled to enact
federal programs.
This fundamental right to physical autonomy extends as well to
state and local executive organs. Just as Congress cannot conscript
or "commandeer" state legislatures, it cannot interfere with a
state's "bodily" integrity by commanding state executive officials to
enforce federal enactments. The Court so held in Printz v. United
States, 294 which invalidated provisions of the Brady Handgun
Violence Prevention Act. The Brady Act imposed minimal, tempo-
rary obligations on local law enforcement officers to conduct interim
289. See id. at 151 (noting that the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendment Act
of 1985 "embodie[d] a compromise among the sited and unsited States").
290. Id. at 156-57.
291. Id. at 178.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 188.
294. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
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background checks on prospective firearms purchasers.295 Although
state executive officers might consent voluntarily to participate, the
Court held that they could not be "pressed into federal service" or
compelled to enforce federal laws.2" The Court held that the "forced
participation of the States' executive in the actual administration
of a federal program" violated the states' right to physical auton-
omy. 297 States cannot, the Court said, be "dragooned" into enforcing
and administering federal law.29 8
The purported source for this fundamental constitutional right is
elaborated in somewhat greater detail in Printz than in New York,
where the Court discovered it as an affirmative limitation inherent
in the Tenth Amendment. 299 As it does under substantive due
process, the Printz Court looked closely at history and tradition,
finding little historical or customary support for federal comman-
deering of executive officials."s°
This still left the question of whether there was a textual source
for the states' right to physical autonomy. The Court asserted that
the right to autonomy was part of the essential and "inviolable" core
of statehood.'s l The Court extrapolated the anti-commandeering
principle from the incidents of the sovereign rights to exist and to
participate in the political process. The right to physical autonomy
thus was derived from a variety of constitutional provisions,
including Article V, which provides that three-fourths of the states
must vote to amend the Constitution, and Article IV, Section 3,
which provides for the protection of the states' physical integrity.3"2
The states' right to physical autonomy was also, the Court said,
implicit in the grant of "only discrete, enumerated" powers to
Congress, and the reservation of residuary power to the states.30 3
The Court's methodology moved Justice Stevens, before reading his
295. See id. at 903-04 (describing requirements).
296. Id. at 905.
297. Id. at 918.
298. Id. at 928 (quoting Mack v. United States, 66 F.3d 1025, 1035 (9th Cir. 1995)
(Fernandez, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
299. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992).
300. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 905-18.
301. Id. at 919 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 245 (James Madison)).
302. See id. at 919 (citing, inter alia, U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2; U.S.
CONST. art. IV, § 3; and U.S. CONST. art. V).
303. Id.
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dissent in Printz from the bench, to "remark[] spontaneously that
Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court reminded him of Justice
Douglas's opinion in the Griswold contraceptives case of 1965,
which extrapolated a right to privacy from the Constitution's
'penumbras' and 'emanations.'"304
This right to autonomy is, as the Court stated in New York,
absolute in character.0 5 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority in
Printz, stated that commandeering "compromise [s] the structural
framework of dual sovereignty ... [so] a 'balancing' analysis is
inappropriate."3 0 1 "It is the very principle of separate state sover-
eignty that such a law offends," the Court stated, "and no compara-
tive assessment of the various interests can overcome that funda-
mental defect."30
7
In sum, state physical autonomy is a fundamental right of
statehood. As the Court stated inPrintz: "It is an essential attribute
of the States' retained sovereignty that they remain independent
and autonomous.... "3"' Although the Tenth Amendment is men-
tioned as one source for the right to autonomy, the Court ultimately
reasoned penumbrally, extrapolating this right from various
constitutional provisions that provide for the physical integrity and
existence of the states. Finally, the Court held that the "essential
attribute" of state physical autonomy cannot be compromised, even
where the federal interest is weighty or compelling.0 9 This state
right thus is of an even stronger character than its individual rights
analogs, which can be comprised, at least theoretically, by compel-
ling governmental interests.
b. State "Mental" Autonomy
One of the most significant safeguards individual rights-holders
are afforded is protection against unwitting or unknowing waiver
of their fundamental rights. The Constitution invalidates waivers
304. Jeffrey Rosen, Dual Sovereigns, NEW REPUBLIC, July 28, 1997, at 16, 17.
305. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 935.
306. Id. at 932.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 928.
309. See id. at 932.
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of rights that result from governmental coercion, trickery, or the
withholding of relevant information.1 l
The Court has not historically shown much concern for what
might be described as the "mental" autonomy of the states.
Congress is generally free to coerce states by, for example, attach-
ing conditions to federal subsidies or threatening to preempt state
legislation.31' To date, the Court has placed few limits on Congress's
resort to fiscally administered coercion.
There are signs, nevertheless, that the current Court may be
solicitous of at least some state claims to "mental" autonomy.
Protection of this kind was recently afforded the states in
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v.
College Savings Bank.312 The basic issue in Florida Prepaid was
whether the state, or more accurately an arm of the state, could be
sued under the Lanham Act for unfair competition. 3 ' Seminole
Tribe and its progeny had held that Congress has no authority to
waive state immunity under its Article I powers.314 Nor, the Court
held, did Congress in this instance have the power to abrogate
state immunity pursuant to the power granted to Congress in
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce the due process
guarantee. 15
This left only the possibility that the state had voluntarily waived
its immunity from suit. The Court has always maintained that
state sovereign immunity is, like any right, "a personal privilege
which [a state] may waive at pleasure."3 16 In order to protect this
state fundamental constitutional right, however, the Court has
insisted on a clear statement by a state that it intends to consent
to federal court jurisdiction.317 Florida Prepaid had not, however,
310. See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (stating that waiver of counsel
must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent).
311. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (holding that Congress could condition
federal highway funding on states' adoption of a minimum drinking age).
312. 527 U.S. 666 (1999).
313. See id. at 668-69.
314. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72-73 (1996).
315. See Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 674-75 (finding no deprivation of a cognizable property
interest to be remedied). Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides: "The Congress
shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
316. Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447 (1883).
317. Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 675-76.
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expressly consented to suit. The argument nevertheless was
advanced that it had "impliedly" or "constructively" waived its right
to immunity by voluntarily engaging in "nonessential" activities,31
which Congress had indicated would subject "any person" to suit. 19
The Court rejected this "constructive waiver" theory, overruling
a precedent that had in fact approved the concept of implied state
consent.320 The reasons the Court gave for rejecting the theory of
constructive waiver were expressly grounded upon well-established
principles relating to waiver of individual rights. First, merely
placing the state on notice that it might be waiving its right to
immunity was fundamentally different, the Court reasoned, from
ascertaining whether the state had knowingly and intelligently
consented to suit.3 2 1 "The whole point of requiring a 'clear declara-
tion' by the State of its waiver," the Court said, "[was] to be certain
that the State in fact consents to suit."322 Voluntariness, therefore,
means essentially the same thing with respect to states as it does
with respect to individuals-it must be indicated clearly and
expressly. Congress cannot rely upon the possibility of the states
misunderstanding the circumstances that will give rise to waiver.
Second, the Court noted that constructive waivers "are simply
unheard of in the context of other constitutionally protected
privileges." 23 Indeed, the Court noted that there is a presumption
against waivers of fundamental personal constitutional rights.324 It
stated: "State sovereign immunity, no less than the right to trial by
jury in criminal cases, is constitutionally protected." 25
Third, there were, in addition, equality values underlying the
Court's decision. After all, the Court noted, federal sovereign
immunity cannot be impliedly waived.32 The Court saw no reason
why state immunity should be treated any differently. 27 Further-
318. Id. at 676, 680.
319. See id. at 670 (setting forth pertinent language of the Lanham Act).
320. See id. at 680 (expressly overruling Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Ala. Docks Dep't, 377
U.S. 184 (1964)).
321. Id. at 681.
322. Id. at 680.
323. Id. at 681.
324. Id. at 682.
325. Id.
326. United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969).
327. Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 682.
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more, states should not, the Court noted in response to the
dissenters, be role-typed such that they are penalized whenever
they "step out of their proper economic role" to engage in commer-
cial activities. 32 The Court has similarly prohibited the government
from utilizing inappropriate role-typing in its equal protection
doctrine relating to gender classifications.3s
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Court was concerned
about the prospect of "forced waivers" affecting the states. There is
a point at which psychological coercion undermines the voluntari-
ness of a person's consent or waiver of constitutional rights.33 ° In a
similar fashion, the Court held that Congress can effectively coerce
states by certain forms of compulsion. According to the Court, "the
point of coercion is automatically passed-and the voluntariness of
waiver destroyed-when what is attached to the refusal to waive is
the exclusion of the State from otherwise lawful activity."3 1 If
Congress could exact such "forced waiver[s]" on the theory of
constructive consent, the Court feared that it could effect an end-
run around Seminole Tribe and its progeny.332
States thus have at least the beginnings of a right to be free
from some forms of "mental" coercion. The right is based upon
waiver principles that have been consciously imported from
individual rights jurisprudence, and upon an analogous personal
right to be free of overreaching and coercion. The underlying state
right is the right to sovereign immunity. There is, however, no
logical reason that the prohibition on coercion should be limited to
this right alone. If other fundamental "states' rights" are similarly
implicated, one might expect the Court to scrutinize the voluntari-
ness of the states' waivers.
328. Id. at 691.
329. See generally United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (invalidating single-sex
military education); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (holding that a
state university could not limit enrollment in nursing program to women).
330. See, e.g., Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387,404-05 (1977) (holding that a suspect had
not voluntarily waived his right to counsel by responding to an officer's "Christian burial
speech" while being transported in police car); see also id at 412 ("[Tlhe entire setting was
conducive to the psychological coercion that was successfully exploited.") (Powell, J.,
concurring).
331. Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 687.
332. See id. at 683.
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In sum, states have fundamental rights both to a measure of
physical and mental autonomy. Federal commandeering of state
and local institutions of government offends principles of state
autonomy and independence. State waivers of constitutional rights,
like individual waivers, must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary
to be effective. Federal statutes that condition participation in
economic activity upon a waiver of sovereign immunity are deemed
impermissibly coercive, a violation of the right to be free of mental
or psychological coercion, as well as a violation of the right to be
free from impermissible role-typing.
4. The Right to Due Process-Notice and an Opportunity to Be
Heard
In addition to its substantive component, the Due Process Clause
provides certain procedural protections for individual life, liberty,
and property interests. Individuals who relate in a variety of ways
with government, including as recipients of benefits, sometimes are
entitled to protections like notice and pre-termination hearings.33
Whether they are so entitled depends upon the nature of the
interest at stake-whether, for example, there is a constitutionally
cognizable "liberty" or "property" right at issue. 34 The particular
process that is due is generally determined based upon a balancing
of private and governmental interests, and an assessment of the
likelihood of error.335
Recently, states too have been granted a number of procedural
protections for their fundamental liberty interests in such things as
internal ordering and sovereign equality. Gregory's "clear state-
ment" rule is one such procedural protection.336 Process federalism
similarly requires that Congress make plain its intent to subject
states to private lawsuits.3 7 States, therefore, are generally entitled
333. See Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (holding that respondent had no
property interest sufficient to trigger his right to a pre-termination hearing); Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (holding that due process required a welfare recipient to be
afforded an evidentiary hearing prior to termination of benefits).
334. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 571.
335. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
336. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,470 (1991) (holding that ADEA was ambiguous
with regard to intent to include state officials among those regulated).
337. See, e.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985). The clear or
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to notice where Congress intends to affect their interests in "life,"
liberty, or property."3 8
There is, in addition, a strong recent trend to provide states with
additional procedural rights where certain congressional powers are
concerned. The Constitution grants Congress the power to remedy
and prevent civil rights violations.3 9 Specifically, under Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress has the power to enforce
the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment, including those of
due process and equal protection, by "appropriate legislation."
340
Section 5 thus is a positive grant of congressional power. Although
this power has traditionally been construed liberally, 41 the current
Court has imposed substantial limits upon it.
One of the enforcement mechanisms Congress has relied upon in
enforcing the guarantees of the Reconstruction Amendments is
subjecting the states to private lawsuits. In a series of recent
decisions, the Court has shielded states from remedial and prophy-
lactic congressional abrogation of their immunity from private
lawsuits seeking money damages. 342 The results in these cases are
plain statement rule applies as well in the preemption area. See, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (stating that Congress should make clear its intent
to preempt state legislation).
338. In addition to requiring clear statements, the Court has focused in recent commerce
cases on drafting deficiencies in federal laws. For example, in doubtful cases, Congress must
plainly provide that an item of commerce has moved interstate. See United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549,562 (noting that the statute in question had no jurisdictional element and that
Congress made no findings concerning effects of gun possession on interstate commerce). The
Lopez Court also intimated that congressional findings might be necessary where Congress
legislates at the margins of its authority. See id. at 563 (noting that "findings would enable
us to evaluate the legislative judgment that the activity in question substantially affected
interstate commerce, even though no such substantial effect was visible to the naked eye").
339. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2 (granting Congress the power to enforce the
prohibition on slavery and involuntary servitude); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (granting
Congress the power to enforce the guarantees in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment);
U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2 (granting Congress the power to enforce the prohibition on racial
discrimination in voting).
340. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. For discussions of Congress's Section 5 authority, see
generally Timothy Zick, Constitutional Empiricism: Quasi-Neutral Principles and
Constitutional Truths, 82 N.C. L. REv. 115 (2003); Timothy Zick, Marbury Ascendant: The
Rehnquist Court and the Power to "Say What the Law Is," 59 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 839 (2002)
[hereinafter Zick, Marbury Ascendant].
341. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 652-58 (1966) (asking only whether
Congress's conclusions were reasonable).
342. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (invalidating VAWA under
Section 5 in part because the record failed to indicate that discrimination against victims of
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only partially driven by federalism concerns. The Court is jealously
(some might say possessively) guarding its own power to construe
the Constitution, which it feels is threatened whenever Congress
interprets constitutional guarantees in the course of providing civil
rights remedies.343 States nevertheless benefit directly from the
procedural rules the Court has developed in this area. The Section
5 cases are rooted, at least partially, in the "states' rights" renais-
sance.
Recent precedents require that Congress satisfy two procedural
requirements before it may subject states to private lawsuits in the
civil rights area. First, Congress must compile and present a
thorough legislative record that contains evidence of"a history and
pattern" of specific unconstitutional state conduct." This require-
ment, in effect, mandates that Congress conduct hearings on its
own predicates for Section 5 enactments. As Justice Kennedy
recently stated: "The charge that a State has engaged in a pattern
of unconstitutional discrimination against its citizens is a most
serious one. It must be supported by more than conjecture."345 The
*Court has been particularly aggressive in its enforcement of this
state-friendly burden of proof, rarely finding that Congress has
adduced sufficient proof to support its enactments.346
gender-motivated crimes existed in all, or even most, states); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents,
528 U.S. 62, 89 (2000) (invalidating provision of Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967 authorizing federal damage suits by state employees against the states as sovereigns
as "an unwarranted response to a perhaps inconsequential problem"); Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 645 (1999) (invalidating
an attempt by Congress to abrogate state Eleventh Amendment immunity to enforce the
Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act, finding little proof of
"widespread and persisting" patent violations and almost no evidence that Congress even
considered the issue of state remedies (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 526
(1997))). But see Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 740 (2004) (upholding
provisions of Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993); Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978,
1994 (2004) (upholding provisions of Title II of Americans with Disabilities Act).
343. For a discussion of the interpretive issues, see generally Zick, Marbury Ascendant,
supra note 340.
344. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368 (2001); see Kimel, 528
U.S. at 89 ("Congress never identified any pattern of age discrimination by the States, much
less any discrimination whatsoever that rose to the level of constitutional violation."); Fla.
Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 640 ("It is this conduct then-unremedied patent infringement by the
States-that must give rise to the Fourteenth Amendment violation that Congress sought
to redress in the Patent Remedy Act.*).
345. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 748 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
346. See cases cited supra note 342.
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Second, Congress must demonstrate that its enactment is
narrowly tailored to the specific evil it has identified. Section 5
legislation, the Court has held, must exhibit "congruence and
proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and
the means adopted to that end." 47 This narrow tailoring require-
ment has been interpreted to mean that enactments might have to
be limited to those areas of the Nation in which Congress has
demonstrated the requisite history and pattern of discrimination.
These procedural rights overlap to some extent with the substantive
fundamental rights of states. One of the purposes of the tailoring
requirement, for example, is to scrutinize broad congressional
schemes carefully, thereby protecting the states' right to order their
internal affairs.34
The upshot is that before any Section 5 enactment can take
effect, the states, as a group, are entitled to the equivalent of an
evidentiary hearing at which the government must prove that the
states, or at least most of them, were involved in a pattern of
unconstitutional behavior. Although Congress is under no obliga-
tion to provide the states an opportunity to be heard, the reality is
that the states possess most of the evidence that Congress is
seeking. In many cases, therefore, states will be asked to provide
documentary and other evidence in the course of congressional
hearings. The hearings that are conducted concerning congressional
"charges" of state discrimination operate in effect as pre-waiver
hearings on "charges" of state misconduct.
In assessing Congress's showing subsequent to these hearings,
the Court does not defer to Congress or take institutional limita-
tions and competencies into account. Rather, the Court conducts
an admittedly "close review" of the legislative materials. 49 Most
enactments fail to satisfy this heightened scrutiny.3" Even if the
record indicates a pattern of unconstitutional state activity, the
Court also engages in a detailed examination of the rights and
remedies afforded under the statute in order to assess "congruence
347. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520.
348. See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 755 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that Congress's family
and medical leave scheme "does not respect the States' autonomous power to design their
own social benefits regime").
349. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 370.
350. See supra note 342.
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and proportionality."3 1 These requirements, in particular the
special burden of proof Congress must bear to demonstrate a
pattern of unconstitutional state action, in effect require strict
judicial scrutiny of Section 5 measures.5 2
At least one member of the Court is not satisfied with even these
significant procedural safeguards. In Nevada Department ofHuman
Resources v. Hibbs,53 Justice Scalia argued in dissent that each
state should have the individual right to contest the application of
any Section 5 enactment against it. He rejected treating "the
States" as a body for purposes of determining whether federal
legislation is supported by the requisite record of a pattern of
unconstitutional conduct.5 4 If New York, for example, is to be
subjected to suit, Justice Scalia reasoned, then Congress must
demonstrate a pattern of unconstitutional conduct by New York's
officials. As he explained: "There is no guilt by association, enabling
the sovereignty of one State to be abridged under § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment because of violations by another State, or
by most other States, or even by 49 other States." 55 This proposi-
tion was self-evident to Justice Scalia, because "[wihen a litigant
claims that legislation has denied him individual rights secured by
the Constitution, the court ordinarily asks first whether the
legislation is constitutional as applied to him."3 56 Even if a statute
thus survives a facial challenge, according to Justice Scalia, each
state has the same constitutional right any individual would have:
to challenge the statute as applied.
As Justice Scalia's approach suggests, the procedural safeguards
of federalism are still in the developmental stage. At this juncture,
there are two primary procedural protections. First, there are clear
or plain statement rules that, at a minimum, require that Congress
consider the federal-state balance when legislating and make
plain when it intends to "upset" that balance. Second, and far more
351. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 372 (holding that the ADA failed to meet the congruence and
proportionality standard).
352. See Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal
Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 477 (2000)
(stating that Section 5 review approaches the strict scrutiny standard).
353. 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
354. Id. at 742-43 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
355. Id. at 741-42.
356. Id. at 743.
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significantly in terms of substantive effects, the states have in effect
been granted a right to an evidentiary hearing before Congress.
Before it can legislate an abrogation of state sovereign immunity,
Congress must demonstrate a history and pattern of unconstitu-
tional state action and further demonstrate that its remedy is
"congruent and proportional" to the evil identified.
To review, the states have steadily amassed a variety of rights
akin to fundamental individual rights. The substance of these
rights, the manner in which they have been discovered, and their
strength all parallel fundamental, inherent individual rights. The
rights to intimate ordering, equality, autonomy, and due process
extend the basic rights of sovereignty to new areas and new heights.
In this respect, as well, they resemble their broad individual
rights counterparts. This is a new conception of federal liberty and
federalism, one that puts power to one side in favor of the
expansion of "states' rights." Viewed from this perspective, we can
now approach "states' rights" with a measure of clarity. The
Anti-Federalist trifecta-individuality, morality, and rights-has
gradually produced the beginnings of an extra-textual bill of rights
for states. This bill, however, is beyond the minimal aspirations of
the Anti-Federalists, who were concerned chiefly with the preserva-
tion of the states and their most essential sovereign rights. States
have essentially become "moral persons" in the strongest sense.
They are treated as sentient, fundamental rights-bearing persons.
III. STATES ARE NOT PEOPLE: THE FALLACY OF THE NEW FEDERAL
LIBERTY
We now have a better understanding of the various senses in
which states can be said to possess constitutional "rights." Although
the sovereign rights of states must remain inviolable, this Part
criticizes the Court's recent discovery of fundamental "states'
rights." The thesis is that federal liberty and civil liberty are not
properly viewed as constitutional analogs. This Part begins with an
argument that constitutional powers and constitutional rights are
not interchangeable constructs. Specifically, it is false to suggest,
as the Court has, that the discovery of fundamental "states' rights,"
or inherent "attributes" of statehood, is simply the "mirror image"
of a determination that Congress lacks the constitutional power to
2004]
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act."5 7 "States' rights" are not merely the flip side of the powers
coin; they are, in fact, fundamentally different currencies. Powers
and rights invite fundamentally different inquiries, and they
encourage fundamentally different institutional roles and attitudes.
The "fundamental rights" strand of the current federalism doctrine
is historically and jurisprudentially anomalous. Its closest relative
is a discredited version of "states' rights" that was vanquished in
the constitutional revolution associated with the New Deal.3"
This Part next demonstrates, in more specific terms, that civil
liberty is not an appropriate model for federal liberty. States were
not broadly conceived as rights-bearing persons, but rather as
power-sharing entities. Accordingly, states' constitutional rights,
unlike the rights of persons, are narrow and expressly circum-
scribed. Moreover, issues of judicial competency and legitimacy, as
well as the lack of any necessity for aggressive judicial involvement
in the discovery of fundamental "states' rights," all militate in favor
of a judicial double standard that enforces fundamental individual
rights while refusing to recognize unenumerated, fundamental
"states' rights." Finally, more elemental reasons for rejecting civil
liberty as a model for federal liberty are advanced, including the
absence of any sound theoretical or normative foundation for
fundamental "states' rights" and the negative effects that will
inevitably flow from the enforcement of a variety of negative state
liberties.
A. Protecting State Sovereignty: State Powers Versus "States'
Rights"
There are three basic options insofar as the protection of state
sovereignty is concerned. As Garcia suggested, the first option is
simply to leave states to defend themselves in the political
process.359 The Court itself seems to have abandoned this option.
60
This Article does not support it, at least insofar as the approach
counsels wholesale judicial abandonment of federalism. The second
357. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156 (1992).
358. Compare Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (invalidating Child Labor Act),
with United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (overruling Hammer).
359. See supra notes 200-13 and accompanying text.
360. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
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option is for courts to fashion appropriate limitations on federal
enumerated powers. This option would leave ample space for the
states' exercise of "sovereign" authority, while at the same time
providing the widest protection, among the available options,
for individual liberty. The Court, in recent commerce cases, has
demonstrated some affinity for this option, which does not focus
narrowly on the states as states but rather more generally on the
scope of federal power. 6 ' The Court has been reluctant to follow
this option in other areas, however, including the spending power,
which it continues to interpret as essentially without limits."6 2 The
third option, and the one the Court is now, as this Article points
out, vigorously pursuing, is to treat the states as special "persons"
and to discover, by implication and extrapolation, fundamental
state constitutional rights. These fundamental rights, as noted
above, protect the states as states from federal regulation and
control.
These last two options are not cut from the same cloth. The
fundamental "rights" that states have been granted under the
Court's new conception of federal liberty are plainly not based upon
a distributive calculus of sovereign power. There is no question, for
example, that Congress has the power, under the Court's commerce
precedents, to regulate the solid waste that was at issue in New
York. The same is most likely true, at least if one follows the
Court's expansive interpretation of the commerce power, of the sale
of handguns in Printz. Similarly, the text of the Eleventh Amend-
ment limits the judicial power in only the narrowest respects. It
does not grant states the blanket liberty the Court has found to
emanate from it and other sources. Finally, the Court has consis-
tently acknowledged that Section 5 is a broad, "positive grant of
legislative power."363 Indeed, the Court has repeatedly said that
361. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,627 (2000) (concluding that local gender-
motivated violence was beyond Congress's commerce power); United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549, 567 (1995) (concluding that possession of a handgun in a local school zone was not
economic activity).
362. See Sabri v. United States, 124 S. Ct. 1941, 194546 (2004) (rejecting the argument
that Congress must, when exercising the spending power, require a connection between
forbidden conduct and federal funds); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 208-09 (1987)
(upholding conditional spending of highway funds based upon the state's adoption of a
minimum drinking age).
363. CityofBoerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,517 (1997) (quotingKatzenbach v. Morgan, 384
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Congress is to be chiefly responsible for enforcing the guarantees of
the Fourteenth Amendment.364 Yet today substantial procedural
limits trump even this "plenary" power.
One way to diminish the significance of the recent shift in focus
from distributive power to inherent, fundamental "states' rights" in
all of these contexts is simply to contend that there is no difference
between a federalism based upon distributive principles and one
based upon "states' rights." To put the matter differently, one might
contend that powers and rights are essentially flip sides of the same
coin. This was the position taken by Justice O'Connor on behalf of
the Court in New York, where she insisted that there is no mean-
ingful difference between discovering "states' rights," or what the
Court referred to as "attributes" or "incident[s]" of state sover-
eignty,365 and concluding that states possess residual powers.3 6
Indeed, at least where Congress is regulating the states directly,
Justice O'Connor described these inquiries as "mirror images of
each other."16 7 Turning to yet another metaphor, she elaborated:
In the end, just as a cup may be half empty or half full, it makes
no difference whether one views the question at issue ... as one
of ascertaining the limits of the power delegated to the Federal
Government under the affirmative provisions of the Constitu-
tion or one of discerning the core of sovereignty retained by the
States under the Tenth Amendment.'
The Court has expressed a similar attitude with respect to the
Eleventh Amendment and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In other words, it "makes no difference" whether one considers
U.S. 641, 651 (1966)).
364. See id. at 536 ("It is for Congress in the first instance to 'determin[e] whether and
what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment,' and its
conclusions are entitled to much deference." (quoting Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 651)). Indeed,
the Court was willing to go so far as to reaffirm that [1]egislation which deters or remedies
constitutional violations can fall within the sweep of Congress' enforcement power even ifin
the process it prohibits conduct which is not itself unconstitutional." Id. at 518.
365. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156, 157 (1992).
366. Id. at 157.
367. Id. at 156. For another critique of the "mirror image" claim, see Yoo, supra note 11,
at 1347-48 (arguing that the specific holding in New York, which permits Congress to subject
states to generally applicable laws but not to single states out for regulation, undermines the
"mirror image" argument).
368. New York, 505 U.S. at 159 (emphasis added).
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congressional enactments that implicate these amendments as
falling outside the power granted therein, as violating "background
principles" and "presuppositions" relating to state sovereignty, or,
in the case of Section 5 enactments, as failing to meet newly devised
procedural limitations. 69 In any case, Congress is denied the
authority it has claimed.
The only respect in which it "makes no difference" whether courts
base decisions on powers or rights concerns the ultimate result.
Whether one views the question in New York as one of power or
rights, the Court's bottom line is that Congress's enactment is
invalid. It does, however, make a world of difference in terms of
how courts enforce federalism. It is not merely semantics to
distinguish powers from rights in this regard. Indeed, we have no
trouble seeing this important distinction when individual rights are
at stake. Everyone can tell the difference between a holding that
Congress lacks the power to regulate an item of commerce, for
example, and one that concludes that even if Congress possesses
such power, an affirmative limitation in the Bill of Rights, or
elsewhere, precludes federal regulation.
There are, indeed, several important distinctions between
traditional "distributive federalism" and the new "sovereignty
federalism," 7 or what this Article has referred to as "federal
liberty." This Part begins by highlighting two of these differences,
leaving others to be addressed as the argument progresses. First,
a rights-based federal liberty affects institutional roles in a manner
and to an extent that are foreign to distributive federalism.
Second, the discovery of discrete constitutional "rights" or "affrmla-
tive limitations" in favor of the states is an historical and jurispru-
dential anomaly. The Court itself has twice confirmed this, once
369. See Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991) (stating that the
Eleventh Amendment stands "not so much for what it says, but for the presupposition ...
which it confirms"); City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519-20 (setting forth the "congruence" and
"proportionality" requirements).
370. See Martin S. Flaherty, Are We To Be A Nation?: Federal Power vs. "States' Rights"
In Foreign Affairs, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1277, 1282-84 (1999) (distinguishing between
'distributive federalism" and "sovereignty federalism').
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during the 1937 New Deal constitutional revolution371 and more
recently in Garcia.
1. Rights, Powers, and Institutions
Rights and powers adjudications portend fundamentally different
judicial roles. Courts review powers with considerable deference.
They tend to defer substantially to other institutions, whether
because they are more democratic or have more expertise, or
perhaps both. In terms of constitutional powers, therefore, courts
speak mostly in terms of the rationality and reasonableness of
institutional choices and prerogatives.
Fundamental constitutional rights, on the other hand, occasion
the most aggressive judicial scrutiny. When courts deal with
fundamental rights, whether personal or sovereign, they apply
strict scrutiny; the implication of such constitutional rights
demands at least compelling governmental interests and
narrowly-tailored responses. 72 When rights are at stake, courts
leave the realm of the merely rational or reasonable and demand
much more. The language and methodology of heightened scrutiny,
such as we see in the immunity and Section 5 cases, for example,
are wholly anomalous to considerations of constitutional power.
These things are familiar only to the protection of constitutional
rights. The rights of internal ordering, equality, autonomy, and due
process thus operate precisely as their individual rights counter-
parts do, namely as trumps to federal power that is otherwise
granted, expressly or as a result of judicial interpretation, by the
Constitution. This is the version of "states' rights" the Court is
371. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 123-24 (1941) (stating that the Tenth
Amendment "states but a truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered");
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937) (abandoning earlier efforts to
enforce exclusive enclaves of state authority).
372. Restriction on speech content, for example, are subject to strict judicial scrutiny. See,
e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (invalidating a statute prohibiting the defacement
of a United States flag). In terms of state fundamental rights, the Court has sometimes been
unwilling even to consider the nature of the government's interest. See New York, 505 U.S.
at 178 ("No matter how powerful the federal interest involved, the Constitution simply does
not give Congress the authority to require the States to regulate."). Other times the Court
applied elements of strict scrutiny, like record review and narrow tailoring. See, e.g., Bd. of
Trs. of the Univ. ofAla. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 370-71 (2001) (conducting a "close review"
of legislative record).
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championing.373 It looks nothing like the lenient distributive
calculus of traditional federalism.
Given these fundamental differences in judicial perspective and
role, it is hard to understand how it "makes no difference" whether
courts enforce federalism by cabining federal powers or by discover-
ing unenumerated fundamental "states' rights." There is no such
ambivalence where individual rights are concerned. Congress surely
would have had the power, in a case like Griswold, to regulate
interstate traffic in contraceptives or, to take another example, to
regulate the interstate shipment of pornography. Any such
regulations, however, would potentially conflict with the right to
privacy, in the one case, or the right to free speech, in the other. In
this sense, rights and powers are not "flip sides" of a coin or "mirror
images" of one another.
Although they ultimately may lead to the same result, rights and
powers remain conceptually and constitutionally distinct; they
require distinctive inquiries. We can readily distinguish between an
individual rights regime in which courts define governmental
limitations with reference to the scope of enumerated powers, as
ours did at least for its first century, and one in which courts
enforce, and in some cases discover, "fundamental" rights. As the
examples involving contraceptives and pornography demonstrate,
these regimes ask different things of courts. The question in a
rights regime is not whether the regulations of contraceptives and
pornography are "commerce," for instance, or whether they fall
within the judiciary's interpretation of the scope of the commerce
power (they surely are, and surely do), but rather whether the
regulation of contraceptives invades an unenumerated fundamental
right to "privacy," or whether the regulation of pornography violates
the right to free expression as the Court has interpreted that
liberty. The latter sorts of questions are distinct in terms of
interpretive focus, not to mention in terms of the sorts of values
373. Laurence Tribe distinguishes between "extrinsic" and "internal" limits on federal
authority. Extrinsic limits are "those that override, or trump, power aflirmatively delegated
by the Constitution to Congress." Laurence Tribe, 1 AMERiCAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 913 n.1
(2000). "Internal limits" are "those that restrict the affirmative reach of congressional power
from the outset." Id. Federal liberty is based upon extrinsic limits, both textual (like the
Tenth and Eleventh Amendments) and those based upon "background principles." See
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72 (1996).
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that must be considered, from those that are routinely asked under
a traditional distributive paradigm.
The same distinctions are present where fundamental "states'
rights" are concerned. Rather than ask questions that at least
arguably have a textual basis, such as "Is this commerce?" or "Does
the regulated activity have a substantial effect on commerce?,"
courts must instead ask a-textual and extra-textual questions like
"Is this a fundamental attribute of state sovereignty?". Rather than
contemplate the limitation on judicial power set forth in the
Eleventh Amendment's text, courts must instead consult "back-
ground principles" and "presuppositions" in order to determine
whether "states' rights" have been abridged. Under Section 5, the
question is not whether Congress's enactment is "appropriate," but
whether, even if Congress has acted rationally, and, hence,
appropriately, states have not been provided fair notice, or some-
thing like a fair hearing on the "charge" of discrimination Congress
has made. Again, this is a distinct sort of interpretation, one that
relies upon different sources, precepts, evidence, and rationales
than a distributive and structural calculus. Under Section 5, for
example, this requires a laborious review of the legislative record
and attention to whether the law is narrowly tailored to the
legislative end. Neither of these elements of heightened judicial
scrutiny is present where the question is solely one of the scope of
federal power.
The doctrine of fundamental "states' rights" thus produces
transformations of both judicial perspective and role. The judiciary,
however, is not the only institution that is appreciably affected.
Congress too must be concerned that its powers are not necessarily
what they seem. Whereas it has had some time to get used to
individual rights trumps, which are at this point fairly well settled
even if Congress often fails to take them into account, Congress is
at sea in determining when a "states' rights" trump might surface.
Surely Congress could not have suspected that it was acting beyond
its enumerated powers in cases like New York and Printz. No state
right to be free from federal "commandeering" had yet been
discovered. Congress, furthermore, had been regulating states in a
similar fashion for many years. Similarly, Section 5 had been a
plenary power until City of Boerne was decided. There was no way
to anticipate "congruence and proportionality," much less height-
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ened record review.17' "States' rights" thus upsets settled expecta-
tions and makes regulation far less predictable, at least in the short
term when rights are being newly discovered, than a distributive
regime. 5
Of course, these are not the only ways in which it "makes a
difference" how courts enforce federalism. Rights tend to be far less
flexible in nature, for example, than powers, which have the
capacity to ebb and flow in a system characterized by structural
nuances. Further, rights tend to distract attention from things like
community and encourage states to think of themselves as wholly
separate units.317 Rights, particularly as our courts interpret them,
tend to be all-or-nothing propositions.
These and several other distinctions will be discussed below,
when we consider the effects a fundamental rights-based federal
liberty is likely to have on federalism. For now it is necessary only
to establish that there are important differences between a
federalism based upon powers and one based upon fundamental
"states' rights."
2. The Historical and Jurisprudential Anomaly of
Fundamental "States' Rights"
Judging from the tone and substance of the Court's opinion in
New York, Justice O'Connor apparently wishes us to believe that
there is nothing unusual about the notion that states possess
unenumerated fundamental rights. Neither history nor the Court's
own jurisprudential tradition lend support to that assertion.
374. See Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80, 85
(2001) (referring to this phenomenon under Section 5 as a "crystal ball" problem).
375. To be sure, new or novel interpretations of constitutional powers can have a similar
effect. A determination, such as was made in Lopez, that Congress failed to regulate an item
of "commerce," however, affects only that case and no other, whereas newly announced
"states' rights" are of the winner-take-all variety. Rights discovery and enforcement, unlike
limitations on federal power, tends not to be an iterative, incremental process. In that sense,
the discovery of fundamental "states' rights" has a greater effect on institutional operations
and roles than does a distributive power calculus.
376. See generally MARYANNGLENDON, RIGHTSTALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENTOF POLITICAL
DiscouRSE (1991) (critiquing the focus in political and other discourse on "rights talk" as it
concerns individual rights).
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Arguments on behalf of "states' rights" have, of course, been
advanced since the Founding. These arguments, however, did not
press the case for discovery of discrete, fundamental "states' rights"
that would act as trumps to federal power in the same sense that
individual rights function. Even the Anti-Federalists, who first
advanced the metaphor of moral personhood, did not seem to take
it as literally as the modern Court does. They worried mostly that
the proposed central power would be so broad as to annihilate
the states entirely.377 The "moral person" metaphor was, for Anti-
Federalists, a rather desperate plea to the Framers to leave
something in terms of local sovereignty for the states. In other
words, they were concerned primarily with the scope of Congress's
enumerated powers and federal supremacy. Anti-Federalists feared,
most of all, state annihilation, and they argued most strenuously
for the states' sovereign rights, which were ultimately recognized.
Even their proposed "bill of rights" for states was designed to carve
out a sphere of powers for states, rather than to prescribe a set of
"affirmative limitations" on Congress.378 Moreover, no one at the
time contemplated an aggressive role for the courts in discovering
"inherent" state rights.
Similarly, whether it was the assumption of states' Revolutionary
War debts by the United States or the proposal for a Bank of the
United States, the early "states' rights" debates focused on the
concept of limited national power, not the discovery of discrete
fundamental "states' rights." Under Patrick Henry's leadership,
for example, the Virginia general assembly adopted resolutions
disparaging assumption of state debts as "repugnant to the
Constitution of the United States, as it goes to the exercise of a
power not expressly granted to the General Government."3 79
Similarly, the great debate over the chartering of a Bank of the
United States was waged in terms of federal enumerated powers,
not inherent state rights.38 0 The doctrine of nullification, which
along with secession ranks as one of the great embarrassments for
federalism, was similarly premised upon the argument that
377. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
378. See supra Part I.C.
379. MCDONALD, supra note 7, at 30.
380. See id. at 31 (describing the debate over the first Bank of the United States).
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Congress had exceeded its enumerated powers in enacting tariffs.3"'
Even the highly politicized "states' rights" controversies of the
1950s and 1960s, despite their incendiary rights rhetoric, were
premised ultimately upon the notion of limited federal power, not
the discovery of rights trumps that operated to nullify otherwise
legitimate exercises of federal power.
This is not the place for a more lengthy historical review of
"states' rights." It suffices to note that "states' righters" have
consistently framed their arguments in terms of distributive power,
not literal constitutional rights, and certainly not unenumerated
fundamental rights of the sort that have recently been discovered
to exist. Of course, early state supporters did not have a doctrine of
substantive due process upon which to draw. They did not have the
theoretical or doctrinal analogs to argue that states, like persons,
should have fundamental rights when none were textually granted.
Nor did they have a sense of what judicial power would become.
Only now are such arguments being vigorously advanced, and only
now, as a result of judicial interpretation, are they yielding
constitutional doctrine. As courts have largely forsaken structure
and power in terms of individual liberties, so too have they moved
precipitously to a rights regime for states.
Jurisprudentially and doctrinally, as well, the discovery of
fundamental "states' rights" is a discredited approach to enforcing
the federal-state balance. The Court, in a series of decisions now
counted among its greatest embarrassments, once sought to protect
state sovereignty by discovering inherent state constitutional rights
in the text of the Constitution. It did so, in cases like Hammer v.
Dagenhart382 and United States v. Butler,3 8 essentially by butcher-
ing the text of the Tenth Amendment. In Butler, for example, the
Court held that the Agricultural Adjustment Act "invade[d] the
reserved rights of the states" because the authority for its passage
was not "expressly granted" to Congress. 3 4 The idea that Congress
has only those powers that are expressly granted was, of course,
381. See id. at 104-06 (discussing the doctrine of nullification).
382. 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
383. 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
384. Id. at 68 (emphasis added).
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taken directly from Article II of the Articles of Confederation. 38 5 The
Tenth Amendment itself says no such thing.386
Not even the modern Court is willing to tack so far backwards in
interpreting the Tenth Amendment's import with respect to the
balance of sovereign power. Indeed, until recently, the Court has
seemingly accepted Justice Stone's interpretation of the Tenth
Amendment: "The amendment states but a truism that all is
retained which has not been surrendered."387 More recently,
however, there has been a creeping return to the notion that the
Tenth Amendment exhibits far more than a "truism." The new
federal liberty elevates the Tenth Amendment to the status of a
rights guarantee, an affirmative limitation on federal power rather
than an interpretive guide to constitutional power. Indeed, in New
York, Justice O'Connor flatly asserted that the Tenth Amendment
was every bit the affirmative limitation on congressional power that
the First Amendment was on governmental power to abridge
individual speech rights."' Simply to read the text of these two
amendments is to recognize the deficiency of this argument. The
First Amendment is, by its terms, an affirmative limitation
("Congress shall make no law.... ");389 the Tenth Amendment is just
as plainly not an affirmative limitation at all, but rather an
interpretive guide for distributing sovereign authority ("The powers
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution....")."9
The precedents Justice O'Connor relied upon in New York to
support the "mirror image" proposition are themselves quite telling.
She cited only two cases-Lane, in which the Court essentially
reiterated that the Constitution grants states the sovereign right to
exist,391 and Garcia, which expressly rejected a judicial search for
essential or inherent rights of statehood as "not only unworkable
but... also inconsistent with established principles of federalism. 392
385. See supra text accompanying note 112.
386. See U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people.").
387. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
388. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156-57 (1992).
389. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
390. U.S. CONST. amend. X
391. See Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. 71 (1868).
392. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 531 (1985).
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The dearth of examples itself proves the anomaly of the fundamen-
tal rights approach. So do the cases Justice O'Connor cites as
examples of the more traditional distributive power model,393
including McCulloch v. Maryland,394 which has been the anchor for
that model since 1819.
Indeed, for most of the past two hundred years, the Court has
protected the states by directly narrowing federal powers rather
than discovering fundamental "states' rights."395 One would be hard
pressed to locate, in the judicial annals of federalism, the sort of
express comparisons the current Court routinely makes between
individual rights and the fundamental rights of states. The basic
premise of federalism, as the Tenth Amendment confirms, has
been the existence of a central government with broad, although
not unlimited, powers and state governments that exercise the
remaining powers not granted to Congress or prohibited to the
states. With the exception of the rather narrow grant of basic
sovereign rights, state sovereignty is, by purposeful constitutional
design, residual and derivative; its scope depends on the reach of
national power and is by express terms tied to it.396 Moreover,
certain federal powers, such as those granted in the Reconstruction
Amendments, including Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,
were expressly intended to alter the balance of power between the
federal government and the states. Until very recently, the exercise
of these powers was not treated as analogous to a federal charging
mechanism subject to procedural constraints.
The fundamental "states' rights" movement thus signals an
important shift for federalism. We have become accustomed to
393. New York, 505 U.S. at 155.
394. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). Justice Story likewise viewed the Tenth Amendment
as an interpretive guide rather than an affirmative limitation on congressional power. See
JOSEPH STORY, 3 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1901 (Da
Capo Press 1970) (1833) ("It is plain ... that it could not have been the intention of the
framers of this amendment to give it effect, as an abridgment of any of the powers granted
under the constitution, whether they are express or implied, direct or incidental.").
395. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 203 (1824) ("No direct general power over
these objects is granted to Congress; and, consequently, they remain subject to State
legislation.").
396. This assumes, ofcourse, that either the states or federal government have power with
regard to the subject. This is not always the case. See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995) (invalidating state term limits measure for members of
Congress).
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defining personal liberty and autonomy in terms of rights trumps,
rather than in terms of structure and limited powers.397 The turn
from powers to rights is a significant transformation of the concept
of limited government, however, insofar as states are concerned.
There is no bill of rights for states in the Constitution. Protection
for the states was intended to be, and until recently has been,
largely structural in character, a product generally of enforced
limitations on federal powers. To be sure, the Court has generally
been unwilling to make substantial inroads on federal power, but
this path remains open to the Court should it wish to take it.
The notion that states have enforceable unenumerated rights
alters the relationship states have with the central government
by providing, in essence, a second line of defense against federal
intervention in the lives and livelihoods of the states. This means,
symbolically, that states are indeed more than mere corporate
bodies, political subdivisions, federal appendages, or puppets of
central authority. They are, in fact as well as in law, more like
persons. It means, substantively, that even if Congress or the
judiciary acts pursuant to an enumerated power, states, like
persons, may yet enjoy a liberty or freedom from regulation.
Federalism has turned from considerations of power and at least
nominal fidelity to text toward a symbol or image of state-as-person
that does not depend upon either of these. This is in no respect
merely the flip side of a distributive calculus.
B. Sovereigns, Persons, and Constitutional Rights
Despite differences in method and the lessons of history, it
appears as if the Court will continue to enforce federalism in this
manner, by treating states as rights-bearing persons. So let us
compare the status of states and persons insofar as constitutional
397. As Michael Sandel has commented:
Nor, in the first century of its existence, did the Bill of Rights play an important
role in protecting individual liberties against federal infringement. Liberty in
the early republic had less to do with individual guarantees against government
action than with the dispersion of power among branches and levels of
government.
MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC
PHILosOPHY 38 (1996).
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rights are concerned. What does the Constitution indicate with
regard to the "rights" of each?
Sovereign constitutional rights and individual constitutional
rights are obviously not of similar number or character. Although
the Constitution contains a panoply of individual rights, including
those in the Bill of Rights, it provides for literal "states' rights" or
affirmative limitations on federal power only in the most limited
sense. This makes sense, as the overriding purpose of the Constitu-
tion, the thing that animates the document from top to bottom, is
the preservation and protection of individual liberty. The two
principal means of ensuring the liberties of the people are the Bill
of Rights, which constrains governmental power with respect to
certain spheres of personal autonomy, and the doctrine of enumer-
ated powers, which generally limits the reach of federal power.
Neither the Bill of Rights nor the doctrine of enumerated powers is
concerned with the status of states as states.
As noted, the Constitution recognizes the states' sovereign rights
to exist, to form separate governments, to participate in political
processes, and to interpret state law.398 That the Constitution
recognizes these very limited sovereign rights does not mean,
however, that states are constitutional rights-bearers in every
significant respect, or that the principles and doctrines that protect
"moral persons" apply with equal force to the states. The mere fact
that the Constitution recognizes divided sovereignty as a principle
does not automatically give rise to a federal liberty that is as vital
and encompassing as is constitutional civil liberty.
Indeed, the Constitution itself strongly suggests otherwise. It
attests that divided sovereignty and structural constraints exist for
the benefit of individuals and their liberty and dignity, not the
states and their liberty and dignity. This is apparent from the
character of the sovereign rights of states themselves. Whereas
individual liberties are broadly granted in the Constitution, leaving
substantial interpretive gaps to be filled in, the constitutional rights
of states are of a much narrower character. States' political rights,
for example, are expressed in narrow terms admitting of no doubt
as to their scope. The states' rights to political participation and
398. See supra Part II.A.
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political influence are spelled out in express terms.399 The Constitu-
tion thus expressly indicates that states possess equal suffrage and
have a right to pass on constitutional amendments. This is quite
unlike, say, the First Amendment's preservation of individual
rights "peaceably to assemble" and to "petition the government for
a redress of grievances."°0 The fear, of course, in drafting a Bill of
Rights was that the mere failure to list a right would be counted as
evidence of its non-existence. No such fear animated the provision
of state sovereign rights, since their protection was not to be found
in individual guarantees but in structural safeguards.
The Constitution contains far more limitations with respect to
states than it does explicit rights guarantees. There are, in fact,
express limits even on the most critical of "states' rights." The
Constitution may grant states the sovereign right to exist, but there
can be no mistaking, as the Supremacy Clause provides, that the
Constitution and federal laws are "the supreme Law of the Land...
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding."4 1 This provision substantially limits the states'
prerogatives and initiatives, what we might consider their constitu-
tional "quality of life." It constrains states in a fashion flatly at odds
with the scope of personal liberty that the Constitution recognizes.
Further, the Constitution contains several express limits on
states. They may not, for example, enter treaties, coin money, enter
into agreements or compacts with other states, or themselves wage
war except in extraordinary circumstances. 40 2 Similarly, state
judiciaries exist, but they cannot announce authoritative decisions
on matters of federal law.4 3 The powers expressly and impliedly
granted to Congress also necessarily diminish state sovereignty. 4°4
So does the Bill of Rights, which now constrains states in nearly all
respects.
Further, although a state has the right to organize its own
government, that right is limited substantially by the requirement
that the state not deviate from "a Republican Form of Govern-
399. See supra Part II.A.3.
400. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
401. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
402. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
403. U.S. CONST. art. III; see Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
404. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
296 [Vol. 46:213
STATEHOOD AS THE NEW PERSONHOOD
ment."405 States may have a sovereign right to choose their own
officials, but those officials are expected to serve in pre-determined
chambers, as the Constitution expressly mentions state legislative,
judicial, and executive branches.4 6 It grants the states the right to
participate in the amendment process, but it vests in Congress the
ultimate choice with respect to the mode of ratification.0 7
The very tenor of the Constitution suggests that states are
subordinate institutions with limited authority, not dignified,
rights-bearing persons. Aside from providing for minimal state
rights of sovereign preservation and self-determination, the
Constitution contains no other express or implied rights guaran-
tees for states. It certainly nowhere expressly provides for preemp-
tion of federal power in the name of statehood or unenumerated
"attribute [s] of state sovereignty.""° In fact, the general rule, as
specifically expressed most forcefully in the Supremacy Clause,0 9
is federal preemption of state authority. This formula of federal
supremacy is manifested elsewhere as well, in numerous specific
constitutional provisions. For example, states have the power to
decide upon the times, places, and manner for holding elections, but
Congress "may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations,
except as to the Places of chusing Senators."410 The constitutional
"trumps" thus all run in one direction.
With the limited exceptions of the aforementioned sovereign
rights, the Constitution speaks only to sovereign power, which
states are sometimes expressly denied and sometimes granted, as
in the Tenth Amendment's reservation of state residual power.4 '
These powers, however, are not granted to benefit the states as
states. When powers are granted, they are intended to permit states
to pursue not their own interests, but the interests of their
respective citizens. States, after all, exist only by the grace of the
consent of those whom they govern, and draw their powers from
them. States represent the people and exist to support and protect
405. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
406. See U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 3 (contemplating three-branch state governments).
407. See U.S. CONST. art. V.
408. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156 (1992).
409. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
410. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
411. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 (setting forth limits on state power).
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the people's rights.412 Indeed, the very idea of "states' rights" beyond
the notion of limited sovereign rights strikes a discordant note. An
accused, for example, has a right to judgment in his favor if found
innocent by a judge or jury. A state, by contrast, has no right to a
conviction, even if the accused is guilty.413
The Constitution, both expressly and by implication, manifests
the basic understanding that states, like other governmental
institutions, are generally power-sharers, not rights-bearers. Every
new law student learns that constitutionally prescribed institutions
exercise powers. The Court measures, calibrates, and distributes
these powers in various contexts, including the doctrine commonly
referred to as "separation of powers." The President shares some
powers, such as lawmaking, with Congress, and is granted other
institutional powers, such as the right to nominate judges, exclu-
sively.414 Even with respect to these "exclusive" powers, there are
substantial checks; thus, the President cannot simply appoint
federal officers and judges, but must seek the advice and consent of
the Senate.415 Moreover, even the most exclusive presidential power
represents an institutional faculty, not a matter of personal right.
As Watergate most vividly demonstrated, the President must do
what is best for the office and for the Nation, not what suits his own
self-interest. Similarly, Congress does not possess anything we
might plausibly refer to as "rights." It too has only enumerated,
shared, and substantially checked institutional powers. In sum, we
do not speak of the "rights" of Congress, or of the President, but of
the powers of their respective institutions, and of discerning the
appropriate balance among them.416 Why, then, does the Court
continue to speak in the broadest terms of the constitutional
"rights" of states?
412. See Caminker, supra note 36, at 86 ("[T]he notion that states are organically
bestowed with a dignity incident to all sovereigns rests in tension with the notion that states
are mere creatures of and subservient to the truly sovereign people.').
413. The example is from RONALD DwORIUN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 100 (1977).
414. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (invalidating one-House veto
legislation).
415. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
416. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (upholding constitutionality
of U.S. Sentencing Commission); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (upholding
independent counsel provisions of Ethics in Government Act of 1978).
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It is, thus, a fallacy to treat the Tenth Amendment as a reserva-
tion of fundamental "states' rights" in the same fashion that the
Ninth Amendment has sometimes been interpreted to reserve
unenumerated rights for the people.4"' The Ninth Amendment
speaks expressly of "rights"; the Tenth Amendment does not. This
was a conscious choice. The Articles of Confederation, in Article II,
purported to reserve certain broad, essential rights of statehood,
like independence.41 The Constitution grants states the basic
sovereign right to exist and a limited right to frame and administer
their own governments. Beyond this, the Tenth Amendment refers
only to residual powers reserved by the states. It does not provide
for any affirmative limitations. The Eleventh Amendment similarly
speaks in terms of limiting the "Judicial power."419 It is, like the
Tenth Amendment, an interpretive guide, in this instance for the
scope of the judicial power. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
also is an extensive grant of power to Congress to enact "appropri-
ate" legislation. 20 By their terms, these constitutional provisions
invite an examination of governmental power, not the discovery and
enforcement of sovereign rights.
It is only with regard to persons that the Constitution contem-
plates the robust protection of rights. The first eight amendments
in the Bill of Rights expressly protect a range of individual rights.
The Ninth Amendment reserves other, unenumerated rights to "the
people.""'2 Still other individual rights are scattered throughout the
Constitution.422 It thus makes sense to speak of the constitutional
417. The Ninth Amendment provides: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S.
CONST. amend. IX.
418. See CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: HUMAN RIGHTS, NAMED AND
UNNAMED 69 (1997) ("It has to be interesting that neither the word 'federal' nor any of its
derivatives and cognates occur in the Constitution.").
419. The Eleventh Amendment provides: "The Judicial power of the United States shall
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one
of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
420. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
421. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
422. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1 ("No Person shall be convicted of Treason
unless on the testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open
Court."); U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 ("The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.").
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rights and liberties of persons. Conversely, although it makes sense
to speak of the very limited sovereign "rights" of states, it does not
follow that states possess fundamental constitutional rights.
C. In Defense of a Double Standard for Judicial Enforcement of
"Fundamental" Constitutional Rights
Despite all of this, it has again become fashionable to argue on
behalf of "states' rights." Lynn Baker and Ernest Young have
presented perhaps the most comprehensive recent defense of what
they refer to as "states' rights."4 The version of "states' rights"
these scholars defend, however, is that which focuses on enumer-
ated powers, not the fundamental rights version that is the focus of
this Article. Baker and Young's thesis is that "federalism," specifi-
cally the enforcement of substantive limitations on Congress's
commerce power, has been wrongfully placed in "exile," while
fundamental individual liberties have flourished as a result of
heightened judicial scrutiny and protection.424 They criticize this
"double standard" of judicial review and argue that "federalism" is
every bit as deserving of judicial review as individual rights.4"
This Article does not disagree with Baker and Young's thesis that
federalism should not be treated by the courts as if it were non-
justiciable. Nor does it disagree with their contention that the Court
is capable of devising enforceable limits for Congress's enumerated
powers, a point to which the Article returns in Part IV. The more
pressing question, for present purposes, is whether states' sovereign
rights to existence and autonomy ought to be enforced as individual
rights are, and, specifically, whether a fundamental rights regime
is appropriately applied on behalf of statehood. Neither Baker and
Young, nor others, have systematically addressed this specific
enforcement question. Many of the arguments made in favor of
judicial review of "federalism" issues nevertheless implicate
arguments that the Court, and its defenders, would likely advance
in favor of the fundamental rights strand of federalism.
423. See generally Baker & Young, supra note 11.
424. See id. at 75-76 (arguing that federalism has been "banished" along with the economic
substantive due process doctrine).
425. Id. at 77.
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Baker and Young advance three reasons forjudicial and scholarly
reticence to treat federalism, like individual rights, as worthy of
judicial scrutiny: institutional competence, necessity, and norma-
tive choices. 42' They assert that none of these reasons suffices to
place federalism on the "do not enforce" side of the line. 2 ' This may
be correct, but these same concerns, and others, do support a
different double standard, one that refuses to enforce federal liberty
in the same manner, and with the same vigor, as civil liberty. This
Part argues that there are sound reasons for a double standard
where fundamental constitutional rights are concerned.
1. Institutional Competence and Legitimacy
As the discussion in Part II demonstrated, the Court has
struggled to define the source of state fundamental constitutional
rights to internal association, equality, autonomy, and due process.
This should come as little surprise. As discussed above, the
Constitution does not generally treat the states as rights-bearers.
As a result, the Court has been forced to create "states' rights"
by: twisting the Tenth Amendment into an affirmative limitation
on power; identifying essential "incident[s]" or "attribute[s]" of
state sovereignty;42 consulting the "plan of the convention,"
"presupposition[s], "429 and "background principle [s]" ° of federal-
ism; and inventing procedural standards, like heightened record
review and "congruence and proportionality,"3 l which operate to
trump broad congressional powers to enact "appropriate" legisla-
tion.3 2
As Baker and Young point out in the course of arguing for
substantive limits on the commerce power, "judges face similar
difficulties in all areas where the constitutional text provides little
precise guidance."4' They posit that the real issue is whether the
426. Id. at 78.
427. Id.
428. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156-57 (1992).
429. See Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991).
430. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72 (1996).
431. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997).
432. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.").
433. Baker & Young, supra note 11, at 79.
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Court is capable of "fashioning new rules that would constrain
Congress while at the same time constraining the courts."43' Baker
and Young see no reason why the Court is any less capable of this
task than it is of defining fundamental rights under the doctrine of
substantive due process. 35 "There is no reason to think," Baker and
Young argue, "that judges are less competent to develop workable
doctrinal rules of federalism than they are with respect to, say, the
right to privacy. " 36 This argument invites two distinct inquiries.
The first is whether courts are able to fashion any workable
doctrinal rules where federalism is concerned. The second inquiry
invites the comparison at the heart of this Article's thesis, namely,
whether federal liberty and civil liberty ought to be enforced in
constitutional parity.
With respect to the first question, it may well be that courts are
able to develop constitutional doctrine that supports statehood by
curbing enumerated powers. In fact, this Article suggests, in Part
IV, that the distributive strand of federalism, rather than the
fundamental "states' rights" strand, represents the legitimate
future of federal liberty. It must be acknowledged that the distribu-
tive approach to federalism raises interpretive difficulties. At least
under the distributive approach, however, the courts can and often
do focus on specific constitutional text, study and learn from
historical and jurisprudential patterns of power distribution, draw
upon a tradition of flexible distributive principles, and generally
take broad context into account.
These are all substantial advantages associated with policing
powers rather than relying upon the ad hoc judicial discovery of
fundamental "states' rights." This same range of tools and methods
is not available to courts intent on searching for "states' rights" in
the penumbras and emanations of the Constitution. Constitutional
text must be ignored or twisted beyond recognition in order to
discover new rights. Moreover, there is generally no jurisprudence
or institutional expertise to consult, as all of the fundamental
"states' rights" are new judicial creations. Nor is there room for
error or reconsideration, because the products of a rights-based
434. Id. at 88.
435. See id. at 88-89 (noting that similar charges of institutional incompetence have been
made against substantive due process, which survives today).
436. Id. at 78.
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federal liberty are either inflexible proscriptions or absolute
prohibitions on federal power. Context, as the Court has repeatedly
made clear, simply does not matter where the fundamental rights
of states are concerned. Judicial competency concerns thus are
graver in the case of the fundamental rights strand of federalism
than they are in the case of its distributive strand.
With respect to the second question, namely whether federal
liberty, like individual liberty, ought to be enforced as a matter of
rights rather than powers, there are sound reasons for adopting a
double standard of judicial review. Baker and Young are correct
that "[tihe textual basis for principles of federalism in the Constitu-
tion is surely stronger than the textual basis for substantive due
process."" 7 By "principles of federalism," Baker and Young are
referring to the various constitutional provisions that recognize the
states' basic sovereign rights, as well as the Tenth Amendment's
reservation of state residual powers. These constitutional sources
support the broad constructs of divided sovereignty and limited
federal power. They are, as noted, the textual basis for the basic
sovereign rights of states.
These "principles of federalism" indicate, at least, that courts
may have to step in to preserve state sovereignty. Courts might be
called upon to enforce state sovereign rights like existence,
separateness, and political participation. The rather bare "princi-
ples of federalism" set forth in the Constitution do not, however,
provide a basis for extrapolating a series of broad, fundamental
"states' rights." This Article will not offer a defense of substantive
due process, which admittedly poses its own indeterminacy
problems. It does, however, contend that the template for substan-
tive due process is far more developed than the relatively blank
slate upon which the Court has drafted the burgeoning doctrine of
fundamental "states' rights." As a matter of judicial competency,
substantive due process has advantages over a rights-based federal
liberty.
As mentioned, there is no historical, textual, or interpretive
tradition for the fundamental rights strand of federalism. There is
no test or standard to guide the discovery of fundamental "states'
rights." There are no checks, save the inclinations of five members
437. Id. at 94.
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of the Court, to stem the growth of states' fundamental rights. As
the status of states grows, so too, it seems, does the states' list of
fundamental rights.
Further, the "principles of federalism" lack the substantive depth
and thickness required for inferring broader fundamental rights.
We cannot plausibly compare the limited sovereign rights of states,
or the other scattered recognitions of federalism found in the
Constitution, to the sweeping guarantees found in the Bill of
Rights. The sovereign rights of states are not the sort from which
judges can plausibly extrapolate further implied and inherent
rights. These rights are, as explained, quite narrow by design.
Sovereign state rights to exist, form separate governments, and
participate in the Nation's political decisions, for example, are not
full of ellipses; they do not readily admit of penumbras and
emanations. Sovereign state rights function to preserve the states,
not to clothe them with autonomy, privacy, procedural safeguards,
or equality.
There is, in fact, quite a bit more judicial stretching, both
conceptually and mechanically, that is required to discover
fundamental "states' rights" than even the admittedly pliable
doctrine of substantive due process demands on behalf of funda-
mental individual rights. Deriving a guarantee of sexual or intimate
"privacy" from the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against
unreasonable searches of the home and person, for example, hits far
closer to the mark than deriving the anti-commandeering autonomy
"right" from the purported "affirmative limitation" of the Tenth
Amendment, from the states' expected participation in the constitu-
tional amendment process, or, more distantly still, from the
citizenship clauses in Article III, Section 2 and Article IV, Section
2. The difference is one between wholly manufacturing rights and
partially manufacturing them, although, in the latter instance, at
least it is done from quite similar raw materials. Mining fundamen-
tal individual rights from structure is certainly not unheard of;
discovering inherent "states' rights" in this sort of material is
another matter entirely.
The Constitution provides an abundance of personal rights from
which courts might infer broader individual rights such as "liberty"
and "privacy." These rights take the form of various express denials
of state and federal power, as well as guarantees of liberty and
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autonomy in various provisions of the Bill of Rights. Rights to free
speech, free exercise, and free association, to take only those in the
First Amendment, set a theme of personal liberty and autonomy
that is nowhere sounded on behalf of states. The Reconstruction
Amendments furthered this tradition by broadly guaranteeing such
rights as "equality" and "due process" against state interference.
These and other rights guarantees are at least a plausible basis for
some broader conception of individual liberty that extends beyond
the bare terms of the text. Whether or not these guarantees
expressly invite judicial extrapolation, the fact is that they often
necessitate interpretation of amorphous constructs like expression,
association, equality, and due process. The same cannot be said of
sovereign state rights, whose phrasing and themes come nowhere
near this sort of expansive vision of freedom and autonomy. By
design, states were to gain any additional liberty and autonomy not
from implicit rights, but rather from their participation in gover-
nance and distributive principles.
In addition to the textual and thematic divergences, there are no
yardsticks by which to measure the reasonableness or legitimacy
of newly discovered fundamental "states' rights." The purportedly
objective history upon which the new "states' rights" have been
predicated has been repeatedly and effectively called into doubt by
other scholars. 38 Further, there are no other rights to consult for
direction as to how far sovereign "equality" or "autonomy" or rights
to process should be stretched. There are, instead, only things like
"presuppositions" and"background principles." 39 Nor can the courts
rely, as they now do under substantive due process, on other
seemingly objective sources, such as state or federal laws, to
determine whether a right is or remains "deeply rooted in history
and tradition."440 Nothing like a societal or legislative consensus
exists to constrain the fundamental rights of states. Indeed, the
establishment of a state right effectively precludes just this sort of
checking. Once the anti-commandeering ban is announced, for
example, every subsequent federal law that implicates the ban is a
438. See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and
Principle, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2183-92 (1998) (questioning the historical basis of the
"anti-commandeering" rule).
439. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
440. See supra note 1723and accompanying text.
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constitutional violation. Once the expansive right to sovereign
immunity is discovered, there is no objective source upon which one
can rely to demonstrate a change in the constitutional climate.
Fundamental "states' rights," in sum, are a far more ossified lot
than fundamental individual rights, which can, as recent cases
demonstrate, both evolve over time and be effectively constrained.
To reiterate, issues of judicial competency loom larger with
regard to rights-based federal liberty than with regard to the
doctrine of substantive due process. There are far fewer relevant
textual analogs from which to extrapolate. There are no extant
benchmarks for judicial "presuppositions" and the like. The cost of
erroneous decisions is higher as well for federal liberty, as there
appears to be no way to revisit or reconsider rights once they have
been discovered. Indeed, Garcia was an express concession that
courts have no particular competence or expertise with respect to
discovering fundamental "states' rights."441 Garcia was correct in
this respect when it was decided, and it remains so.
Let us suppose, however, for the sake of argument, that substan-
tive due process and the fundamental "states' rights" strand of
federalism occupy essentially the same textual vacuum. The
question remains whether there is an interpretive method within
judicial competence that will prevent the over-enforcement of
"states' rights" and curb judicial subjectivity. This is necessarily a
tall order. Again arguing in favor of substantive limits on the
commerce power, rather than for the fundamental "states' rights"
challenged in this Article, Baker and Young suggest that Justice
Souter's approach to substantive due process, which he articulated
in Washington v. Glucksberg, might serve as an appropriate model
for the enforcement of federalism."2 Again, as Part IV suggests, this
may in fact be a workable model where direct limits on the
commerce or other enumerated powers are concerned. The question
441. It is also true, however, as Baker and Young suggest, that federalism, like
substantive due process, has never been "repudiated" by the Court. Baker & Young, supra
note 11, at 92. Again, however, this depends on what one means by "federalism." The
fundamental "states' rights" approach was expressly repudiated in Garcia in favor of political
safeguards and structural checks. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S.
528, 552 (1985). As controversial as it has been, substantive due process has never been
jettisoned by the Court in such a seemingly definitive fashion.
442. See Baker & Young, supra note 11, at 89-90 (discussing Justice Souter's approach to
substantive due process).
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here is whether this model might be used to constrain the scope of
the new rights-based federal liberty.
Justice Souter's approach to fundamental rights is influenced by
the views of Justice Harlan, who believed that judges have an
obligation to review legislation that appears to infringe individual
rights for conformity with the Constitution, even if the text of the
Constitution does not expressly negate governmental power."
Justice Harlan believed that this is precisely the sort of "reasoned
judgment" judges are often asked to make; Justice Souter agrees
that there is no escape from making these difficult decisions, even
in the murky context of substantive due process.' His preferred
method for discovering and enforcing fundamental individual rights
is the common law method, which proceeds carefully, incrementally,
and, above all, flexibly."'
This is precisely what is so troubling about the new federal
liberty. The Court treats states as holders of strong, absolute
constitutional rights. Considered as a group, the federalism cases
of the past decade do not proceed in the tradition of the common law
approach at all. As Justice Souter stated in Glucksberg, the common
law approach is "suspicious of the all-or-nothing analysis that tends
to produce legal petrification instead of an evolving boundary
between the domains of old principles.' All-or-nothing rules
are precisely what have been announced in cases like Printz,
which wholly prohibits "commandeering, " 7 and Alden, which
raises immunity from suit as an impregnable barrier to private
litigants."' The newly announced state rights to "autonomy" and
"equality" leave no room for future developments or contingencies.
Indeed, there is a notable lack of flexibility in all of the "states'
rights" cases, including those regarding state procedural rights.449
Context is simply irrelevant insofar as these "states' rights" are
concerned.
443. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 763 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring).
444. Id. at 769.
445. See id. at 767.
446. Id. at 770.
447. See supra text accompanying notes 294-98.
448. See supra text accompanying note 235.
449. See supra notes 339-56 and accompanying text (discussing the rigidity of the Court's
Section 5 analysis).
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Where, as well, is the "reasoned judgment" in cases like Printz
and Alden? Printz's conclusion, for example, that "[iut is the very
principle of separate state sovereignty that such a law offends" is
a judgment, to be sure, but not a particularly well-reasoned one.45 °
There is, in fact, a mounting record that strongly suggests that the
Court is not capable, at least in terms of "states' rights," of
"fashioning new rules that would constrain Congress while at the
same time constraining the courts."45
Baker and Young point as well to tradition to counter questions
of institutional competence with regard to the enforcement of their
version of federalism. They posit that the "tradition of judicial
enforcement of federalism, like that of substantive due process
recounted in Glucksberg, is longstanding and persistent.""2
Again, this demonstrates the necessity of being clear about the
nature and character of the federalism or "states' rights" one is
advancing. It is of course true that the courts have always claimed
the authority to define the limits of Congress's enumerated powers,
and in that sense to "enforce" federalism. An overarching view of
the states as rights holders, however, coupled with a method of
enforcing federalism that relies upon discovering and enforcing
inherent and fundamental "states' rights," are, as argued earlier,
quite anomalous. In the modern era, only National League of Cities
really comes close to this fundamental rights-based approach, and
it did not survive long enough for courts, or states, to develop any
real attachment to or reliance upon either its approach or its
underlying principles.453 It runs directly counter to the tradition of
federalism, which protects states by ensuring that federal power is
reasonably and appropriately limited.
Finally, in terms of institutional legitimacy, the Court has offered
no normative or other justification for now abandoning Garcia in
favor of the aggressive discovery and enforcement of fundamental
"states' rights." The functional, political, and institutional reasons
the Court gave in Garcia for abandoning the "states' rights"
approach are just as applicable today as they were then. What, if
anything, has changed? One is left to speculate concerning the
450. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 932 (1997).
451. Baker & Young, supra note 11, at 88.
452. Id. at 94.
453. See supra notes 200-02 and accompanying text.
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reasons for all of the inconsistency and upheaval. It took nearly
sixty years for commerce doctrine to manage one appreciable
doctrinal shift, 54 whereas in just over two decades states have
experienced three seismic shifts with respect to their fundamental
"rights"-they have been granted fundamental rights, then left
apparently to fend for themselves in the political process, and now
once again enjoy a growing list of fundamental rights. As rocky as
the shoals of substantive due process have been, the principle that
individuals enjoy fundamental human rights has remained a
constant. The same simply cannot be said on behalf of fundamental
"states' rights."
In sum, there are substantial competency and legitimacy
concerns with a rights-based federal liberty. In the abstract,judicial
discovery of fundamental "states' rights" seems to share precisely
the same difficulties that plague substantive due process, including
textual indeterminacy and judicial subjectivity. On closer inspec-
tion, however, the discovery of fundamental "states' rights" suffers
from greater defects than the judicial discovery of individual
fundamental rights. The fundamental rights of states are not
readily derive from the sovereign rights of states. They exist, if at
all, by virtue of a warping of the tautological Tenth Amendment,
vague judicial impressions and outright re-interpretations of the
original "plan" of government, and other amorphous and uncon-
strained "background principles." From these interpretations have
arisen inflexible, purportedly inherent, and often absolute funda-
mental rights of statehood. Both in terms of judicial competency
and legitimacy, it is a mistake to enforce federal liberty in constitu-
tional parity with civil liberty.
2. Necessity-Political Safeguards
Baker and Young identify the source for the judicial double
standard they oppose, the one that aggressively enforces individual
rights but not federalism, as footnote four in United States v.
Carolene Products Co.' The footnote generally provides for a
454. Compare NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), with United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
455. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
2004] 309
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
presumption of constitutionality for economic enactments, while
intimating that heightened judicial review may be appropriate for
legislation that appears to violate a specific guarantee of the Bill of
Rights, restricts the political process, or evinces prejudice against
"discrete and insular" minorities. 46 Because the plight of states in
federalism cases appears to raise none of these special concerns,
courts historically have not applied especially rigorous scrutiny to
federalism claims. 57
Indeed, some commentators, most notably Professors Choper and
Wechsler, have suggested that courts should not review federalism
claims at all, but should relegate federal-state relations largely
to the political process." Garcia, which cited Professor Wechsler,
purported to adopt this approach insofar as the states were being
regulated as states.'59 In light of subsequent events, however, it
seems that no one, least of all a current majority on the Court,
subscribes to the theory that federalism ought to be treated as
nonjusticiable. This Article will not revisit the extensive arguments
presented in favor of and against Wechsler's "political safeguards"
theory. The Article accepts that courts should play some role where
federalism is concerned. The question is what that role should be in
456. See id. at 153 n.4; Baker & Young, supra note 11, at 80-81.
457. As Baker and Young point out, the approach set forth in the Carolene footnote has
not always been followed consistently. The Court has, for example, exercised "aggressive
judicial review on behalf ofinterests that are well represented within contemporary political
processes." Baker & Young, supra note 11, at 83. They cite sexual and reproductive liberty
cases like Griswold and Roe to make their point. Id. Nor, they contend, can the enforcement
double standard be defended on the ground that economic interests have generally received
less judicial solicitude than non-economic ones; after all, the dormant Commerce Clause is
rather vigorously enforced, as are limitations on commercial speech. Id. at 84. Regardless of
the confusion regarding the purported definition or parameters of the double standard, Baker
and Young contend that courts, and commentators, continue to apply it unthinkingly. See id.
at 85.
458. See JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A
FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 380-81 (1980) (arguing
that the Court should preserve political capital by deciding individual rights claims and
leaving structural claims to the political process); Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards
of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National
Government, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 543, 545 (1954) (arguing that political checks should be
relied upon to police federalism). There have been efforts to revive and update these sorts of
arguments. See, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back Into the Political Safeguards
of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2000) (updating Wechsler's arguments).
459. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528,550-51 & n.11 (1985).
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light of the fact that states and persons are not similarly situated
constitutionally.
John Hart Ely articulated a comprehensive and most persuasive
interpretation of the Carolene Products "double standard."460 As Ely
explained in detail, the principal concern, in terms of constitutional
process, is that minorities, whether political, racial, or other, not be
essentially denied representation.41 To avoid this, the Constitution
in various provisions protects the "paradigmatically" and "politi-
cally powerless," such as out-of-state residents, who are unrepre-
sented in local politics, and racial minorities, which tend to be
generally unrepresented or at least underrepresented.462 More
broadly, the Constitution protects both the "literally voteless" and
those who find themselves "in a state of persistent inability to
protect themselves from pervasive forms of discriminatory treat-
ment." 63 Finally, Ely argued, the Constitution "imposes ajudicially
enforceable duty of virtual representation," one that requires that
representatives consider, and sometimes act upon, the interests of
their minority charges.464 When they fail to do so, it may be
necessary for courts to aggressively enforce this important duty.
Political safeguards such as, for example, the role states play in
choosing United States Senators and the President obviously cannot
protect states from all federal overreaching. Courts are needed, as
Baker and Young persuasively posit, to police the boundaries of the
commerce and other federal powers, if only to let Congress know
there are limits to its authority. To conclude from this, however,
that courts must intervene to protect federal liberty as vigorously
as, or in the same manner as, civil liberty would blink distinctions
of both substance and degree.
First, let us be clear about the nature of the "political malfunc-
tion" that might be said to require the discovery of fundamental
"states' rights" and the application of heightened judicial scrutiny.
We are not talking, in terms of federalism, about any state being
460. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
(1980).
461. See id. at 82 (noting that the Constitution's theory of representation "cannot mean
that groups that constitute minorities of the population can never be treated less favorably
than the rest, but it does preclude a refusal to represent them").
462. Id. at 83.
463. Id. at 84.
464. Id. at 86.
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denied an opportunity to vote or participate in the political
process. 465 This sovereign right is not, nor can it be, denied.466 Nor
are we concerned with laws that interfere with or burden the basic
opportunity to participate in the political process and to cast a vote.
No state's right to vote is being diluted in any of the state funda-
mental rights cases; the rule of "one state, one vote" is being
honored. 4 7 With respect, then, to these particulars, fundamental
rights discovery and heightened judicial scrutiny are not implicated
for federalism.
To be sure, there will be times when a "minority" of states loses
a political battle to a determined majority. Certain regional
coalitions, for example, may band together to the detriment of a
geographic "minority." In opposing the "political safeguards"
argument and urging the enforcement of substantive limits on the
commerce power and, perhaps, a substantial judicial role in that
enforcement, Baker and Young seem most concerned with this sort
of "horizontal aggrandizement" of power, as distinguished from the
"vertical aggrandizement" that results from bare federal encroach-
ments on states.468 As Baker and Young put it, a congressional
majority "may take action that encroaches on the autonomy of a
minority of dissenting states."6 9 This is a "states' rights" version of
the "tyranny of the majority" concern upon which the Carolene
Products footnote is partially grounded.
Even accepting that "horizontal aggrandizement" is a matter of
substantial concern, this does not justify a fundamental rights
regime for states. Indeed, the fact that the sort of state politicking
that sometimes results in majority dominance on one or more issues
might be considered a malfunction of the political process, rather
than an inevitable consequence of its proper functioning, is a
testament to how far "states' rights," in the fundamental and most
literal sense, has advanced as a philosophy of federalism.
465. Compare in this regard the "fundamental rights" strand of equal protection as it
concerns the right of individuals to vote. See Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663
(1966) (holding that a state cannot condition the right to vote in state elections on payment
of a poll tax).
466. See supra Part II.A3.
467. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (establishing the constitutional
requirement of "one person, one vote").
468. Baker & Young, supra note 11, at 126-27.
469. Id. at 118.
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Under what systematic disadvantage do so-called "minority"
states labor? What evidence is there of a persistent and entrenched
hostility to their interests? It seems more than a little farfetched to
suggest that states can be so marginalized or politically downtrod-
den as to be entitled to heightened judicial solicitude. There is no
such thing as a perpetual state underclass. States thus are
differently situated from political and other minorities whose beliefs
and practices have been commonly, historically, and traditionally
infringed upon or disfavored by the majority. Even the most
beleaguered state, which finds itself in the minority with respect to
some policy or another, thus cannot be compared to individuals who
express unpopular opinions, practice controversial religions, belong
to historically marginalized racial, ethnic, or other groups, or
engage in acts that have historically been morally and legally
condemned by society.470 Without fundamental human rights and
the heightened scrutiny they entail, these persons truly would have
no meaningful opportunity to participate in politics or, more
broadly, society.
This sort of strong case for aggressive judicial review simply
cannot be made on behalf of the states. When it comes to political
opportunity and political power, states and persons simply are not
comparably situated. By terms of their equal suffrage in the Senate,
among other things, states enjoy a seat at the table to which most
individuals cannot aspire. States, in addition to the traditionally
recognized structural safeguards, also are protected by a variety of
470. Baker and Young point out that the Court has often exercised "aggressive judicial
review on behalf of interests that are well represented within contemporary political
processes." Id. at 83. The use of the word "contemporary" is critical. When Griswold andRoe,
cases Baker and Young point to, were decided, it is doubtful there was widespread political
acceptance of the right to use contraceptives and to abort a pregnancy. After all, advocates
ultimately relied upon courts to make their case against what they saw as repressive
legislative agendas. See generally DAVIDJ. GARROw, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO
PRIVACY AND THE MAKING OF ROE V. WADE (1994) (providing a detailed description of the
legislative and judicial battles over the right to sexual and reproductive freedoms). At
present, it seems to be reliance upon the rights developed in such cases, more than any need
to police the political process, that keeps the Court involved in the area of sexual freedom.
See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,856 (1992) (noting that
"for two decades of economic and social developments, people have organized intimate
relationships and made choices that define their views of themselves and their places in
society, in reliance on the availability of abortion in the event that contraception should
fail').
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organic procedural safeguards that operate within the federal
legislative process.471 Further, states, through their representatives,
can barter and build coalitions. Today's state losers may well be
tomorrow's legislative winners.
Heightened judicial scrutiny of the kind the Court has applied in
its recent spate of fundamental "states' rights" cases is intended
principally to protect the marginalized. "Minority" states, unlike
minority groups and marginalized persons, do not need the support
of fundamental "rights" or heightened judicial scrutiny to obtain a
meaningful opportunity to participate and be counted. Ely's
argument was that the primary role of the courts should be to keep
the channels of the political process open and functioning so that all
have at least an opportunity to participate.47 2 The states' sovereign
political rights protect that very interest, which cannot be denied.
As unfortunate as it may sometimes be that some states lose out
in the political process, this circumstance does not call for judicial
scrutiny in the same manner, or to the same degree, as the repeated
and invidious overriding of minority preferences in, for example,
cases of race or gender discrimination or invasions of intimate
privacy interests. The concern for "marginalized" states, whatever
that may mean, simply does not rise to the level of concern courts
should and do have for marginalized groups and individuals.
Indeed, as Baker and Young concede, some horizontal aggrandize-
ments, although courts cannot know for certain which ones, may
actually turn out to be beneficial.4" 3 The same can hardly be said for
restrictions on the participation of individuals in the political
process. There are few, if any, such restrictions that we could
reasonably label as beneficial.
Finally, consider Ely's argument that courts are needed to
enforce a duty of "virtual representation" with regard to
471. See Baker & Young, supra note 11, at 127; see also Bradford R. Clark, Separation of
Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REv. 1321, 1339 (2001) (arguing that
procedural restraints constitute a "supermajority requirement" which protects state
freedom).
472. See supra notes 460-64 and accompanying text.
473. See Baker & Young, supra note 11, at 124-26 (citing, inter alia, northern efforts to
end slavery in southern states). Heightened judicial review of aggrandizements would be
complicated, to say the least. Baker and Young concede: "Telling the difference betweengood
horizontal encroachments and bad ones will not always be an easy task." Id. at 126.
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marginalized individuals and groups. 7 4 What is the basis for
imposing, and judicially enforcing, such a duty on states with
regard to one another? States are not representatives of other
states. To be sure, they are part of a national body and should keep
the national community and national interests in mind. That is not
the same, however, as insisting that states owe a general duty to
one another akin to the duty that elected representatives owe to
their constituents. States assembled in Congress do not represent
one another. They primarily represent the interests of their
citizens, and if their citizens are not satisfied, if they believe that
their interests are not being appropriately considered, then of
course they may seek to remove their representatives by exercising
the franchise. Further, with regard to marginalized minority
personal interests, courts are available to enforce the duty of virtual
representation. Among the states, however, there is no representa-
tive system for the courts to police.
In sum, there is nothing in either the Carolene Products rationale
or an Ely-based theory of judicial review that recommends or
supports fundamental rights enforcement or an aggressive judicial
posture in favor of the states. States, even minority ones, are not
systematically or persistently disadvantaged. Of course, the mere
existence of opportunity for states to affect legislative outcomes
does not mean that courts are not needed, as Baker and Young
suggest, "to remind Congress of its own obligation to restrain itself
and to catch any particularly egregious examples of federal
overreaching that slip through the system's political and procedural
checks.""7 This suggests, at most, a limited and deferential judicial
role, however, not the aggressive discovery and enforcement of
fundamental "states' rights" that currently characterize federal
liberty.
3. Normative Choices
Perhaps it was not institutional incompetence or necessity that
led the Garcia Court to purport to leave the federalism area, and
that has led the Court more generally to avoid, at least until
474. See supra text accompanying note 464.
475. Baker & Young, supra note 11, at 128 (citation omitted).
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recently, an expansive rights regime for states. Perhaps, as Baker
and Young contend, individual rights like abortion and sexual
privacy are simply "normatively more attractive than states'
rights."476 After all, the phrase "states' rights," for many, conjures
a host of negative associations, including, for some, virulent racism.
It is possible, therefore, that the Court, and many scholars as well,
have been "read[ing] particular values out of the Constitution
simply because popular opinion at a given point in history finds
them normatively unattractive."'"
This proposition cannot, of course, be tested empirically. There
may indeed have been some residual judicial ill will toward "states'
rights" due to its association with bad actors, both public and
private, in our nation's past. It seems unlikely, however, that in
1985, when Garcia was decided, the Court rested its decision to
curtail fundamental "states' rights" federalism on these sorts of
negative associations. It probably gives too little credit to the Court,
and to scholars, to suggest that modes of judicial enforcement or
scholarly support are based primarily upon "changing normative
preferences" or mere popularity. 478 Even if one is not willing to give
judges and scholars such credit, it is surely a stretch to paint the
"states' rights" of National League of Cities with the same brush as
the old "states' rights" of segregationists. The "states' rights" of
what might be considered the modern era-freedom from federal
wages and hours regulations, for example-are hardly the sort that
invoke segregationist ghosts.
There is, in fact, little reason to doubt the Court's word that, after
some experience, it simply found the "traditional state functions"
test specifically, and fundamental "states' rights" more generally,
to be both an unworkable and illegitimate doctrinal shift. This
determination was a function ofjudicial competence and necessity,
not normative considerations.7 9 In the next Part, however, this
Article addresses the normative question Garcia did not reach. It
suggests that the Garcia Court was correct to reject a rights-based
federal liberty, not because fundamental individual rights are
normatively preferable to the rights of states, but because civil
476. Id. at 133.
477. Id.
478. Id.
479. See supra notes 203-13 and accompanying text.
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liberty rests upon a constitutional foundation that is absent where
federal liberty is concerned.
D. Civil Liberty, Federal Liberty, and "Fundamental" Rights
It seems implausible that the Garcia Court was oblivious to
the fact that the strong indictment it leveled against federal
liberty--essentially that it was amorphous, unworkable, and
illegitimate-was applicable as well to the much-maligned doctrine
of substantive due process. The Court was not, of course, then
interested in comparing and contrasting the constitutional
protections provided to persons and states. It may have been
principally concerned with avoiding, or at least not propagating, the
confusion and controversy substantive due process has engendered.
Just because the Court can compound such problems on behalf of
"states' rights" does not mean that it must do so. Perhaps the Court
was, as Dean Choper has suggested, preserving its institutional
"political capital.""' If there were underlying, deeper motivations
for the apparent abandonment of "states' rights" in Garcia, the
Court did not share them.
We must then consider whether broad constitutional rights to
intimate association, equality, autonomy, and process, so critical to
individual liberty, are appropriately enforced on behalf of the states
as well. We must determine not whether these state rights are
"popular," but rather whether they are, like fundamental individual
rights, well-grounded and essential to the well-being of their
possessors. If states are going to be treated as if they are persons
with inherent, fundamental rights, it is fair to ask whether the
reasons, or at least the figuratively comparable reasons, courts
tweak text and make substantive stretches on behalf of human
rights apply as well to "states' rights." It would seem that if federal
liberty is to become part of our federalism, it is incumbent upon its
supporters to offer some underlying theory for it."'
480. See CHOPER, supra note 458, at 258 (arguing that the Court should preserve its
"precious capital for those cases in which it is really needed-where individual, usually
poorly represented and unpopular, rights are at stake").
481. Although I agree that those who would deprive "states' rights" of any judicial review
whatsoever bear the burden of demonstrating why this should be so, it seems equally clear
that those who wish to argue that states have "fundamental" rights should bear the burden
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1. Traditional Foundations of Federalism
The obvious place to begin this inquiry is with the generally
touted normative bases for federalism. As the Court stated in
Gregory, the separate existence and independence of states "assures
a decentralized government that will be more sensitive to the
diverse needs of a heterogenous society; it increases opportunity for
citizen involvement in democratic processes; ... and it makes
government more responsive by putting the States in competition
for a mobile citizenry."" 2 Indeed, it is difficult to defend federalism
without resorting to these sorts of arguments. As even strong
defenders of a robust federalism concede, "states' rights have no
independent value; their worth derives entirely from their utility in
enhancing the freedom and welfare of individuals.""3
It is difficult to see how the fundamental "states' rights" of
internal ordering, equality, autonomy, and due process can be
defended on these terms. To be sure, the states' continued existence
may further each of these goals. States' existence, however, is not
in doubt; it is preserved as a sovereign right. The sovereign rights
of states directly serve the traditional interests of federalism. By
ensuring that states exist, form their own governments, participate
in the political process, and have an opportunity to interpret their
own laws, the Constitution itself advances the principal interests
of federalism. The Tenth Amendment adds a potentially significant
further layer of protection for these sorts of interests. It encourages
careful attention to the enumeration of federal power, thereby
preserving state sovereign authority."4
It is increasingly difficult to see how granting states broad
immunity rights, protecting them from "commandeering" regardless
of circumstance, or granting them strong procedural safeguards,
will substantially serve any of the commonly invoked interests of
federalism. Indeed, insofar as the new "states' rights" implicate the
of demonstrating why this should be so. See Baker & Young, supra note 11, at 99 (arguing
that "critics of the Rehnquist Court's new federalism cases have a serious obligation to
explain why so many of them are willing to tolerate similar or even greater degrees of
judicial adventurism in the area of substantive due process").
482. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991).
483. Baker & Young, supra note 11, at 135 (emphasis added).
484. See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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traditional benefits of federalism, particularly the protection of
individual liberty, they appear to be largely counter-productive. In
the most general sense, it may be that prohibiting Congress to
waive state immunity, commandeer state officials, or fashion broad
remedies for state civil rights transgressions, serves the overarch-
ing cause of individual liberty by stifling congressional exercises of
power. This does not necessarily ensure, however, that individual
liberty will be enhanced in either the short or the long term. For
one thing, each of the fundamental "rights" of states is actually in
conflict with the claims and liberties of individuals, sometimes
citizens of the very state that benefits from the newly discovered
fundamental right." 5 For example, the fundamental rights of states
to "due process" often prevent Congress from addressing national
problems of discrimination under Section 5 or from otherwise
abrogating the states' right to immunity from private lawsuits, thus
again placing states' interests ahead of private claims of liberty and
justice. In this sense, federal liberty is expressly anti-utilitarian,
even selfish in nature. It posits that states' interests prevail not
only over national interests, but in some cases even over the
interests of state citizens themselves.
Further, although it is not at this moment possible to demon-
strate empirically that the discovery of fundamental "states'
rights" will actually lead to a net diminution of personal liberties,
logic supports such a claim. Indeed, in a federal system in which
Congress cannot enlist state officials to assist in enforcing its
policies, the most natural result is an expansion of the federal
bureaucracy and the federal legal regime. It is difficult, therefore,
to understand how forcing Congress to expand the federal bureau-
cracy in order to enforce federal statutes will ultimately protect
either state or individual liberties. States will labor under the
preemptive power of federal laws, and they and their citizens will
face an expanding federal bureaucracy. The continual discovery of
fundamental "states' rights" will, in the long term, work directly
against the liberty interests federalism is said to support: it will
diminish cooperation, wrest potential enforcement actions from
485. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Does Federalism Advance Liberty?, 47 WAYNE L. REV. 911,
913-14 (2001) (arguing that federalism decisions of the past decade have been "rights
regressive").
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state and local officials, and lead to an ever larger federal presence.
In sum, the lines being drawn on behalf of "states' rights" today are
far less likely to result in increased citizen freedom tomorrow.
Most of the fundamental "states' rights" that the Court has
recently discovered-particularly the rights to equality, autonomy,
and process-are not generally grounded upon advancing individual
liberty, but rather upon enhancing the stature of states. Enhancing
state stature does not necessarily lead to the advancement of
individual liberty. Indeed, as it discovers and enforces fundamental
"states' rights," the Court invokes traditional federalism justifica-
tions less and less; it relies instead more and more on dignitary and
other status-type interests as justifications for "states' rights." e6 As
a result, the Court leaves the impression that it is "pointlessly
favoring the states with exemptions from the rule of law."487 Federal
liberty, as the Court is enforcing it, sends the message that states
are somehow more worthy than individuals who, for example, have
no choice but to answer lawsuits against them. It thus generally
supports the notion that states "acquire a life and interests
independent of those conferred upon them by the people" and "rests
in tension with the notion that states are mere creatures of and
subservient to the truly sovereign people."4s
In sum, fundamental "states' rights" federalism does not tend to
advance the usual foundational principles of federalism. Indeed, the
discovery of these new, absolute rights would appear to do little to
either add to the diversity of statehood or to enhance individual
liberties. The positioning of states as uber-persons appears to have
more to do with enhancing states as states than with enhancing
individual liberties.
486. See Althouse, supra note 36, at 246 (noting "how the theme of deference to the states
has drifted from normative, structural analysis to a states' rights approach"); see also Erwin
Chemerinsky, The Values of Federalism, 47 FLA. L. REV. 499,501 (1995) (noting "the absence
of discussion in the Supreme Court's federalism cases about the underlying values of
federalism").
487. Althouse, supra note 36, at 246.
488. Caminker, supra note 36, at 86.
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2. Morality and Fundamental Rights
The rights of states ultimately must stand, then, on their own
bottom. They must be defended, like fundamental individual rights
are defended, as worthy of protection against federal encroachment
come what may. As Ronald Dworkin states: "The nerve of a claim
of right ... is that an individual is entitled to protection against the
majority even at the cost of the general interest."48 What would
such a justification, however, even look like where states are
concerned? To inform this inquiry, let us consult some justifications
commonly advanced on behalf of fundamental individual rights,
namely, morality and individuality.
One of the most prominent theoretical underpinnings for
fundamental personal rights is morality. As Dworkin has argued,
fundamental human rights derive from the concept of the moral
person. 9 Dworkin posits that the Framers assumed that the
personal rights granted by the Bill of Rights "could be justified by
appeal to moral rights that individuals possess against the
majority, and which the constitutional provisions, both 'vague' and
precise, might be said to recognize and protect."49' The same
observation might be made with respect to the fundamental rights
persons are said to enjoy under the Due Process Clause, the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
or other "vague" constitutional provisions. As Dworkin stated: "Our
constitutional system rests on a particular moral theory, namely
that men have moral rights against the state."492 "A claim of right,"
he posited, "presupposes a moral argument and can be established
in no other way.'
93
This sets disputes about individual rights apart from other
political disputes, including those relating to federalism. To be sure,
largely as a result of Anti-Federalist advocacy on behalf of the
states as "moral persons," states can stake something like a moral
489. DWORKIN, supra note 413, at 146; see id. at 139 (explaining that "a man has a moral
right against the state if for some reason the state would do wrong to treat him in a certain
way, even though it would be in the general interest to do so").
490. See id. at 10-11 (describing the moral basis for legal rules).
491. Id. at 133.
492. Id. at 147.
493. Id.
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claim to their preservation, separateness, and political rights. When
they parted with aspects of their sovereignty upon joining the
Union, the states expected in return some degree of physical
security and independence. This is a far cry, however, from
positioning states as full "moral persons." The contract of federation
cannot be stretched so far as to claim that states can demand, with
moral force, the fundamental rights of equality, autonomy, or due
process. States, as states, lack not only morality, but anything of
similar gravity that might bestow upon them claims to such strong,
preemptive rights. States are constructs; their worth derives from
their utility and function, not their status or morality.
This is why the states cannot lay claim, in any meaningful sense,
to such essentially human characteristics as "dignity" and "esteem."
It is precisely because individuals are moral persons that govern-
ment must "treat its citizens with the respect and dignity that adult
members of the community claim from each other."494 Each person
has a claim to "equal respect as an individual."4 95 These are
fundamental values where human rights are concerned. Again, as
Dworkin has explained:
It makes sense to say that a man has a fundamental right
against the Government, in the strong sense, like free speech, if
that right is necessary to protect his dignity, or his standing as
equally entitled to concern and respect, or some other personal
value of like consequence. It does not make sense otherwise."
Things like dignity and respect lie at the core of personhood; they
buttress our claims to the most basic human rights. Moral
philosophers like Kant have explained that "there are ways of
treating a man that are inconsistent with recognizing him as a full
member of the human community."49 7 This is one of the most
powerful reasons for recognizing such fundamental human rights
as privacy, equality, liberty, and autonomy.
494. Id. at 11.
495. Id. at 13.
496. Id. at 199.
497. See id. at 198 (discussing the "powerful idea of human dignity," an idea associated
with Kant).
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What does any of this, however, have to do with the fundamental
rights of states? Can it really be contended that subjecting a state
to private lawsuits before administrative agencies,49 s or enlisting
the aid of its executive officials for the briefest of time in the service
of important national ends,4 is profoundly or gravely unjust?
Disrespect for states' sovereign status is, one must concede, rather
trivial in comparison to disrespect or disregard for a person's status
as fully human. Besides, states' inferior sovereignty does not stem
from any assaultive federal act. States are, by conscious constitu-
tional design, inferior sovereigns with residual powers. Our
Constitution does not presently recognize the notion that any
individual is morally or otherwise "inferior." Indeed, it expressly
preserves, in the strongest of terms, individuals' equality under the
law.' By contrast, the Constitution not only recognizes the inferior
sovereignty of states, but also expressly enshrines it in the Suprem-
acy Clause.5° 1 The upshot, then, is this: insofar as the Constitution
is concerned, not all sovereignties are equal, or of equal concern.
Concepts like state "dignity" and "esteem" are merely judicial
constructs designed to artificially inflate statehood.
3. Individuality, Normalization, and Supremacy
Alternatively, we might consider the Court's approach to
fundamental "states' rights," beginning with National League of
Cities, as an attempt to define the core aspects or attributes of
statehood in a manner similar to judicial efforts to define the core
aspects of personhood. As Jed Rubenfeld has pointed out, however,
focusing on "core," "essential," or "inherent" attributes is not a very
fruitful way to conceptualize fundamental rights. 2 This leads
inevitably to charges of judicial subjectivity, which have been
answered only incompletely, whether one speaks in terms of the
498. See, e.g., Fed. Mar. Coinm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760 (2002)
(stating that abrogation of state immunity from proceedings before a federal regulatory
agency violates state "dignity").
499. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898,914 (1997) (asserting that state executive
officials cannot be "commandeer[ed]" to enforce federal law).
500. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
501. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
502. See Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737 (1989) (examining
the "positive aspect" of privacy).
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rights of persons or the rights of states, by the Court's reliance upon
history and tradition. The Garcia Court forcefully expressed this
concern with regard to the "inherent" rights of states.0 3
Perhaps it is more meaningful to ask, as Professor Rubenfeld has,
what it is about the government's efforts to regulate that leads the
Court to announce that a right is "fundamental."50 4 Put differently,
what is the government seeking to produce by compliance with the
law? 5 Professor Rubenfeld posits that there are two characteristics
stemming from governmental regulations that cause some rights to
be defined as fundamental. The first is the extent to which the
regulation occupies the lives of the persons regulated. Anti-
abortion, 06 anti-miscegenation,0 7 and compulsory education0 8
laws, therefore, "tend to take over the lives of the persons involved:
they occupy and preoccupy."50 9 Moreover, "[tihese laws do not
simply proscribe one act or remove one liberty; they inform the
totality of a person's life."510 The second characteristic shared by
such laws is that they attempt, often through such near-total
occupation, to standardize individuals. These laws "all involve the
forcing of lives into well-defined and highly confined institutional
layers."5 1
1
Supposed federal encroachments on "fundamental" attributes of
state sovereignty do not implicate these sorts of concerns. They are,
if anything, trivial in comparison to the all-encompassing nature
of laws that have been invalidated as violating individual rights
like privacy or liberty. The specific Brady Act provisions at issue
in Printz, for example, had little more than symbolic significance
in terms of the states' continued existence. The Act would have
effected only a ministerial, and temporary, use of state law
503. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 543-44 (1995).
504. See Rubenfeld, supra note 502, at 751.
505. See id.
506. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
507. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
508. See Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923).
509. Rubenfeld, supra note 502, at 784.
510. Id.; see also id. at 787 ("Privacy takes its stand at the outer boundaries of the
legitimate exercise of state power. It is to be invoked only where the government threatens
to take over or occupy our lives-to exert its power in some way over the totality of our
lives.").
511. Id. at 784.
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enforcement officials. 12 Laws abrogating state immunity from
private suits, although certainly an inconvenience for states, also
fail to approach total or near-total occupation of state functions.
The fundamental rights of states are not the sort of defense
against "creeping totalitarianism" or "unarmed occupation" that has
animated, if not justified, judicial discovery of controversial rights
to privacy and autonomy for individuals.51 State existence and
independence have not been truly threatened by any of the federal
laws the Court has invalidated as contrary to the fundamental
rights of states.
The concern over normalization or standardization does not
resonate here either. Fundamental human rights are vitally
important to individual self-development. As John Stuart Mill, who
wrote most eloquently about the freedom of speech, stated, "the
free development of individuality is one of the leading essentials
of well-being." 14 We want human beings to have "vigour" and to be
"energetic" in the exercise of their rights so that they may reach
their full potential, what Mill called their "originality."' 5 We want
persons to be free to make important choices about their own lives,
interests, and beliefs. In sum, we believe in personal uniqueness
and see value in preserving it.
It might be argued that granting states fundamental rights will
permit them, like persons, to have individuality and diversity. As
noted above, however, the fundamental rights of states that have
been recognized thus far are not designed to further these sorts of
interests. Shielding states from lawsuits and "commandeering," or
providing them with substantial procedural guarantees in connec-
tion with a federal "charge" of discrimination, may enhance state
freedom in a general sense. The fundamental right to equality
certainly provides states with, for example, a choice as to whether
512. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 904-05 (1997).
513. Rubenfeld, supra note 502, at 785.
514. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 57 (Stefan Collini ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1989)
(1859) (emphasis added).
515. Id. at 58, 61. Of course, utilitarian arguments are sometimes made in defense of
human rights. With respect to the right to freedom of speech, for example, exposure to a
marketplace of ideas will at least theoretically benefit us all by, among other things, bringing
us closer to truth. Rights are not, however, only, or even principally, about the benefit they
provide to others.
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to submit to citizen lawsuits in a particular forum. In other words,
it frees states from the burden of regulation.
This right, like rights to internal ordering, autonomy, and due
process, however, does very little to advance state originality or
individuality. State "fundamental rights" are not designed to free
states, for example, to come up with novel policies or social
experiments. They do not somehow bring local government closer
to the people. In addition, it is safe to say that no one will choose to
live in a state based upon whether the state is immune from
damage actions. State fundamental rights thus have nothing
whatsoever to do with enhancing state uniqueness or individuality.
Again, the rights of states seem designed to enhance state dignity
and esteem for their own sake, without regard to any larger interest
or purpose.516
States are not individuals with free will and rights expectations
whose originality must be protected, even at the expense of local
citizens' rights or broad national interests. One would not know this
from reading the recent "states' rights" precedents. For example, in
Florida Prepaid, the Court emphasized that Congress cannot
stereotype states by making waiver of their right to immunity
contingent upon certain activity, such as non-traditional market
participation.517 The Court suggested, in reasoning reminiscent of
516. There is a rudimentary sense in which the very notion of "individuality," as critical
as it may be with regard to persons, does not comport with the most basic concept of
statehood. States, unlike persons and unlike other entities, such as corporations, which have
been granted certain constitutional rights, are not mere participants in marketplaces,
whether of products or ideas. Although states certainly can act in this capacity, such
behavior is an exception to the usual sovereign capacity in which states act. See, e.g., Hughes
v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976) (drawing a distinction between states as
market participants and states as market regulators); see also Mark P. Gergen, The Selfish
State and the Market, 66 TEL L. REv. 1097, 1106-07 (1988) (discussing the distinction
between state as sovereign and state as market participant). Nor are states separate units
of free will with a variety of rights expectations. They are sovereigns with limited powers and
limited rights. States owe their very existence to the governed. They exist principally to
serve, not to pursue originality and self-fulfillment. States' self-development is no more a
constitutionally protected interest than is the self-fulfillment of the President or individual
members of Congress. In sum, the states, no less than Congress and the President, are not
empowered to selfishly pursue their own interests and individuality. States, as states, can
make no personal constitutional claim to originality and individuality. They can make a
claim only to diversity and individuality insofar as these things enhance individual liberties.
517. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 666,
691 (1999).
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its doctrine of gender equality, that this would force states into
stereotypical roles or functions.51 Justice Scalia has also objected
to Congress treating the states as a homogenous group under
Section 5, a practice he labels, again in an express reference to
individual rights, "guilt by association."519 This sort of reasoning
treats states as prideful rights-bearers, fully capable of feeling
affronted, repressed, and stigmatized.
This sort of mocked-up sensitivity in the name of state "individ-
uality" and "states' rights" is unprecedented. It is also contrary to
the "constitutional plan" the Court now routinely invokes on behalf
of fundamental "states' rights." The constitutional difference
between civil liberty and federal liberty with regard to interests in
"individuality" is patently clear: Congress is expressly empowered
by the Supremacy Clause in particular, and by the structure of
government in general, including the provision of express powers
like those granted in the Commerce Clause 20 and Section 5,521 to
normalize and standardize the states. It may preempt their laws in
whole or in part; it may consent to some or all state laws that might
otherwise violate the Constitution; and it may encourage and cajole
the states to accept federal goals and policies by promises of
substantial funding. Congress, in short, is expressly authorized to
pursue unity and standardization with respect to the states. By
virtue of its special relationship with the states, it may extend its
reach well beyond the boundaries that govern the relationship
between government and citizen.
In sum, there exist a number of sound reasons for rejecting
a rights regime for states that have nothing to do with mere
value preferences or prejudices against "states' rights" per se. The
fundamental rights of states fail to serve traditional interests of
federalism, such as enhancement of individual liberty. Further,
states, unlike persons, have no valid moral claims to fundamental
rights. By constitutional design, states possess basic sovereign
rights. As constructs, they do not have "natural" rights. States have
not in any way been threatened with the sort of occupation or
dominance that has given rise to various individual fundamental
518. See id.
519. Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 741 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
520. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 13, cl. 3.
521. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
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rights. Finally, as inferior sovereigns, states' interests must often
yield to federal and constitutional interests in standardization. The
Constitution manifests this reality in plain terms.522
E. The Negative Implications of Negative State Liberties
The fundamental "states' rights" the Court has recently discov-
ered obviously improve the status of statehood. These rights elevate
states from inferior sovereigns with inferior powers to proud and
respected bearers of constitutional rights. This puffing of statehood
will not, of course, tear the Nation asunder or lead us toward a civil
war. It is not as dangerous in that respect as certain prior "states'
rights" movements. There is no call, for example, for secession or
nullification of federal laws.
The negative implications of these various negative state liberties
are substantial nevertheless. There are three principal negative
effects that will flow from a fundamental rights-based federal
liberty. The first, and perhaps most troubling, is a loss of critical
institutional flexibility. As the Court alters its principal focus from
sovereign power to fundamental "states' rights," legislative and
judicial institutional flexibility inevitably will be lost or diminished.
A broad commerce power, for instance, permits Congress to fashion
remedies for national problems. It allows for a flexible response to
changing circumstances. Policing the margins of such power likely
will have a minimal effect on legislative flexibility, particularly if
that policing takes the form of incremental common law enforce-
ment. Additionally, it will leave the courts free to make adjust-
ments in future enforcement contexts.
By contrast, once a fundamental right has been discovered and
established, it is exceedingly difficult to narrow or jettison. Witness
in this regard the fundamental right to "privacy," or the fundamen-
tal right to "liberty" in matters of sexual intimacy. As the abortion
controversy demonstrates, courts have a devil of a time backtrack-
ing on fundamental rights. Individuals' reliance on these rights
forms quickly, and it tends to be passionate. Further, the recogni-
tion of one fundamental right can have a ripple effect on other
522. U.S. CONST. art. VI, c. 2.
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rights. As the Court noted in Casey, where arguments to abandon
the right to abortion were expressly advanced:
[Flor two decades ... people have organized intimate relation-
ships and made choices that define their views of themselves
and their places in society, in reliance on the availability of
abortion in the event that contraception should fail. The ability
of women to participate equally in the economic and social life
of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their
reproductive lives.5"3
Fundamental "states' rights" similarly constrain legislative and
judicial flexibility. In fact, many of these rights are even stronger
than individual fundamental rights. They tend to be absolute in
character. Unlike individual fundamental rights, the state rights of
immunity and autonomy appear to admit of no limitations or
exceptions.524 Regardless of the interests of the national community,
these rights cannot be encroached upon by Congress.525 Most of the
new "states' rights" are of this winner-takes-all variety, rather than
the products of political compromise and dialogue. 26 There is no
room for future constriction, despite whatever may occur. The only
way for the Court to reverse course is to overrule the "states' rights"
precedents, a course not inconceivable (recall National League of
Cities and Garcia) but nevertheless highly unlikely with the
passage of time and the expansion of already-recognized rights.
Institutional flexibility is critical to state-federal relations. Civil
liberty and federal liberty differ in the effect each is likely to have
on this aspect of federalism. An expansive ruling with respect to
the rights of individuals is not likely to affect, in any substantial
manner, the operations of government. The right to engage in
homosexual intimacy, for example, simply means that the govern-
523. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992).
524. These rights may even trump powers exercised in the area of foreign affairs. See
Flaherty, supra note 370, at 1280 (disagreeing with other scholars and arguing that "federal
foreign affairs authority does and should trump the prohibition against the national
government enlisting state officials").
525. See GLENDON, supra note 376, at 12 (asserting that rights "tend to be presented as
absolute, individual, and independent of any necessary relation to responsibilities").
526. See id. at 9 ("[In its simple American form, the language of rights is the language of
no compromise. The winner takes all and the loser has to get out of town. The conversation
is over.").
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ment cannot spend its resources prosecuting individuals for
consensual sexual activity that takes place within their homes. By
itself, this is a relatively narrow contraction of governmental power.
Interpreting "states' rights" broadly, or absolutely as the Court has
preferred, has a far more substantial effect on legislative efficiency
and flexibility. Where Congress cannot "commandeer" state officials
or subject states to suits by private parties, it must necessarily
resort to the federal bureaucracy and federal agencies to pursue its
objectives. The practical consequences of such absolute limitations
are less flexibility, a larger federal bureaucracy, and, most likely,
less overall enforcement than would be possible if states and
private parties could be enlisted to assist.
As Justice Breyer stated in his dissent in Federal Maritime
Commission: "An overly restrictive judicial interpretation of the
Constitution's structural constraints (unlike its protections of
certain basic liberties) will undermine the Constitution's own
efforts to achieve its far more basic structural aim, the creation of
a representative form of government capable of translating the
people's will into effective public action."527 History supports this
premise. If the arc of the commerce power teaches anything, it is
that judicial formalism is unworkable in the area of federalism.
Surely, one might respond, the relatively few substantive "rights"
that the states currently enjoy will have little overall effect on
governmental flexibility. We are, in any event, only at the beginning
of the modern "states' rights" movement. There is no indication that
the Court is prepared to end this experiment with the discovery of
"rights" to intimate ordering, equality, autonomy, and process. Not
being bound by text, but rather only by such things as "background
principles," the Court may well discover other new rights. Just over
a decade ago, after all, few would have imagined the discovery of a
fundamental state right to physical autonomy.
What other fundamental rights might be awaiting discovery? It
is, for example, a matter of some dispute at this moment whether
the states enjoy a right to free speech."' If in fact it is determined
527. Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 787 (2002) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
528. Some courts have held that state entities do not enjoy free speech rights. See, e.g.,
Student Gov't Ass'n v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Mass., 868 F.2d 473, 481 (1st Cir. 1989) (noting
that "a state entity ... itself has no First Amendment rights"). But cf Am. Meat Inst. v. Ball,
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that they do, then we can expect arguments on behalf of states that
federal regulations of various sorts infringe their First Amendment
expressive rights. If they have speech rights, then perhaps states
also will come to enjoy a species of the right to "free association"
that permits them to discriminate against neighboring states in
ways currently proscribed. Perhaps, in fact, states will ultimately
enjoy a right to choose with whom they shall associate, suggesting
that, like persons, they are "connected to others only by choice."5
To take one final example, there is no question that the states have
at least a limited right not to be "mentally" coerced by federal
laws.530 If that is so, the Court may be poised to rethink Congress's
coercive power under the Spending Clause as well, which thus far
has been treated as "plenary."
531
Of course, recognition of these rights would require a significant
rethinking of current doctrine, particularly the principles of the
dormant Commerce and Spending Clauses. This seems to be no
deterrent. The Court has demonstrated its willingness to remake
federalism in radical ways over the course of the past two
decades, even in contexts in which federal power was once
deemed "plenary."532 Perhaps all of these rights will be recognized;
perhaps none of them will. Without meaningful limits, we shall
have to wait and see. With each new right, however, Congress's
authority and flexibility in dealing with the states will be apprecia-
bly diminished, as will the courts' own ability to act flexibly.
The second principal negative effect that will be associated with
the discovery of federal liberties is both symbolically and substan-
tively important. As the reference to possible additional "states'
rights" suggests, federal liberty as a trend implies the ascendance
of a creeping compact theory of government. We tend to think of
rights as individualized possessions. The states, by contrast, are
usually regarded as a unit, at least insofar as Congress relates to
them. It would be difficult for Congress to relate to states other-
424 F. Supp. 758,770 (W.D. Mich. 1976) (assuming, without deciding, that states may assert
free speech rights to resist federal regulations).
529. GLENDON, supra note 376, at 48.
530. See supra Part II.B.3.b (discussing "coerced" waivers of state immunity).
531. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203,208 (1987) (upholding a spending condition
premised upon adoption of a minimum drinking age).
532. See supra Part II.B (discussing new "states' rights" limiting Congress's commerce and
Section 5 powers).
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wise, given its overarching obligation to fashion national solutions.
As "rights talk" increases with regard to states, however, we begin
to see arguments that stress the inherent separateness of states.
We hear in these arguments echoes of the Anti-Federalists' compact
theory of the Constitution-that "the Nation [is] a collection of
States" rather than a cohesive national unit.
533
Consider, for example, Justice Scalia's argument in Hibbs that
states cannot be subjected to lawsuits based upon "guilt by associa-
tion," but are entitled, like persons, to contest Congress's remedial
enactments individually. 4 This would mean, in the civil rights
context, that federal legislation enacted to remedy or prevent a
widespread evil would be subject to invalidation by any individual
state with respect to which Congress has not satisfied the burden
of proving a pattern of discriminatory conduct. The most likely
result, assuming Congress does not, or cannot, alter its standard
procedures for the enactment of federal legislation, may well be that
the law goes largely unenforced. Federal liberty thus would likely
constrain Congress from legislating with the broad brush necessary
to confront national evils like discrimination. 5 The more states are
considered to be rights-bearers, the more common these sorts of
arguments are likely to become. The more common they become, the
more Congress must begin to consider states as individual units,
and deal with them in this capacity. That is a fundamentally
altered dynamic for federalism, one that Congress does not appear
to be prepared to accept or accommodate.
In this sense, at least, the new "states' rights" is much like its
predecessors. It presents a possible schism or fault-line with states
arrayed against national interests, only this time armed with an
533. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 803 (1995).
534. See Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 741-42 (2003) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
535. Section 5 legislation does not assign guilt or liability to individual states. Congress
passes Section 5 legislation based upon general rules of conduct and findings of national
interests and evils of the sort it typically makes. It has historically been granted substantial
deference as to its findings, as well as its chosen remedies. See South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 330 (1966) ("Congress is clearly not bound by the rules relating
to statutory presumptions in criminal cases when it prescribes civil remedies against other
organs of government under § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment."). Casting states as individual
wrongdoers thus misinterprets the institutional function of Congress under Section 5 and
similar grants of power.
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expanding array of strong rights trumps. The Court has on many
occasions, and in myriad contexts, encouraged an attitude of
national unity rather than selfish state concern. Dormant Com-
merce Clause doctrine, for example, is based upon the central
premise that the states "sink or swim together." 6 The new federal
liberty ignores that fundamental admonition.
This leads to the third, and final, principal negative effect of
federal liberty, one that is only now beginning to materialize. As
noted in the Introduction, "states' rights" has been as much a
political rallying cry or ideological sound bite as a coherent
constitutional doctrine. We can, in terms of doctrine, safely ignore
politically expedient uses of the phrase. As "states' rights" gains a
constitutional foothold, however, it gains a certain legitimacy that
signals something to state officials, as well as to courts. Where state
power affects individual rights, for example, it suggests that the
strongest defense to a claim of individual right is not a claim to
sovereign power, but a claim of a countervailing state "right." This
creates a clash of rights rather than a situation in which a state
power has potentially invaded a fundamental individual right.
Consider in this respect the recent decision of the Eleventh
Circuit in Lofton v. Secretary of the Department of Children and
Family Services.s" In Lofton, the court upheld a state statute that
prohibits "practicing homosexuals" from adopting children. 3B
Despite any lack of federal involvement whatsoever, the court
described this as a "states' rights issue." 9 What the court appar-
ently meant was that the state, with respect to the adoption
decision, essentially acted as a parent with regard to all of the
putative adoptee children within its control. State-as-parent implies
that the state is vested with all of the fundamental rights and
privileges associated with parenthood.5" In exercising those
"rights," the court indicated that the state was entitled to make
distinctions it otherwise would not be permitted to make under its
536. See Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511,523 (1935) ("The Constitution ... was
framed upon the theory that the peoples of the several states must sink or swim together,
and that in the long run prosperity and salvation are in union and not division.").
537. 358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 2004).
538. Id. at 806.
539. Id.
540. See id. at 809-11.
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traditional police power, including, as the court held, distinctions
based solely upon sexual orientation. 41 Merely characterizing the
state's adoption regime as implicating a "states' rights issue" thus
had the effect of nullifying an individual right to be free from
discrimination. As federal liberty takes hold, we are quite likely to
see many more examples of this sort of invocation of "states' rights."
The lesson of federal liberty, after all, is that rights are a powerful
substitute for ever-waning state power.
In sum, there are substantial negative effects that result from the
discovery and enforcement of negative state liberties. Federal
liberty undermines the structural flexibility needed in federal-state
relations. The ultimate extent to which "states' rights" will diminish
institutional flexibility remains to be seen. As Justice Breyer warns,
however, federal liberty has no "logical stopping point."542 Further,
as federal liberty becomes stronger, we speak less in terms of
community and nation, and states will be considered and dealt with
more as rights-bearing units. The compact theory thus retains a
vital foothold in the federalism debate. Finally, as it gains accep-
tance and resonates in the states and in the courts, the malleable
concept of "states' rights" will be utilized in creative ways to nullify
individual rights in a variety of contexts. As federal liberty gains
strength and momentum, therefore, individual rights are likely to
be compromised still further.
IV. THE FUTURE OF FEDERAL LIBERTY
As noted, courts are faced with three principal paths when it
comes to federalism. First, they might, as Garcia suggests,
essentially abandon the area.54 They might, instead, concentrate
on defining limits on federal enumerated powers. Finally, courts
might, as the Supreme Court has done, discover and enforce
fundamental "states' rights."
This Article has argued that the fundamental "states' rights"
approach to federal liberty is seriously flawed. The movement
541. See id. at 817 (holding that Lawrence did not create a fundamental right to adopt for
homosexual persons).
542. Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 788 (2002) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
543. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 545-46 (1995).
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toward fundamental "states' rights," which began with National
League of Cities, suffers from substantial methodological, theoreti-
cal, and other infirmities. It should, once again, be abandoned.
Despite the difficulties with a fundamental rights-based federal-
ism, there are sufficient concerns with regard to the exercise of an
ever-burgeoning federal power that suggest that states' interests
should not be entrusted solely or exclusively to the vagaries of the
political process. States, because of their diminishing relative
power, are not able to defend themselves against some federal
encroachments with which courts should be concerned. This Article
thus would not support the first path above, namely, judicial
abandonment of federalism.
Heightened and aggressivejudicial scrutinywould be appropriate
insofar as any federal action were to deny or substantially abridge
the sovereign rights of states to existence, separateness, or political
participation. "[C]ongressional abolition of state legislatures (or,
possibly, preemption of all state law enforcement)," therefore, would
plainly be prohibited.544 The Constitution guarantees at least this
much to states.
The question is not, however, how to deal with these and other
most unlikely federal encroachments on state sovereignty. The
issue is how to approach the far more common encroachments that
result from the exercise of plenary federal powers. Whenever an
institution as powerful as Congress acts, substantial intrusions are
a real possibility. Beyond taking care to protect the core sovereign
rights of states, there is valuable symbolic significance to maintain-
ing some judicial vigilance insofar as federalism is concerned. As
Vicki Jackson has argued, informing Congress and others that
states will not be wholly abandoned is a powerful symbolic state-
ment about the basic structure of our Constitution.545 Moreover, as
Professor Jackson also suggests, declaring federalism to be wholly
unenforceable does not sit well with our conception of the rule of
law. 46 In a government of limited powers, Congress, just like
544. Jackson, supra note 438, at 2255.
545. See id. at 2183 (arguing that by protecting the states' right to exist, courts would
prevent states from having to resort to physical force to defend themselves).
546. Id. at 2224.
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everyone and everything else, must be told that it has some
limits.5 7
If we are to abandon the methods and philosophy of fundamental
"states' rights," however, what shall we use in its place? In
substantial measure, the answer is that we should utilize the tools
that pre-existed the ascendance of a literal, preemptive "states'
rights" federalism. We seem to have drifted far from some basic
principles where federal power is concerned. Specifically, one of the
casualties of the fundamental "states' rights" movement has been
the longstanding presumption of constitutionality afforded federal
enactments. There is a "strong presumption of constitutionality due
to an Act of Congress, especially when it turns on what is 'reason-
able.'""' In the current climate, it is all too easy to forget that in
most instances, when courts interpret Congress's enumerated
powers, reasonableness is all that is required. This does not call for
aggressive, strict judicial review. Nor, as argued below, does it lead
inevitably to judicial abandonment of the states. Restoring the
presumption, and the deferential attitude that has traditionally
accompanied it, is only a modest first step. This must be part of a
broader turning of the ship of federalism back toward a dynamic
that measures and distributes powers rather than boldly discovers
state rights. It is too late in the day for this approach to be adopted
insofar as individual liberty is concerned. It is not, however, too late
for the Court to turn its back on a rights-based federal liberty.
As noted, even the old "states' rights" proponents recognized that
the principal paradigm of federalism is one that looks to the scope
of Congress's enumerated powers when seeking to determine
whether the federal-state balance has been improperly upset. 49
This distributive paradigm treats state power as the Constitution
intends, namely as residual and derivative. The scope of enumer-
ated federal powers thus should be the focus of inquiry in federal-
state clashes that do not implicate the core sovereign rights of
states. The fact that it is a state that has been regulated, or
"affronted," ought to make no constitutional difference. If the courts
547. Id. at 2228 ("To make the political safeguards of federalism work, some sense of
enforceable lines must linger.").
548. United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 585 (1948).
549. See supra Part III.A.2 (discussing historical anomaly of current "states' rights"
approach).
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want to limit Congress, then let them do so by constraining the
scope of its commerce and other enumerated powers, not by
discovering an ever-expanding list of fundamental "states' rights."
The distributive approach should govern whether the power at
issue is the regulation of commerce, or bankruptcy, or relates to
patents or spending. If the Court wishes to rein in federal authority,
whether to protect citizens or states, or both, it should do so by
enforcing real limits on these powers. Such limits would be far more
likely to enhance overall individual liberty than would the contin-
ued discovery of inherent "states' rights." They would do so in a
manner that does not raise the specter of judicial favoritism of
states as states.
The focus on power has been increasingly diminished by the
discovery of fundamental "states' rights." It is all too easy to forget
that the Eleventh Amendment speaks to judicial power. 50 It is not
a general placeholder for unenumerated "states' rights." If a federal
enactment does not impermissibly add to the judicial power by
authorizing a suit outside its terms, then it ought to be permitted.
If there is a need for broader protection for the states' right to
sovereign equality, then let the Constitution be amended to provide
for it.
Similarly, nothing in the text of Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment so much as hints at any procedural limitation on the
powers granted therein."' So long as Congress appropriately seeks
to enforce the Reconstruction Amendments, it is permitted to act.
Now, it is surely proper for the Court to ensure that Congress does
not seek to overrule specific Court precedents expressly through
exercise of this power.5 52 That sort of challenge to judicial power
must necessarily be answered. It is not, however, appropriate to
strictly scrutinize congressional power in all cases by enforcing a
state-friendly burden of proof and requiring that laws be narrowly
tailored. These are conventions associated with a rights regime, not
a distribution of constitutional powers.
550. See U.S. CONST. amend XI.
551. See U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 5.
552. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997) ("[T]he design of the
Amendment and the text of § 5 are inconsistent with the suggestion that Congress has the
power to decree the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment's restrictions on the States.").
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This focus on power might strike many as far too lenient with
regard to central authority. If this is so, it is largely because we
have become accustomed to the Court's discovery of "extrinsic"
constitutional limits on Congress. The distributive model was, in
fact, the method used to enforce federalism before states became
persons, and prior to the constitutional recognition of such things
as state "dignity" and "autonomy" as constitutionally significant
interests.
As other scholars have pointed out, and as this Article discussed
in Part III, resort to the traditional distributive paradigm does not
leave courts at sea in enforcing federalism.5" Although courts
cannot legitimately discover separate state enclaves, fundamental
rights, or inherent attributes of statehood, this Article agrees that
'lilt is possible to identify greater and lesser degrees of connection
between enumerated powers and regulated conduct."554
The path of the commerce power demonstrates that if courts are
expert at anything at all in the area of federalism, it is the calibra-
tion of power based upon express rather than loosely defined,
unenumerated implied constitutional limitations. The Court's
much-discussed recent commerce clause decisions-United States
v. Lopez555 and United States v. Morrison55 6-hold out the possibility
that federalism might be enforced incrementally and flexibly rather
than through the discovery of absolute "states' rights." Depending
on how they are ultimately interpreted by the courts, Lopez and
Morrison may be cause for some optimism that the common law
method can produce legitimate and meaningful substantive limits
on the commerce power.557
In those cases, the Court relied in part on a determination of
whether the activity that Congress sought to regulate was "com-
mercial" or "non-commercial" in nature .5 ' Neither activity--gun
553. See, e.g., Baker & Young, supra note 11, at 97 (arguing that courts can and should
use the distributive model).
554. Jackson, supra note 438, at 2233.
555. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
556. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
557. See Baker & Young, supra note 11, at 99 (arguing that Justice Souter's Glucksberg
concurrence "points the way toward how courts can overcome" the institutional liabilities in
both substantive due process and substantive federalism areas).
558. See id. at 97-98 (discussing Lopez and Morrison); see also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 565-67
(setting forth the commercial/non-commercial standard). There may, however, be less fluidity
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possession in Lopez nor gender-motivated violence in Morrison-
was considered to be the sort of commercial concern traditionally
within the ambit of the commerce power. Significantly, the Court
set forth no specific rules or definitions for future cases, seemingly
permitting the commercial/non-commercial standard to be
enforced incrementally, as future contexts warrant. This standard,
therefore, is a potentially promising example of a flexible, incremen-
tal approach to limiting federal power. It seems to suggest, in the
common law tradition, "an incremental process of inclusion and
exclusion."559
Lopez and Morrison might optimistically be interpreted as
utilizing flexible and incremental standards to enforce limits on
Congress's enumerated power to regulate interstate commerce. The
commercial/non-commercial standard announced in Lopez is one
way to police Congress's power without culling rigid "states' rights"
from structural penumbras. Where a regulated activity does not
appear to be of the type the commerce power has traditionally
encompassed, then there is reason for some skepticism regardless
of who or what is being regulated. This approach at least permits
an incrementalism that "states' rights" federalism refuses to
accommodate. Through this standard, the Court has essentially
informed Congress that there are margins at which it must justify
to some greater degree, although certainly not under strict judicial
scrutiny, the exercise of its power. In such cases the usual presump-
tion of constitutionality is not necessarily appropriate.
Application of this sort of standard is not as troubling from a
judicial competence standpoint as discovering some state "right"
that trumps federal power. This is so for two principal reasons.
First, this is the very sort of question that the text of the Commerce
Clause invites: Is the thing regulated even in the nature of a
commercial activity? Is it "commerce"? Second, as discussed
previously, the Court has much to draw upon in answering this sort
here than meets the eye. Lopez and Morrison may portend nothing more than a warning to
Congress to restrain its appetite for power. Or the cases may signal that there are
meaningful, judicially enforceable limits on the commerce power. There is, however, a third
possibility: these cases may signal an intention on the part of the Court to define state
enclaves of internal ordering rigidly by cordoning off "traditional" areas of state regulation.
See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564 (making reference to traditional areas like education and criminal
law).
559. Baker & Young, supra note 11, at 97.
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of question, and in presenting the reasoned judgment that the
common law requires. It may draw upon the whole commerce power
tradition, as it did in Lopez itself.560
There are, as well, interpretive aids other than the Tenth
Amendment for courts to rely upon in distributing sovereign power.
One interpretive guide that has long been neglected is the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause.56' Commentators have increasingly turned
to this clause of late as a possible source of limitations on Con-
gress's enumerated powers.6 2 Of course, basing a decision on what
is "necessary" or "proper" might fall prey to the same criticism
as "states' rights," namely, that it is insufficiently determinate.
That is a fair criticism, but at least the "necessary" and "proper"
standards point courts toward the right questions; for example,
"how the measure is connected to a federal power and whether
some necessity for federal regulation (above and beyond what the
states can do or are doing) has been identified."13
Importantly, this focus on power has the advantage of inviting a
consideration of context, specifically the federal and state interests
that are treated as relevant under a rights-based federalism. It
permits a flexibility that a rights-based approach to federalism
cannot tolerate because of its very nature. In so-called "comman-
deering" cases, for instance, the Necessary and Proper standard
might focus, as Professor Jackson has suggested, "both on the
reasons for the federal action and the degree of interference with
the performance of duties under state law.""' Courts might
consider such things as "the size of the burden or amount of state
time and resources needed to perform the federally mandated
tasks.""5 Not all federal directives thus would be deemed automati-
cally invalid; minor interferences, for example, could be distin-
560. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552-59 (reviewing commerce clause doctrine).
561. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
562. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 438, at 2243; see also Stephen Gardbaum, Rethinking
Constitutional Federalism, 74 TEX. L. REV. 795 (1996) (arguing that Congress's power to
preempt state law, as well as its authority to regulate local activity that affects interstate
commerce, is limited by the Necessary and Proper Clause).
563. Jackson, supra note 438, at 2245.
564. Id. at 2253.
565. Id.
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guished from more substantial ones, which might require a second
look.56
6
In this regard, at least, National League of Cities was not the
mistake it is often thought to be. The mistake of National League
was its formalism, the idea that the courts could identify the
"traditional state functions" that were off limits to federal author-
ity. The Court did not, however, ultimately adopt an absolute rights
approach. In fact, the Court was quite careful to point out that even
essential state functions might be regulated if an important
national interest demanded it.567 That is just the sort of flexible
response the new fundamental "states' rights" approach would not
permit.
The National League of Cities Court was correct to eschew
formalism, for as Professor Jackson states, "the demands of
federalism do not lend themselves to decontextualized, formalist
rulemaking by courts."' Yet today, neither the substantialness of
federal interests nor the actual burden on states make any
difference under New York, Printz, Alden, or Federal Maritime
Commission. Congress cannot commandeer, and it cannot abrogate
under its commerce power-period. Similarly, states' procedural
"rights," especially the requirement that Congress compile a
substantial legislative record of state violations under Section 5,
have generally been inflexibly applied. It is the rare federal
enactment that will satisfy the new due process trifecta of height-
ened record review, congruence, and proportionality.
Congress's enumerated powers call for a great deal more
flexibility than this approach allows. With regard to the right toimmunity, for example, even if courts refuse to limit the scope of
immunity to the terms set forth in the Eleventh Amendment, it
should not be enough to assert that a state is "affronted" by having
to defend itself in proceedings brought by individuals before an
administrative tribunal. There are other rights and powers to
consider in such cases, and there are consequences associated with
a right or principle that insists upon a bloated federal bureaucracy
566. See id. at 2253-54.
567. See Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 853 (1976) ("The limits imposed
upon the commerce power when Congress seeks to apply it to the States are not so inflexible
as to preclude temporary enactments tailored to combat a national emergency.").
568. Jackson, supra note 438, at 2254.
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for enforcement. Dignity, esteem, and respect are simply being
asked to do too much in the immunity doctrine, to the exclusion of
considerations of regulatory burden, efficiency, and other interests.
This is not the place for a detailed re-examination of all of the
recent federalism cases using a more flexible, power-driven
distributive approach. It suffices to state that extremes do not work
well where federalism is concerned. The goal, always elusive, is to
have courts take into consideration as many circumstances as
possible. "To be successful, federalism must be pragmatic and it
must be dynamic." 9 This obviously rules out fundamental "states'
rights" federalism. This Article, if only preliminarily and tenta-
tively, suggests some possible alternatives. There is no need for bold
proposals, as we already had a working paradigm for state and
federal power. It is time we considered returning to it.
CONCLUSION
States remain a constitutional enigma. Although their existence
is constitutionally recognized and protected, little beyond this is
certain. In part due to its indeterminacy, state sovereignty has
captured an enormous amount ofjudicial and scholarly attention of
late. In the courts, the ascension of states, from residuary beneficia-
ries of the scraps produced by the tautological Tenth Amendment
to joint sovereigns possessing constitutionally cognizable "dignity"
and "esteem," has been truly remarkable.
The phrase "states' rights" is often bandied about carelessly or
invoked as political expediency dictates. This Article has attempted
to clarify the constitutional meaning of "states' rights." It posits that
states currently enjoy two types of constitutional rights. States
possess certain core sovereign constitutional rights. Under the
Court's recent federalism doctrine, states have also amassed a
variety of fundamental constitutional rights. For each of these,
there is a fundamental individual rights analog. These "states'
rights"-of intimate ordering, equality, autonomy, and due process
-have risen from the purported penumbras and emanations of
federalism, as fundamental individual rights were found to exist
pursuant to what came to be known as "substantive due process."
569. Id. at 2228.
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Civil liberty and "federal liberty" are thus, as a descriptive
matter, cut from the same cloth. The Article argues, however, that
these two liberties differ in substantial respects. Sovereigns and
persons are not similarly situated insofar as constitutional rights
are concerned. The constitutional rights of sovereigns are few and
narrow; they essentially preserve a minimal level of state independ-
ence and autonomy. By contrast, the rights of individuals are many
and broad in character. States simply were not intended to be the
beneficiaries of rights trumps. They exercise power, and their
sovereign rights were to be preserved by attending to the
distribution of sovereign authority. Fundamental "states' rights"
is a misguided attempt, therefore, to treat states as "moral per-
sons." This Article has examined the methodological, theoretical,
and foundational distinctions that critically undermine a conception
of federalism based upon fundamental "states' rights." It has also
identified various negative effects that stem from the discovery and
enforcement of negative state liberties, not the least of which is the
loss of an institutional flexibility that had served federalism well.
For all of these reasons, the Article argues for prompt abandonment
of a federal liberty based upon the fundamental rights of states.
We need not search long or far for possible replacements.
Distributive federalism, which focuses more plausibly on the
calibration of power rather than the discovery of unenumerated
"states' rights," offers a far more legitimate and familiar methodol-
ogy than the Court's new version of "states' rights." It offers, among
other things, a path back to a federalism that values text, exhibits
flexibility, and respects institutional competencies. This is not a
comprehensive solution, but it is a tested way back to what
federalism once was, and what it could be again.
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